The impact of call auctions on China’s stock market liquidity and price quality by Zheng, Willa H
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
University of Wollongong Thesis Collection 
1954-2016 University of Wollongong Thesis Collections 
2016 
The impact of call auctions on China’s stock market liquidity and price 
quality 
Willa H. Zheng 
University of Wollongong 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses 
University of Wollongong 
Copyright Warning 
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University 
does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any 
copyright material contained on this site. 
You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 
1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised, 
without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe 
their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court 
may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material. 
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the 
conversion of material into digital or electronic form. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the University of Wollongong. 
Recommended Citation 
Zheng, Willa H., The impact of call auctions on China’s stock market liquidity and price quality, Doctor of 
Philosophy thesis, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, University of Wollongong, 2016. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/4864 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF CALL AUCTIONS ON CHINA’S STOCK MARKET 
LIQUIDITY AND PRICE QUALITY 
 
 
 
Willa H. Zheng 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment  
of the requirements for the award of the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
From 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Faculty of Business 
 
 
 
 
November 2016 
 
1 
 
CERTIFICATION 
I, Willa H. Zheng, declare that this thesis, submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the School of Accounting, 
Economics and Finance of the Faculty of Business at the University of Wollongong, 
is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. The document 
has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.  
 
 
Willa H. Zheng   
27 January 2016 
  
2 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I would like to begin by acknowledging the enduring support, expert advice and careful 
guidance of my supervisors, Dr Gary Tian, Dr Dionigi Gerace and Dr Qigui Liu.  
Thanks to Gary for giving me this thesis topic.  Thanks to Dionigi for teaching me 
SAS and for our memorable chats over coffee over the years that made my PhD 
experience a little bit less dull.  Thanks to George Li for providing the resources I 
needed at the 11th hour.  Thanks to Dr Corinne Cortese for her tough-love that saw this 
thesis to completion. 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my family.  They are the spirit behind this journey.  Semper 
fidelis. 
  
3 
 
 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS INCLUDED AS PART OF THE THESIS: 
 
Chapter 2 is published as: 
Gerace, D., Liu, Q., Tian, G. G. and Zheng, W. (2015), Call Auction Transparency 
and Market Liquidity: Evidence from China. International Review of Finance, 
15: 223–255.   
4 
 
Table of Contents 
Synopsis .................................................................................................................. 7 
Chapter 1. Introduction ...........................................................................................10 
1.1  Call auction transparency and market liquidity ..........................................11 
1.2 Call auction transparency and market efficiency .......................................13 
1.3 The impact of a closing call auction on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange ......14 
1.4  Summary ..................................................................................................16 
Chapter 2. Call auction transparency and market liquidity: Evidence from China ....17 
2.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................17 
2.2 Institutional Details: Shanghai Stock Exchange.........................................21 
2.3 Data and sample........................................................................................23 
2.4 Empirical Results ......................................................................................24 
2.4.1  The effect of transparency on liquidity in the first hour of trading: 
univariate test results .......................................................................................24 
2.4.2  The effect of transparency on liquidity in the first hour of trading: 
regression analysis ...........................................................................................30 
2.4.3  Spread decomposition ........................................................................32 
2.4.4  Effect on intraday liquidity ................................................................34 
2.4.5  Robustness tests .................................................................................38 
2.5 Summary and conclusion ..........................................................................40 
Chapter 3. Call auction transparency and market efficiency: The Shanghai experience
 ...............................................................................................................................41 
3.1  Introduction ..............................................................................................41 
2.2  Literature review and hypothesis development ..........................................44 
3.3  Institutional Detail ....................................................................................47 
3.4  Methodology ............................................................................................49 
3.4.1  Price Discovery .................................................................................49 
3.4.2  Noise .................................................................................................52 
3.5   Data ..........................................................................................................54 
3.6.   Results ......................................................................................................55 
3.6.1  Price discovery ..................................................................................55 
3.6.2  Noise .................................................................................................58 
3.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................61 
Chapter 4. The impact of a closing call auction on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange ...63 
4.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................63 
5 
 
4.2  Literature review and hypothesis development ..........................................66 
4.3  Institutional detail .....................................................................................71 
4.4  Data & sample ..........................................................................................72 
4.5 Methodology ............................................................................................74 
4.5.1  Univariate comparisons .....................................................................74 
4.5.2 Multivariate analysis ..........................................................................76 
4.5.3  Measuring price efficiency .................................................................77 
4.6  Results ......................................................................................................80 
4.6.1  Effect on liquidity ..............................................................................80 
4.6.2  Effect on volatility .............................................................................82 
4.6.3 Effect on trading activity .........................................................................84 
4.6.4 Price Efficiency .......................................................................................85 
4.7  Conclusion ................................................................................................87 
Chapter 5: Conclusion .............................................................................................90 
References ..............................................................................................................93 
Tables ................................................................................................................... 102 
Table 2.1 Univariate test for five weeks before and after July 1, 2006 ................ 102 
Table 2.2 Simultaneous two-equation regression analysis .................................. 108 
Table 2.3 Components of the effective spread.................................................... 110 
Table 2.4 Five-minute interval intraday data five days before and five days after 
the regime change.............................................................................................. 111 
Table 2.5 Univariate test for shorter or longer time period before and after July 1, 
2006 .................................................................................................................. 113 
Table 2.6 Market transparency reform and liquidity in A-shares that had (and had 
not) reformed the split share structure ................................................................ 115 
Table 3.1 Weighted Price Contribution by time period and trading volume quintile
 .......................................................................................................................... 117 
Table 3.2 Mean WPC across the trading day...................................................... 118 
Table 3.3 Weighted Price Contribution per trade by time period and trading 
volume quintile ................................................................................................. 119 
Table 3.4 Volatility Regression ......................................................................... 120 
Table 4.1 Intraday univariateest for 5 weeks before and 5 weeks after 01 July 2006 
– Full sample ..................................................................................................... 121 
Table 4.2 Intraday univariate test for 5 weeks before and 5 weeks after 01 July 
2006 – Quintiles ................................................................................................ 125 
Table 4.3 Multivariate regressions of spread and volatility during the closing 
minutes.............................................................................................................. 141 
6 
 
Table 4.4 First Pass Regression ......................................................................... 142 
Table 4.5 Second Pass Regression ..................................................................... 144 
Table 4.6 R-squared regression dummy coefficient............................................ 145 
Table 4.7 RRD .................................................................................................. 146 
Figures .................................................................................................................. 147 
Figure 2.1 The intraday proportional bid-Ask spread ......................................... 147 
Figure 2.2 The intraday depth ............................................................................ 148 
Figure 2.3 The intraday volatility....................................................................... 149 
Figure 2.4 The intraday volume ......................................................................... 150 
Figure 2.5 The intraday proportional volume ..................................................... 151 
Figure 3.1 Mean WPC across the trading day .................................................... 152 
Figure 3.2 β estimates of unbiasedness regressions. ........................................... 153 
Graph 1 Overall ............................................................................................. 153 
Graph 2 Quintile 1 (highest) ........................................................................... 153 
Graph 3 Quintile 2 ......................................................................................... 154 
Graph 4 Quintile 3 ......................................................................................... 155 
Graph 5 Quintile 4 ......................................................................................... 156 
Graph 6 Quintile 5 ......................................................................................... 157 
Figure 3.3 RMSE of unbiasedness regressions. .................................................. 158 
Graph 1 Overall ............................................................................................. 158 
Graph 2 Quintile 1 (highest) ........................................................................... 158 
Graph 3 Quintile 2 ......................................................................................... 159 
Graph 4 Quintile 3 ......................................................................................... 159 
Graph 5 Quintile 4 ......................................................................................... 160 
Graph 6 Quintile 5 ......................................................................................... 160 
 
  
7 
 
Synopsis 
 
This dissertation contains three essays that examine the impact of call auctions in 
China.  Since they were introduced in the mid-1990s, call auctions have become the 
most popular method to open and close daily trading in equity markets around the 
world.  By aggregating orders and trade information at a single point in time, call 
auctions facilitate price setting and are a valuable tool in managing the liquidity of the 
trading market.   
 
This dissertation focuses on China.  Up until now, the vast majority of the empirical 
literature in this area are concerned with developed markets.  During the time period 
covered by this dissertation, China was a rapidly growing emerging market, unique in 
that it was dominated by uninformed, individual traders.  Market participants in this 
environment face issues such as asymmetric information and stock illiquidity.   The 
conclusions drawn from this dissertation will be of interest to market regulators, 
traders and fund managers interested in investing in the Chinese equity market. 
 
The first essay examines the relationship between the transparency of the opening call 
auction and the liquidity of the continuous market.  It is inspired by the event that took 
place on the Shanghai Stock Exchange on 1 July 2006, when the exchange changed its 
pre-market opening auction system from an entirely black box into a more transparent 
system with indicative auction prices, indicative equilibrium volume and indicative 
unexecuted volume disseminated in real time throughout the pre-opening period. This 
essay uses the natural experiment offered by the Shanghai Stock Exchange to 
investigate the impact of opening call transparency on market liquidity.  The dynamics 
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of the opening process and its impact on trading activity for the rest of the day is of 
interest to traders because traders can either cluster their trades during the non-trading 
period or withhold their orders until the market opens.  The results indicate that the 
dissemination of indicative trade information during the opening call session led to an 
overall improvement in liquidity costs.  Bid-ask spreads narrowed because adverse 
selection risk fell significantly and there is less price volatility in the continuous market.  
This effect is greater for actively traded securities than illiquid securities.  The results 
also reveal a temporary decrease in trading volume in the first hour. 
 
The second essay builds upon the first essay by examining the impact the introduction 
of opening call auction transparency and the resulting decline in trading activity, on 
the price discovery process of the continuous market in Shanghai.  Market efficiency 
is assessed on both the dimensions of price discovery and noise. The results reveal 
some price discovery migration from the call auction to the continuous trading period. 
As a result, the overall price discovery in the first hour of continuous trading rose.  The 
proportional increase in this price discovery was observed to be greater for inactively 
traded stocks than for actively traded stocks.  Additionally, the continuous market 
became less noisy, even after controlling for trading activity.  
 
The third essay turns its attention to another exchange in mainland China, the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. It competes with the Shanghai Stock Exchange for a share 
in China’s booming stock market capital.  On the very date that Shanghai modified its 
opening call auction design, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange modified its market closing 
procedure by adopting call auctions to close its continuous market trading.  Even now, 
Shanghai and Hong Kong are the only top 10 equity markets in the world that do not 
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use a closing call auction.  This essay studies the effect of the new closing mechanism 
on the quality of the closing market and on the trading behaviour of the Chinese market 
participants.  It employs high-frequency data to examine the effects of the closing call 
auction on  market quality measures such as spreads, volatility, turnover, trade size, 
and price discovery in one-minute intervals.   The results illustrate that the closing call 
auction did not cause a substantial migration of trading activity from the continuous 
market to the call.  Instead, the closing call auction generated a new peak in trading 
activity just prior to the closure of the continuous market as traders sought to avoid the 
informationally opaque closing call.  Bid-ask spreads also narrowed just before the 
end of continuous trading.  The quoted and effective spreads generated at the end of 
the call auction were substantially lower than pre-reform, when the closing price was 
generated by continuous trading prices.  In terms of closing price discovery, the results 
find that the efficiency of actively traded stocks improved but the efficiency of the 
closing price of the inactive stocks worsened.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
Call auctions can facilitate trading and price discovery where normal continuous 
market trading fail.  In illiquid markets and in markets where there is a high level of 
information asymmetry, call auctions do this by pooling orders and executing them at 
a uniform price.  As a result, it minimises market impact costs and reduces the risk of 
front running.  Call auctions facilitate price discovery from informed traders while at 
the same time protecting uninformed traders by enhancing market liquidity.  As 
exchanges around the world move towards an electronic order-book system, the 
majority of stock markets have adopted some form of call auction to open or close 
daily market trading.  
 
But the effectiveness of a call auction is contingent on its design and trading rules 
(Comerton-Forde, Rydge and Burridge, 2007).  The design and trading rules address 
call action concerns such as price manipulation and the free-rider problem about 
revealing private order information.  Design questions include: what type of orders 
should be submitted, what is the length of the auction, how should the auction price be 
computed, and what is the optimal level of transparency?   
 
The goal of this dissertation is to examine some of the contentious design features of 
call auctions.  In particular, it aims to determine the influence of design features, like 
call auction information transparency, on investor trading behaviour. Given the 
important role of call auctions in price setting, an understanding of the impact of these 
design features is extremely valuable.   
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This dissertation consists of three essays.  The first two essays investigate the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and its reform of their opening call auction in 2006.  The third essay 
is focused on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and their introduction of a closing call 
auction during the same time period. Whilst the topic of ‘call auctions’ has been 
extensively explored in the academic literature, both empirically and theoretically, 
very little work has been published about China, which has unique market 
characteristics that give new insight into the behaviour of uninformed individuals in 
financial markets.  
 
The following sections introduce each topic in detail and explains the contribution of 
the work to the existing body of knowledge. 
 
1.1  Call auction transparency and market liquidity 
There currently exists a large body of research on the pre-trade information 
transparency of continuous markets but scant literature on the transparency of call 
auctions, and even scarcer literature on the link between the transparency of opening 
call auctions and the liquidity of the continuous market.  
 
Even amongst the literature on the pre-trade information transparency of continuous 
markets, academic conclusions have been mixed.  This is possibly due to the differing 
designs of the exchanges, and due to the varying degrees of transparency between 
exchanges.   
 
Most studies that examined stock market transparency have adopted either a 
theoretical or empirical approach.  Under a theoretical approach, it is not possible to 
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construct a theoretical model without making behaviour-restricting assumptions about 
the market.  Under an empirical approach, it is often difficult to detangle the effects of 
information transparency from the other changes occurring in the market at the time.  
Additionally, the majority of event studies in the area have examined markets with 
already some level of information transparency.  As such, the outcome of an additional 
increase in transparency has tended to be minor.   
 
The issue of how changes in market design affect liquidity is important enough to merit 
further investigation from both an academic and regulatory standpoint, especially 
when both theoretical predictions and empirical evidence are divided.  Furthermore, 
the dynamics of the opening process and its impact on trading activity for the rest of 
the day is of interest to traders because traders can either cluster their trades during the 
non-trading period or withhold their orders until the market opens. 
 
The essay in chapter 3 uses the natural experiment offered by the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange to investigate the relationship between the transparency of the opening call 
auction and the liquidity of the continuous market.  It is significant because it observes 
a major change in the information transparency of the call auction.  Prior to 1 July 
2006, the opening call auction was a ‘black box’.  On 1 July 2006, the Shanghai stock 
market began disseminating the indicative auction price, indicative equilibrium 
volume and indicative unexecuted volume in real time throughout the pre-opening 
period.  In effect, a veil was lifted over the opening call auction.  This fairly significant 
transition in the transparency level of the opening call auction has rarely been studied 
and is invaluable in attempting to document a strong relationship between information 
transparency and market liquidity.   
13 
 
 
Finally, this study also sheds light on the liquidity patterns of a rapidly growing 
emerging market.  Like many developing markets, the trading day divided into 
morning and afternoon sessions, with a long 90-minute trading break in the middle of 
the day. This study will confirm whether Shanghai’s liquidity pattern differs from 
other studied markets.  
 
1.2 Call auction transparency and market efficiency 
Market efficiency improvement was the main reason for Shanghai’s reform of its 
opening call auction on 01 July 2006.  It was hoped that information transparency 
would enhance the overall price discovery of the market.  However, this outcome was 
not certain. When Hong Kong commenced using an opening call auction in 2002, they 
employed a call auction system very similar to that adopted in Shanghai post-reform.  
It was found by Comerton-Forde, Rydge and Burridge (2007) that the market quality 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange declined, particularly in less actively traded stocks.  
The authors attributed this to a lack of interest in the opening call auction, thus 
preventing it from providing meaningful price discovery and also alleviating the price 
uncertainty at market openings.  
 
This second essay will establish whether the implementation of call auction 
transparency mitigated the problems that motivated SSE to reform, namely poor price 
discovery at the start of the day.  A distinctive feature of the Chinese market is the 
absence of alternative platforms during non-trading hours, such as Electronic 
Communication Networks (ECNs) or Broker Crossing Networks (BCNs).  Given that 
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the opening call is preceded by an extended period of non-trading, the need for price 
discovery is highest at the start of the trading day.  
 
China is an emerging capital market dominated by uninformed individual investors. 
Instead of focusing just on the call auction, the study extends its analysis to the post-
opening trading activities, examining how market participants deal with the 
information revealed during the call auction.  These information reflect market 
sentiment, and thus have ramifications not just for the call, but also for subsequent 
trading periods. 
 
In doing so, it is also an opportunity to confirm Comerton-Forde, Rydge and Burridge 
(2007)’s findings in a different, albeit similar, market by assessing the level of market 
interest in this form of call auction.  It will establish whether, in the context of Shanghai 
and Hong Kong, a semi-transparent call auction is better for market efficiency than a 
fully opaque one. 
 
The study takes a thorough approach, by assessing market efficiency on both 
dimensions of price discovery and noise.  In this regard, it provides a comprehensive 
and robust answer to the abovementioned questions. 
 
1.3 The impact of a closing call auction on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
On 1 July 2006, as a first in mainland China, Shenzhen Stock Exchange commenced 
using a call auction to close normal market trading.  This call auction had a number of 
unusual characteristics, which combined, made its design unique in the world. It was 
unusually short, fully opaque, and existed on a pure limit order book market that did 
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not have an alternative trading platform during the non-trading hours.  The Shenzhen 
stock market, like Shanghai, was a market dominated by uninformed rumour-based 
individual traders, rather than institutional traders who relied heavily on the closing 
price to set the benchmark price for their indexes and funds. 
 
As Hong Kong’s aborted experience of the closing call auction revealed, not all 
introductions of the closing call auction have been positive for the market.  The 
performance of call auctions is largely influenced by its design and trading rules 
(Comerton-Forde, Ryde and Burridge, 2007). The impact of this unique ‘black-box’ 
closing call auction is, thus, worthy of academic study.   
 
Also, the Shenzhen stock market exists as a competitor to the Shanghai stock market. 
Presently, Shanghai and Hong Kong are the only two major, top 10, equity markets in 
the world that does not employ a call auction to determine the day’s closing price.  
 
Thus this third essay attempts to answer the pertinent question for both exchange 
regulators: whether the closing call auction is effective in the Chinese trading 
environment and whether Shanghai should adopt a closing call auction.  The essay 
does this by examining the effects of the new closing mechanism on the quality of the 
continuous market and on the trading behaviour of the market participants.  The essay 
contributes to the academic literature by using high-frequency data to study the effects 
of the closing call auction on  spreads, volatility, turnover, trade size, and price 
discovery in one-minute intervals.  Previous studies have tended to examine these in 
five-minute or half-hour intervals.  Focusing on a much briefer time interval allows 
the study to isolate the effects of market structure from the broader market movement 
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effects; particularly in the minutes preceding the close, when the market is most 
volatile and active.  
 
1.4  Summary 
The three essays contained in this dissertation each examine the impact of a stock 
market call auction reform on market quality.  The insights provided by these essays 
are important given the influential role of call auctions in price setting and managing 
market liquidity.  Each essay is about a controversial feature of the call auction, rarely 
examined empirically, particularly in a Chinese or emerging market context.  The 
empirical findings presented in this dissertation will be of interest to regulators, 
academics and investors in the Chinese market alike.  
 
The rest of this dissertation is organised as follows: Chapters 2, 3 and 4 present the 
three research essays discussed in this chapter. Each chapter contains sections 
describing the prior academic literature, the institutional setting, data and sample, 
research design, empirical results and the conclusions reached.  Chapter 5 summaries 
the results and highlights how the results presented in this dissertation can be used by 
exchange regulators and traders to gain insight into the behaviour of market 
participants under the conditions of asymmetric information that exist in China. 
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Chapter 2. Call auction transparency and market liquidity: 
Evidence from China 
2.1 Introduction 
Literature has documented that transparency, the ability of market participants to 
observe information in the trading process (O’Hara, 2001), is vital to the performance 
of the equity market. The transparency regime of a trading mechanism is directly 
reflected in the operational performance of financial markets and in fundamental 
market variables such as liquidity and price efficiency (Huisman and Koedijk, 1998). 
As capital market information can be divided into two types, pre- and post-trade 
information, capital market transparency also exists in two dimensions: pre-trade 
transparency (order book or quote information) and post-trade transparency (the 
dissemination of trade price and volume of completed transactions) (Madhavan, 2000). 
This study is mainly focused on the former type and investigates whether and to what 
extent the transparency of the call market has a flow-on effect for the liquidity of the 
continuous market in a Chinese context.  
Given the importance of market transparency, a large body of literature has 
examined the impact of transparency on market liquidity but produced mixed results. 
Most of these studies are based on developed markets, and there is still little empirical 
evidence from emerging markets, such as China. Traditional studies on this issue tend 
to suffer from endogeneity, as both market liquidity and transparency can be jointly 
influenced by unknown factors. The growing Chinese capital market provides us with 
an ideal institutional setting in which to conduct our study without being influenced 
by the endogeneity issue because, compared to the developed markets with stable 
regulatory policies on information disclosure, the emerging Chinese market provides 
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us a setting with changing policies, which enables us to conduct event studies by using 
the policy change as an exogenous shock.  
In particular, as the policy change is implemented by the government exchange-
wide, across all stocks and to all investors, we can observe that the change in market 
liquidity follows the regulatory policy change without being influenced by unobserved 
factors. On July 1, 2006, the pre-trading system of the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) changed from a closed call auction to an open call auction system. This made 
the pre-trade information change from an opaque ‘black-box’ to a semi-transparent 
level of information transparency. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect 
of the changing call auction information transparency on market liquidity. The 
rationale is: if information transparency matters to market liquidity, this improved 
transparency should result in a change in liquidity on the following trading day.  
Traditional literature, either from the theoretical or empirical approach, argues that 
pre-trade transparency should be positively related to market liquidity because the 
increased transparency reduces the search cost for traders, the savings of which are 
then passed to their posted quotes or orders. In the meantime, transparency also makes 
traders more confident about posting their limit orders, since adverse selection risk is 
reduced (Flood et al., 1999, Pagano and Roell, 1996,  Biais, 1993, Boehmer et al., 
2005).  
However, more recent empirical studies generate predictions that increased pre-
trade transparency can be detrimental to liquidity. For instance, Madhavan et al. (2005) 
discovered that after the Toronto Stock Exchange publicly disseminated the contents 
of its limit order book on the traditional floor and automated trading system, the spread 
widened and volatility increased. Another empirical paper by Bortoli et al. (2006) 
examined the impact after the Sydney Futures Exchange increased the level of order 
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book disclosure from the best bid and ask to three price levels. They found that while 
there was no significant change to spread, market liquidity diminished as limit order 
traders began charging market order traders a premium for execution quality by 
withdrawing depth from the best quotes.  
This strand of literature argues that too much pre-trade transparency makes 
informed traders reluctant to place limit orders for fear that their private information 
may be ‘picked off’ by opportunistic traders (Bloomfield and O’Hara, 1999, Flood et 
al., 1999), which eventually impairs the market liquidity, especially in illiquid markets 
(Admati and Pfleiderer 1988, Pagano and Roell 1996, Baruch, 2005, Rindi, 2007).  
While we agree that pre-trade transparency may have both a positive (it encourages 
the trading activity of small individual investors) and a negative (it discourages the 
trading activity of informed traders) effect on market liquidity, the net effect that pre-
trade transparency has on liquidity should depend on whether the positive effect 
outweighs the negative effect. We expect there should be a net positive effect between 
pre-trade transparency and liquidity in the Chinese market, given that trading activity 
is still dominated by uninformed individual investors1, compared to developed equity 
markets where a form of polarization between individual and institutional investors is 
evident (Ng and Wu, 2007). In other words, although the increased transparency may 
discourage the trading of informed investors, the positive effect of encouraging small 
investors’ trading activities dominates, resulting in an improved overall market 
liquidity. 
Using the regime change of pre-trade transparency in SHSE as an exogenous shock, 
this study provides evidence that the overall stock market liquidity increased after the 
                                                             
1 As of June 2013, individual investors hold merely 26% of total market capitalization but account for 
78% of daily trading volume.  source: 
https://fundsus.deutscheawm.com/EN/docs/research/CHINESE-WHITE.pdf 
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dissemination of indicative trade information during the opening call session, which 
confirms the positive effect that pre-trade transparency has on market liquidity (Flood 
et al., 1999, Pagano and Roell, 1996, Biais, 1993, Boehmer et al., 2005). In particular, 
our empirical results show that bid-ask spreads narrowed and there is less price 
volatility, and lower adverse selection cost in the market after the pre-trade information 
change from a totally opaque to a semi-transparent level of information transparency, 
and that the above effect is found to be greater for actively traded securities than 
illiquid securities.  
Although the trading volume deceases temporarily in the first trading hour, the 
volume increases in the rest of the trading hours of the day. We explain that the 
temporary drop in trading volume is caused by the fact that investors are now able to 
cancel or amend their orders, which results in less unexecuted orders. Then less 
unexecuted orders are automatically transferred from the pre-open call auction period 
for execution than the pre-reform period. We further document that market intraday 
liquidity is also improved after the reform.  Our findings are robust when we test using 
a longer/shorter benchmark sample period before and after the reform; longer/shorter 
periods of trading after market opens; and a smaller sample of stocks that do not 
undertake share split reform during our sample period. 
This study contributes to current literature in the following ways. First, the majority 
of event studies in the area have examined markets which already have some level of 
information transparency. As such, the impact after an additional increase in 
transparency has tended to be minor. By taking advantage of the emerging Chinese 
market, we examine the change of liquidity when the degree of change in call auction 
transparency is significant, i.e. it changes from a previously totally opaque to a semi-
transparent level. By doing so, we are able to document a much stronger relationship 
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between transparency and market liquidity. Second, we contribute to the current 
literature regarding market liquidity in an emerging market because most previous 
studies in this area focus on developed markets. We provide empirical evidence that 
in an immature emerging market that is dominated by individual noise investors, 
increased pre-trade transparency improves market liquidity. From this perspective, our 
study has important implications for the regulators in emerging markets when making 
the regulatory policy regarding information transparency.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the 
institutional details of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Section 2.3 presents the details 
of our data and sample. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 
2.4.  Section 2.5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.2 Institutional Details: Shanghai Stock Exchange 
The trading system in the SHSE is based on the electronic Consolidated Open 
Limit Order Book (COLOB). A 10-minute opening call auction is held at 09:15 and 
ends at 09:25. This is followed by two continuous auction sessions, the morning 
session from 09:30 to 11:30 and the afternoon session from 13:00 to 15:00. Continuous 
trading is conducted through the submission of limit orders. These orders are matched 
by price-time priority.  
While no special trading mechanism is used to close the morning session or open 
the afternoon session, a special mechanism is used at the close of the afternoon session. 
Closing prices of the stocks of the trading day are generated by taking a weighted 
average of the trading prices of the final minute of each trading day. The information 
of the best five offers and bids and their associated volume, as well as the price and 
volume for the latest transaction on the stock exchanges during the continuous trading 
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sessions, must be displayed on computer terminals viewable by investors on and off 
both exchanges. The market is closed on Saturdays and Sundays and other public 
holidays announced by the exchange. 
There are no designated dealers (specialists) to intervene in trading in the market. 
Investors place their orders with the brokers in the form of either a market order or 
limit order, and only good-to-day limit orders are accepted by the trading system. At 
the end of the trading day, all orders are purged from the COLOB. The minimum tick 
sizes for all stocks are 1 cent (RMB0.01 Yuan). Shares cannot be sold on the same day 
as they are bought. The minimum trading size for both purchase and sell is 100 shares. 
Floor trading among member brokers and short selling are strictly prohibited over our 
study period. During trading sessions on the SHSE, a stock is allowed to trade at a 
price plus or minus 10% from the previous day’s closing price in order to avoid sharp 
price increases caused by ‘buy manias’ and sharp declines caused by ‘sell panics’. 
On July 1, 2006 a new call auction was introduced to open trading. In the past, the 
SHSE closed its order book over the pre-open period. There was also no information 
regarding order books available to investors during the auction process, except for the 
final clearing price generated at the end of the auction. Therefore, the pre-open call 
auction was entirely devoid of information dissemination. During this 10-minute call 
auction period, investors could place limit orders and participate in the opening 
auction, but no orders would be allowed to be withdrawn. Orders that are not executed 
in the opening auction were automatically transferred to the period of continuous 
trading. The determined opening price at 09:25 is continued to 09:30.   
On July 1, 2006, a limit or semi-transparent call auction was introduced to open 
trading. Information of an indicative auction price (IAP), an indicative equilibrium 
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volume indication (IEV), and an expected unexecuted volume indication (IUV)  2 was 
disseminated to the market in real time through the pre-open period, although the order 
book was not yet open to the market. It was hoped that by providing pre-trade 
information during the opening period, the SHSE could increase its efficiency in 
determining an opening price and would encourage more investors to participate 
during the pre-opening auction.   
There are two relevant time periods in the 10-min pre-open call auction period. 
During the first period between 09:15-09:20, allowable messages to the system include 
limit orders and order modifications or cancellations. During the second period 
between 09:20-09:25, modifications and cancellations are not allowed, but new orders 
are accepted before the final opening price and quantity is generated in the market.  
The market then takes a five-minute break between the periodic auction at 09:25 and 
the start of the morning session at 09:30 with the continuous trading mechanism. The 
arrangement of five-minute cooling-off period is similar to the two-minute blocking 
period between 09:58 and 10:00 in the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited 
after 2002 (Asian Etrading 2009). The situation in Shanghai’s current pre-opening 
arrangement is now similar to the Deutsche Börse AG, which discloses information 
about unbalanced amounts but is a closed order book during the opening call auction. 
 
2.3 Data and sample 
The data used in this study are obtained from the Reuters database maintained by 
the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The data consists of 
trades and the best bid and ask quotes for all stocks in the Shanghai A-share Index. 
                                                             
2 The IAP is an indication of the call auction price if the auction was held at that instant. The IEV and 
IUV indicate the volume of shares that will execute and remain unexecuted at the IAP.  
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Details of all trades and changes in best bid and ask prices are time-stamped to the 
nearest second. 
A period of five weeks before and after the disclosure of partial order information 
in the opening call auction of the SHSE is used in the study for analysis3.  This gives 
us a sufficient window to capture the immediate as well as the permanent effect of the 
change in opening call auction transparency.   
Initially, all stocks in the Shanghai A-share index are sampled. The Shanghai A-
share index is of particular interest as it accounts for a substantial proportion of total 
Shanghai trade volume and market capitalization. The A-share index consists of 891 
stocks as at December 31, 2006, and accounts for around 95% of the total market 
capitalization of listed stocks, including both A and B-shares. One hundred and ten 
stocks are excluded from the sample due to their inactive trading during this period, 
reducing the final stock sample size to 780.  However, the final number of observations 
is much more because high-frequency data is used, and each firm has thousands of 
observations. 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
2.4.1  The effect of transparency on liquidity in the first hour of trading: univariate 
test results 
Due to the build-up of information during the overnight non-trading period, 
information asymmetry is greatest at the start of each trading day. Market volatility, as 
shown later in Figure 3.3, takes approximately one hour to stabilise. Thus the impact 
                                                             
3 The period of this study ends on Aug 7, 2006.  On Aug 8, 2006, the SHSE introduced market orders 
to the exchange. This study is purely concerned with limit orders. For robustness we also repeat our 
study to cover a much longer period of time before and after the reform; however, our main findings 
are unchanged. 
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of the dissemination of indicative opening prices and opening volumes under an 
efficient market is expected to be greatest during the first hour of trading. This 
influences traders' decision either to cluster their trades during the non-trading period 
or to withhold their orders until the market opens. Call auctions are sometimes 
desirable to traders since they can absorb the market impact of liquidity shocks 
(Barclay et al., 2008) and reduce asymmetric information problems by providing all 
traders with access to the same price (Madhavan, 1992). Therefore, we start our 
empirical study by examining the impact of pre-open information transparency on 
liquidity in the first trading hour. 
 
2.4.1.1 Measures of stock liquidity 
The following liquidity measures are investigated for each stock:  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿 𝐵𝐼𝐷 − 𝐴𝑆𝐾 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 (%)  
=  (𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  ̶  𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)/(𝑏𝑖𝑑 − 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡)  ∗ 100 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 
= 2 ∗  𝑎𝑏𝑠[𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − (𝑏𝑖𝑑
− 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)] 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 (%)  
=  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑/𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ×100 
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻: 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 
𝐷𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑅 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 
=  (𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 × 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒) 
+  (𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 × 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒) 
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑅 𝑂𝐹 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑆:  𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 
𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑁 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑆: 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 
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𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸: 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌:  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 
𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 𝑂𝐹 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 𝐹𝑅𝑂𝑀 𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 𝑇𝑂  
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺  𝑇𝐻𝐸 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇 𝐻𝑂𝑈𝑅 
=
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟
 
 
2.4.1.2 The effect of transparency on liquidity in the first hour of trading of full sample 
of stocks 
In order to do our univariate test, we first compute separately the average values 
of the above liquidity measures during the first trading hour (between 9:30 and 10:30) 
of each trading day for both the pre-event and post-event period. Then values for the 
pre-event period are subtracted from the values for the post-event period matched by 
time, and student t-tests are performed to assess whether the changes are statistically 
significant. Table 2.1 presents the univariate test results. Panel A presents the entire 
sample, while Panels B to F present the results for Quintile 1 to Quintile 5, based on 
whether the stock is actively traded or not. 
We find that the spread narrowed for all three spread measures. Average quoted 
proportional spread fell by 1.8%. Effective spreads narrowed more significantly, by 
17.0% and 17.5% respectively for average effective spread and proportional effective 
spread.  Order book depth fell by 20% on average, and the average wait between 
consecutive trades lengthened by 23%. The results suggest that as the pre-trade 
information becomes more transparent, which means more information is now 
available at the initial stages of the day’s trading, the bid-ask spreads are narrowed and 
order book depths are reduced at the same time. The results are consistent with Bortoli 
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et al. (2006), who document a decline in depth when the limit order book disclosure 
was increased in the Sydney Futures Exchange in January 2001. Furthermore, the 
greater confidence with which the market in the post-reform period regards the 
opening price is also evidenced by lower price volatilities after the market opens.  
However, the total trading volume decreased by 28.9% and the number of trades 
declined by 14% in the post-reform period compared to pre-reform period during the 
first trading hour period. Intuitively, these results seem to be inconsistent with our 
argument that increased transparency in the post-reform period should result in 
improved market liquidity, so the trading volume should also increase to match lower 
adverse selection cost4.  
The probable reason for this phenomenon is: Under the pre-reform call auction 
system, investors did not know the orders placed by other investors and they were not 
allowed to withdraw their orders once they were placed, so for self-protection, 
investors tended to place orders either too high or too low, which meant a large 
proportion of the orders had not been executed. These unexecuted orders in the 
opening auction were automatically transferred to the period of continuous trading, 
resulting in a large trading volume and trading activity in the first trading hour. Under 
the new semi-transparency system, investors know the indicative auction price and 
equilibrium volume and they are allowed to amend and cancel their orders during the 
first five minutes of the pre-open auction period, and thus their orders are more likely 
to be executed and only a small proportion of unexecuted orders are transferred for the 
continuous trading compared to the previous system, resulting in a decrease in trading 
volume during the first hour of continuous trading. However, as discussed later, the 
                                                             
4 We  are grateful to the reviewers for pointing out this question. 
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trading volume actually bounces back from the second trading hour (see evidence from 
Figure 2.4). 
Taken together, our results support the argument that increased transparency 
results in better market liquidity, which is consistent with previous studies, such as 
Flood et al., 1998; Pagano and Roell, 1996; Biais, 1993; Boehmer et al., 2005. In 
particular, the bid-ask spreads and price volatility both decrease significantly during 
the first trading hour in the post-reform period. Although the trading volume decreases 
temporarily during the first trading hour in the post-reform period, it turns around after 
the first trading hour. 
 
2.4.1.3 The effect of transparency on liquidity in the first hour of trading of different 
groups of stocks 
It is suggested that increased transparency during the opening call auction will 
influence trading behaviour differently according to stock liquidity. Comerton-Ford 
and Rydge (2006) find that the change in the transparency regime enhances price 
efficiency more significantly for actively traded stocks than for illiquid stocks. 
Similarly Madhaven et al. (2005) report that illiquid stocks are adversely affected by 
increased pre-trade transparency, because it discourages traders from placing their 
orders for fear of revealing their information. The absence of orders at the open may 
impair liquidity and subsequent price discovery.  
To see how the impact of transparency varies between liquid and illiquid stocks, 
Shanghai A-shares are sorted into roughly equal quintiles based on average daily 
turnover. Quintile one in Panel B represents the most actively traded stocks, while 
quintile 5 in Panel F represents the least active stocks traded on the Shanghai stock 
exchange during our sample period. To control for the influence of trade volume on 
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trade liquidity, we further split each liquidity quintile into three subgroups based on 
their average trade volumes during the study period. Trade volume subgroup 1 
represents stocks with the largest trade volumes, while trade volume group 3 represents 
the smallest. As trading volume here is used as a grouping variable, we do not report 
the results for trading volume in panels B to F. As expected, quintile 1, the most 
actively traded stock group, has the majority of its stocks contained in the trade volume 
one subcategory, the group with the highest average trade volumes during our study 
period.  The converse is true for quintile 5.   
The results confirm the view of Madhaven et al. (2005) that thinly traded stocks 
are adversely affected by information transparency. Quintile 5 is the only quintile 
group whose average proportional spread increased after the change. And notably, the 
subgroup with the least average trade volume is observed to have higher average 
proportional quoted spreads in the post-event period, for all quintile groups.   
Inactive stocks, which already have long time lags between trades, experience the 
largest increases in time between trades (32% on average). Even among the more 
actively traded stocks, stocks with smaller trade volumes have longer time differences 
within their quintile groups. However, market impact cost, as proxied by the effective 
spread measures, fell for all quintile groups and their respective trade volume 
subgroups.   
There is no discernible pattern in the depth measures. Overall depth and dollar 
depth values fell after the regime change, but for quintile 3 it rose slightly.  The ratio 
of call auction volume to continuous trade volume rose for the most active quintile but 
we are unable to conclude that this ratio changed statistically in the post-reform period 
for any of the other quintile groups. Price volatility dropped by levels that are 
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proportionate to stock liquidity.  Average volatility fell by 15% for quintile 1 and 10% 
for quintile 2. 
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
 
2.4.2  The effect of transparency on liquidity in the first hour of trading: regression 
analysis 
Although the univariate results indicate a significant reduction in both proportional 
bid-ask spreads and depth in the first hour when the opening call auction moves to a 
more transparent state, other factors affecting spread and depth could also account for 
those results. Harris (1994) and McInish and Wood (1992) identified price volatility 
as a significant factor that influences market depth and bid-ask spreads. Market 
capitalisation has been shown to have a negative effect on spread, and a positive effect 
on depth (Huberman and Hulka, 2001).  And volume has been recorded as affecting 
the level of spread (Stoll, 2000).   
The simultaneous regression models are used in this study for the following 
reasons: first, spread and depth are contemporaneously related (Lee et al., 1993; 
Kavajecz, 1999; Dupont, 2000), which means that the issue of endogeneity may 
potentially arise if the contemporaneous relation between spread and depth is 
uncontrolled. In addition, Stambaugh (1999) suggests that when the dependent 
variable is highly autocorrelated (the first-order autocorrelation of proportional 
effective spread is 0.532, [see panel B of Table 2.2]), while the dependent and 
independent variables are contemporaneously correlated, t-statistics and hence R-
square measures tend to be biased away from zero, so simulation regression models 
are recommended.   
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Therefore, the following two regression models are established and conducted 
simultaneously. 
peffspreadit = β0 + β1* ln(depthit )+  β2* ln(volumeit) + β3* ln(market capitalisationi) 
+ β4* volatilityit+ β5* changeit + ∑ 𝛽𝑛
11
𝑛=1  * time interval dummies + εit  (1) 
 
ln(depthit )= γ0 + γ1*peffspreadit  +  γ2* ln(market capitalisation)i  + γ3 *volatilityit + 
γ4* changeit + ∑ 𝛾𝑛
11
𝑛=1 * time interval dummies + εit                                  (2) 
 
where depth is the sum of order book volume at the best bid and ask prices.  
peffspread is the effective spread divided by transaction price. Market capitalization 
is equity market capitalization based on closing prices on June 30, 2006. Volatility is 
the ‘High Low Range Volatility’, developed by Parkinson (1980)5. Change is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one after the change to the opening call system, and a 
value of zero otherwise.  Also included are 11 five-minute time interval dummies for 
the first hour of trading, to capture the time-varying characteristics of these liquidity 
measures. We convert tick data into an average value of five minutes for all variables 
except for market capitalization in our regressions. Therefore, we create twelve 
observations (one observation for each five-minute time interval) for each individual 
stock on one particular day, and have a final observation of 407,486 (we use all 
observations from the May 29 to June 30, 2006 event-period and the July 1 to August 
7, 2006 event-period centred on the change in call auction transparency). Our results 
are reported in Table 2.2. 
                                                             
5 As shown by Parkinson (1980), this volatility measurement, properly scaled, is not only an unbiased 
estimator of volatility but is five times more efficient than the classic estimator of volatility. 
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Panel A of Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics of the main variables. The 
average proportional effective spread, depth, volume, market capitalization and 
volatility of our sample are 0.39%, 52,553, 5,443, 787.15 million RMB, and 4.42% 
respectively. With regard to the autocorrelation of each variable as reported in panel 
B of Table 2.2, one of our main dependent variables, peffspread, is highly 
autocorrelated with a first-order autocorrelation coefficient of 0.532, market 
capitalization has an autocorrelation of 1 because it is a fixed value for each individual 
stock, and all other variables are not highly autocorrelated.  
The regression results for our simultaneous two-equation regression model are 
reported in Panel C of Table 2.2. The change variable in both equations is statistically 
significant and negative, which rejects the null hypothesis that a change in call auction 
transparency has no effect on the spread and depth of the market, at all conventional 
levels.  This result is consistent with our findings from the univariate analysis. In terms 
of the liquidity of the market during the first hour, call auction transparency alleviates 
somewhat the high bid-ask spreads at market opening and at the same time reduces 
order book depth in the market, a result consistent with Bortoli et al. (2006), who 
document a decline in depth when the limit order book disclosure was increased in the 
Sydney Futures Exchange in January 2001. Coefficient estimates for the rest of the 
controlling variables are significant and are of the expected signs.   
[Insert Table 2.2 here] 
 
2.4.3  Spread decomposition 
We have shown that bid-ask spreads narrow following the introduction of 
information transparency into the opening auction process. To confirm that the drop 
in spread during the first hour is driven by reduced adverse selection risk and not by 
33 
 
another factor, we decompose spread and examine the changes in the spread 
components.   
Previous studies have developed several models on the components of bid-ask 
spread. In general, the models can be classified into two types: the first relies on the 
serial covariance properties of the observed transaction prices and decomposes spread 
into two components: adverse selection cost and order processing cost (see Roll, 1984; 
Choi et al., 1984, George et al., 1991; Stoll, 1989; Huang and Stoll, 1994; Lin et al., 
1995); the second class of model is based on the trade initiation indicator variable and 
decomposes spread into three components: adverse selection, inventory-carrying, and 
order processing components (Madhavan and Smidt, 1993; Huang and Stoll, 1997). 
More recent studies have indicated that inventory cost may not exist in order-driven 
markets due to the absence of liquidity suppliers; the two-way decomposition models, 
therefore, provide better estimates of the adverse selection cost (Brockman and Chung, 
1999; Majois and Winne, 2003). As we deal with an order-driven environment that is 
absent of market makers, we follow the approach of Lin et al. (1995) which 
decomposed effective spread into just two components: adverse selection cost and 
order processing cost. The adverse selection and order processing components are 
estimated using the following regression models from Lin et al. (1995): 
 
Adverse selection cost component:  ΔQt+1 = λzt + et+1 (3) 
Order processing cost component:  ΔPt+1= - γzt + μt+1 (4) 
 
where Q is the log quote midpoint, z is the difference between log trade price and 
log quote midpoint, and P is the log trade price.  e and μ are normally distributed error 
terms.  λ in equation (3) is the adverse selection component of effective spread while 
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γ in equation (4) measures the order processing cost component. The estimated average 
values of λ and γ for 806 stocks are reported in table 2.3.   
[Insert table 2.3 here] 
The results reveal a considerable reduction in adverse selection cost as a 
component of effective spread. On average, adverse selection dropped by 42%.  
Adverse selection costs altered from being the majority component of effective spread 
to being roughly even with order processing costs in the post-event period.  
Interestingly, prior to the reform, more actively traded stocks have adverse selection 
cost forming a bigger component of the bid ask spread.  This is probably due to the 
positive relationship that Lin et al. (1995) found adverse selection to have with trade 
size.  After the reform, the pattern is reversed. So the establishment of transparency 
into Shanghai’s opening call auction has had a bigger effect on lowering the adverse 
selection risk and bid-ask spread of actively traded stocks than illiquid securities.   
 
2.4.4  Effect on intraday liquidity 
While we provided plenty of evidence regarding the effect of transparency on 
market liquidity during the first trading hour, in this section, we aim to further 
investigate whether increased transparency also influences intraday liquidity.  
Empirical studies have typically identified either a U-shaped6 or L-shaped7 pattern 
in intraday spreads. U-shaped spread patterns feature a gradual fall in spread after the 
session opening and a gradual rise towards the daily closing.  Intraday spread patterns 
are L-shaped if they open with relatively high spreads but this spread either remains 
                                                             
6 McInish and Wood (1992), Chan et al. (1996), Lehman and Modest (1994).   
7 Chan et al. (1995a), Chan et al. (1995b).  For China, this pattern was noticed by Tian and Guo 
(2007). 
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constant or declines over the remainder of the trading day. Stock exchanges that rely 
on a specialised or designated dealer system for the provision of liquidity typically 
exhibit U-shaped spread patterns, while exchanges that are based on multi-dealer 
systems generally exhibit L-shaped spread patterns (Brockman and Chung 1999). In 
addition to spread, trading volume and volatility have also been found to be U-shaped8. 
Intraday liquidity flows are of concern to the investment strategy of portfolio managers 
and traders because they assist market participants to time their transactions to occur 
at certain parts of the day, and better manage their trading costs. The morning and 
closing periods, with their higher than average level of trading activity, are more 
desirable for traders who regard execution speed as an important criterion in execution 
quality and less desirable for traders looking to minimise price variation.  
China’s intraday liquidity pattern may differ from the above-mentioned studies 
because the market has a 90-minute trading break in the middle of the day. Thus the 
purpose of this section of the paper is twofold:  firstly, to observe whether the U-shaped 
or L-shaped liquidity pattern holds for the Shanghai Stock Exchange; and whether the 
liquidity in the morning and afternoon trading sessions are symmetrical.  Secondly, to 
test how the intraday liquidity patterns are influenced by the pre-trade information 
transparency.   
To analyse the intraday behaviour of various liquidity and trading activity 
measures, we partition each trading day into five-minute intervals and compute the 
average values for each time interval five trading days before and five trading days 
after the opening call auction transparency change. Eighty-three stocks that had trading 
suspended due to abnormal fluctuations during this sample period9 were removed. The 
                                                             
8 Cheung et al., (1994), Chang et al., (1993)  
9 On the SHSE, these suspended stocks resume trading at 10:30am. 
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ten-day time frame captures the immediate impact of the change and minimizes the 
possibility of other changes in market conditions that might affect these liquidity 
measures.   
[Insert Table 2.4 here] 
Table 2.4 presents the results for the average proportional spread, depth, volatility, 
volume and proportional volume values for each of the time intervals in the pre- and 
post-event periods respectively. On the whole, our results support our main argument 
that transparency improves intraday market liquidity because the proportional spread 
narrowed and trading volume increased after the reform.  However, no clear results 
are found regarding the depth, volatility and proportional volume. In order to further 
demonstrate the intraday liquidity patterns and the change of intraday liquidity after 
the reform, we graph Figures 2.1-2.5, to show how the five liquidity measures change 
over time throughout the trading day. 
Figure 2.1 confirms the L-shaped intraday pattern of the average proportional 
spreads in SHSE, which supports Brockman and Chung (1999). Opening spread is 
about 1.7 times the proportional spread for the rest of the day. In addition, we observe 
a clear and significant lower proportional spread when the pre-trade information 
transparency has improved after the event, which is consistent with our results in Table 
2.1 above and supports our main argument that better information transparency results 
in a lower spread.  
[Insert Figure 2.1 here] 
Figure 2.2 depicts the intraday depth pattern in the market. In general, depth is 
quite low at the start of the day and climbs steadily during the morning session. By the 
afternoon session, depth has plateaued. It drops slightly in the last 20 minutes.  
Consistent with our results in Table 2.1, the increase in pre-trade information 
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transparency results in a lower depth during the first 45-minutes of trading; during the 
rest of the day, post-reform depth seems to be similar to pre-reform depth.  
[Insert Figure 2.2 here] 
Figure 2.3 depicts the intraday volatility pattern in the market.  It displays an 
inverse J-shaped pattern. Intraday volatility overall is similar between the two time 
periods, although post-reform volatility in the first hour is smoother and generally 
lower. 
[Insert Figure 2.3 here] 
Due to a trading break in the middle of the day, intraday volume on the SHSE 
shows an asymmetric double-U pattern, as displayed in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.  Except 
for the spikes at the start and end of the session, absolute and proportional volume is 
relatively flat during the morning session. By contrast, in the afternoon trading session, 
they both trend in an upward direction. Some interesting results are identified when 
comparing post-reform to pre-reform volume. In particular, Figure 2.4 shows that over 
the post-reform period, the absolute trading volume rises significantly between 10:30 
and 11:30, and  remains at a higher level during the rest of the day; while from Figure 
2.5, we find that the proportional volume drops substantially only during the first 
trading hour, and settles down during the rest of the trading day.  
Overall, our results, combining Figures 2.4 and 2.5, suggest that investors alter 
their trading strategies after the reform by increasing their trading volume after 11:3010. 
As discussed in the above sections, the temporary drop of trading volume during the 
first trading hour is caused by the fact that investors are now able to cancel or amend 
their orders, which results in fewer unexecuted orders being automatically transferred 
from the pre-open call auction period for execution. 
                                                             
10 We appreciated a reviewer’s comment on this addition. 
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[Insert Figure 2.4 here] 
[Insert Figure 2.5 here] 
2.4.5  Robustness tests11 
For robustness of our main findings, we further conduct the following two types of 
new tests: (1) we increase and decrease the length of our benchmark, and increase and 
decrease the period of trading hours; and (2) we repeat our study for A-shares that did 
not undergo a share split reform during our sample period, and compare the results 
with A-shares that underwent the share split reform. The results for robustness tests 
are reported and discussed below. 
 
2.4.5.1 The effect of transparency on liquidity different length of benchmark and 
different period of trading hours 
The length of our benchmark and the period of trading hours are important to our 
results. One potential issue about our paper is that whether our results still hold if a 
different length of benchmark and a different period of trading hours are used. In order 
to address this issue, we first increase the length of our benchmark to ten weeks before 
and after the pre-trade information transparency reform, and decrease the length to two 
weeks before and after the reform (currently five weeks). The results, as reported in 
panels A and B of Table 2.5, are similar to our main results in Table 2.1 and suggest 
the main findings are robust. Regressions are also conducted but the results, not 
reported in order to save space, are quantitatively similar to our results in Table 2.2. 
We further increase and decrease the periods of trading hours to two hours and half an 
hour after the market opens (currently the period is one hour), with similar results 
being found,  but not reported in order to save space. 
                                                             
11 We appreciated a reviewer’s comment on this addition. 
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[Insert Table 2.5 here] 
 
2.4.5.2 The effect of transparency on liquidity of A-shares that had (and not) reformed 
the share split structure 
The share split reform, which was conducted during 2005 to 2007 for Chinese listed 
firms, has been identified as increasing the price discovery from better risk-sharing 
and better market fundamentals (Li et al., 2011; Liao et al., 2014) and increasing stock 
liquidity after the reform (Chu et al., 2014), so if a firm undergoes a share split reform 
during our sample period, the better liquidity may be caused by the share split reform 
rather than the market transparency reform. Therefore, we repeat our study for A-
shares that had reformed their split share structure and those without during our event 
period, to see whether the market transparency reform has similar or different effect 
on liquidity of A-shares that had or had not reformed the split share structure. The 
results are reported below in Table 2.6.  
Our results suggest that A-shares that had reformed the split share structure have 
an overall better market liquidity (lower spreads) in Panel A than those without the 
reform in Panel B, which is consistent with Chu et al. (2014). Nevertheless, liquidity 
is improved significantly after the transparency reform in both A-shares with and 
without split share structure reform, suggesting that our main results is not driven by 
the share split reform because improved liquidity after the transparency reform is 
observed even in A-shares that did not undergo a split share reform.  
[Insert Table 2.6 here] 
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2.5 Summary and conclusion 
The call auction market competes with the continuous market for order flow. This 
study examines how the increased information transparency in the pre-open call 
auction period affects liquidity in the continuous trade market of the SHSE. By using 
the pre-trade call auction reform as an exogenous shock, we find that increased 
opening call auction transparency is associated with lower average price volatility, a 
smaller proportion of adverse selection cost in effective spread, and a narrower bid-
ask spread for the first trading hour, especially for actively traded stocks. Trading 
volume decreases temporarily in the first trading hour, but turns around thereafter.  
 Overall, we provide empirical evidence that the quality of the Chinese capital 
market was greatly improved when information transparency increased after the pre-
trade call auction reform, which supports the argument by Flood et al. (1999) who 
document that the dissemination of pre-trade information during the opening call phase 
reduces the impetus for traders to actively place orders to ‘test’ the market and bring 
about a faster price discovery in the early moments of trading. Our study suggests that 
in an emerging market, where the market is dominated by individual investors, 
although improved transparency may discourage trading by informed investors, small 
non-institutional investors do benefit from better market transparency. 
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Chapter 3. Call auction transparency and market 
efficiency: The Shanghai experience 
3.1  Introduction 
The call auction's contribution to market quality can be analysed from two perspectives: 
(i) its ability to attract order flow and provide an alternative trading venue to the 
continuous order-driven market, and (ii) its impact on market efficiency.  In chapter 2, 
I found that there was decreased trading activity in the first hour of the continuous 
market following the onset of semi-transparency to the call auction system.  Trading 
activity is intrinsically linked to the price formation process, determining the amount 
and timing of price discovery over daily trading cycles (Ibikunle 2015). The following 
chapter investigates whether Shanghai’s opening call auction transparency, and the 
resulting decline in trading activity, had any impact on the price discovery process of 
the continuous market, particularly within the first hour after market opening. 
 
The motivation for this empirical investigation is due to market efficiency being the 
main reason for the microstructural design change that took place on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SSE) on 01 July 2006.  In an efficient market, prices ‘fully reflect’ 
all available information 12 .  Therefore, recognising the importance of having 
appropriately set prices at the start of the day and responding to the lack of participation 
and transparency in its existing 'black box' opening call auction system, the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange partially opened up its order book to reveal indicative opening prices 
and quantities as the call auction takes place. It was hoped that this change would 
enhance the overall price discovery of the market. 
                                                             
12 Fama (1970) 
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The Shanghai experience warrants investigation because the new opening call auction 
design closely matched the design of Hong Kong’s opening call auction.  The pre-
opening time period is unusually short, divided into phases and order restriction rules 
apply.  After Hong Kong introduced a call auction to open its daily trading in 2002, 
Comerton-Forde, Rydge and Burridge (2007) reported a decline in market quality, 
particularly in less actively traded stocks.  Amongst existing empirical literature, this 
was an anomaly.  The authors attributed it to the design of this opening mechanism, 
which at the time differed significantly from other international call markets. 
According to Comerton-Forde, Rydge and Burridge (2007), the lack of interest at the 
opening call auction prevented it from providing meaningful price discovery and 
alleviating the price uncertainty at market openings.   
 
Given the worsening of overall market efficiency, an examination of the Shanghai 
experience is useful in two ways.  On a qualitative level, it allows me to confirm 
Comerton-Forde, Rydge and Burridge (2007) findings in a different, but similar 
market by assessing the level of market interest in this form of call auction.  Noting 
that in this empirical study, Shanghai moved from a fully opaque to a partially 
transparent call auction, rather than from no call auction to a partially transparent 
auction, I hope to quantitatively use this event to ascertain whether Hong Kong’s call 
auction experience could have been alleviated by a fully opaque opening auction 
instead.  If the results show that information transparency of the open call auction is 
detrimental to continuous market efficiency in Shanghai, then we may propose for 
Hong Kong to adopt a fully opaque call auction as well. 
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This chapter contributes to existing literature in several ways.  First, it is a unique event.  
The reform in Shanghai on 01 July 2006 represented a fairly significant switch from 
no transparency at all to a typical semi-form of information transparency. Given that 
most exchanges have used a semi-transparent form of call auction since they adopted 
calls to open or close those markets, a further regime change can only be incremental.  
Hence, there have not been many opportunities to directly examine the influence of 
call auction transparency.  The SSE reform provides an ideal institutional setting to 
observe changes in overall market efficiency without being influenced by other 
exogenous factors. 
 
The second contribution is that I am able to examine whether the implementation of 
call auction transparency mitigated the problems that motivated SSE to reform, namely 
poor price discovery at the start of the day.  A distinctive feature of the Chinese market 
is the absence of alternative platforms during non-trading hours, such as Electronic 
Communication Networks (ECNs) or Broker Crossing Networks (BCNs).  Given that 
the opening call is preceded by an extended period of non-trading, the need for price 
discovery is highest at the start of the trading day. Furthermore, China is an emerging 
capital market dominated by uninformed individual investors. Instead of focusing just 
on the call auction, I extend my analysis to the post-opening activities, examining how 
market participants deal with the information revealed during the call auction.  These 
information reflect market sentiment, and thus have ramifications not just for the call, 
but also for subsequent trading periods. 
Finally, I examine whether the introduction of call auction transparency affected price 
discovery behaviour differently in stocks with different levels of liquidity.  In chapter 
2, I showed that this was detrimental to the liquidity of thinly traded stocks.  I evaluate 
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how different liquidity stocks respond to price discovery uncertainty at market opening, 
under the conditions of information asymmetry that characterise the Chinese stock 
market.    
I examine a sample of 780 A-share securities traded on the SSE five weeks before and 
five weeks after the reform to the opening call auction.  The results find a migration of 
price discovery from the call auction to the continuous trading period.  Overall price 
discovery in the first hour of continuous trading is boosted in the post-event period, on 
an overall and individual trade basis.  I observe a larger proportional increase in this 
price discovery for inactively traded stocks, than for actively traded ones.  Call auction 
transparency did not have as large of an impact for them.  The level of noises in the 
continuous market, in the post event period, is quieter, even after controlling for the 
diminished level of trading activity.  
   
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the relevant 
literature and outlines the hypotheses, Section 3.3 describes the institutional setting, 
Section 3.4 and 3.5 present the methodology and data, Section 3.6 reports the results 
and Section 3.7 concludes.  
 
2.2  Literature review and hypothesis development 
There exists a fertile body of literature that examine whether the introduction of a call 
auction trading system adversely or positively affects market characteristics.13 But as 
was the case for chapter 2, few papers have linked the market design of the call auction, 
                                                             
13 Biais et al (1999) - Paris Bourse, Pagano Peng Schwartz (2013)- NASDAQ, Chang et al (2008) and 
Comerton-Ford, Lau and McInish (2007) - Singapore Stock Exchange.  Except for Biais et al (1999), 
these papers investigated the introduction of opening call auction in tandem with the closing call, as 
the calls were introduced to the exchanges at the same time. 
45 
 
in this case, information transparency, to the quality of the continuous market in the 
subsequent trading period.  As more exchanges move to adopt a call auction to open 
trading at the start of a trading day, this is a question worth investigating because “[a] 
well designed opening call auction provides traders with an alternative trading 
mechanism that may reduce trading costs and determine more efficient prices at the 
open. A good design may also generate increased trading activity”14.  
 
The general view is that information transparency is good for price discovery and 
market efficiency15. Madhavan (1996) and Pagano and Roell (1996) compared a fully 
opaque call auction with a transparent call that offered order book information to 
market participants. Both papers concluded that the latter should lead to higher market 
quality due to the greater volume of information revealed during the bidding process. 
Hendershott and Jones (2005) showed that after the Island ECN went dark, price 
discovery became less efficient within the ETF market, and between the ETF and 
futures markets. Glosten (1999) argued that “transparency should lead to greater 
commonality of information. Greater commonality of information means that adverse 
selection becomes less of an issue”, implying therefore that prices become more 
efficient. 
 
However, excessive transparency may reduce efficiency if traders fear that placing 
orders will reveal their information (Domowitz and Madhavan, 2001).  Boehmer Saar 
Yu (2005) found that in a market that was transparent, investors submitted smaller 
limit orders in order to manage their order exposure. Hinterleitner et al (2012) 
                                                             
14 Comerton-Ford, Rydge and Burridge (2007) 
15 Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999), Madhavan (1996), Pagano and Roell (1996), Baruch (2005) 
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conducted an experiment whereby they compared a continuous double auction after 
an opening call auction with a stand-alone continuous auction. The call auctions 
differed in their level of transparency. They found no significant differences in the 
effect generated between the transparent and non-transparent call auctions. A 
transparent call auction did not lead to a more efficient opening price, nor generate 
higher liquidity, at the opening, than the non-transparent call auction. Rather than 
facilitate discovery of the fundamental value of stocks, the authors suggested that 
observing the order flow and price discovery during the pre-opening phase increased 
the feeling of uncertainty in the market, which spilt into subsequent periods. Also, 
participants could have been overwhelmed by the amount of information available in 
the pre-opening phase and a fully transparent call auction gave greater room for price 
manipulation. (Arifovic and Ledyard, 2007)  
 
I hypothesise the following events happening.  The transparency of the call will 
eliminate much of the prior incentive for information traders, holding valuable private 
information, to trade during the call.  Those that still make the strategic decision to 
participate in the call auction will wait until the second half of the opening call, when 
only new orders can be submitted and existing orders cannot be modified or cancelled, 
before placing their orders and thus revealing their private information to the market.  
Therefore I hypothesis that there will be less discovery of private information during 
the call auction.  
 
However, the ability to look in, watch prices being determined by the market, and the 
ability to amend their orders based on the updating public information, will alleviates 
the high level of asymmetric information after an overnight period of nontrading, boost 
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investor confidence in the prices determined by the call auction and lower the risk of 
adverse selection for market participants.  I hypothesis that there will be fewer price 
adjustments in the subsequent time periods and thus less ‘noise’.   
 
Based on the above discussion, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The introduction of transparency to opening call auction leads to a 
decrease in price discovery during the call auction 
Hypothesis 2: The introduction of transparency to opening call auction leads to an 
overall increase in price discovery in the continuous trading period immediately after 
the call. 
Hypothesis 3: The introduction of transparency to opening call auction leads to less 
price discovery noise in the continuous trading period immediately after the call. 
 
3.3  Institutional Detail 
The trading system on the SHSE is based on the electronic Consolidated Open Limit 
Order Book (COLOB).  Each morning, a 10-minute opening call auction is held from 
09:15 to 09:25.  This is followed by two continuous auction sessions, between 09:30 
and 11:30 and 13:00 to 15:00.  
 
Trading is conducted through the submission of limit orders. The minimum tick size 
is 1 cent (RMB0.01 Yuan) and the minimum order size is 100 shares.  There are no 
designated dealers (specialists) to intervene in trading.  Only good-to-day limit orders 
are accepted by the trading system.  These orders are matched by price, and then time, 
priority. The information of the best five bids and offers, their associated volume, and 
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the price and volume for the latest transaction must be displayed on computer terminals 
viewable by investors both on and off the exchange. The market is closed on Saturdays 
and Sundays and other public holidays announced by the exchange. 
 
At the end of the trading day, all orders are purged from the COLOB.  To prevent 
buying or selling panics, trading is halted for the whole day if prices deviate more than 
10% from the previous day’s close.  In addition, shares cannot be sold on the same day 
as they are bought. Floor trading among member brokers, and short selling are strictly 
prohibited during this study period. 
 
Prior to July 1 2006, the pre-open call auction was entirely devoid of information 
dissemination. There was no information regarding order books available to investors 
during the auction process, except for the final clearing price generated at the end of 
the auction. During this 10-minute call auction period, investors could place limit 
orders and participate in the opening auction, but no orders would be allowed to be 
withdrawn. Orders that are not executed in the opening auction were automatically 
transferred to the period of continuous trading. The determined opening price at 09:25 
is continued to 09:30.   
 
On July 1 2006, a limited or semi-transparent call auction was introduced to open 
trading. Information of an indicative auction price (IAP), an indicative equilibrium 
volume indication (IEV), expecting unexecuted volume indication (IUV) were 
disseminated to the market in real time throughout the pre-opening period. It was 
hoped that by providing pre-trade information during the opening period, the SHSE 
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could increase its efficiency in determining an opening price and would encourage 
more investors to participate during the pre-opening auction.   
 
There are two relevant time periods in the 10-min pre-open call auction period. During 
the first period between 09:15-09:20, allowable messages to the system include limit 
orders and order modifications or cancellations. During the second period between 
09:20-09:25, modifications and cancellations are not allowed, but new orders are 
accepted before the final opening price and quantity is generated in the market.  The 
market then takes five-minute break between the periodic auction at 09:25 and the start 
of the morning session at 09:30 with continuous trading mechanism. The arrangement 
of 5-minute cooling-off period is similar to the 2-minute blocking period between 
09:58 and 10:00 in the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited after 2002 (Asian 
Etrading 2009). The situation in Shanghai‘s current pre-opening arrangement is now 
similar to the Deutsche Borse AG, which discloses information about unbalanced 
amounts but is a closed order book during opening call auction. 
 
3.4  Methodology 
The academic approach to measuring market efficiency can be essentially distilled into 
two categories: in terms of price discovery or noise. 
3.4.1  Price Discovery 
Price discovery is defined as the speed at which new information is incorporated into 
stock prices.  To measure the intraday period-by-period price discovery, I used the 
well-established weighted price contribution (WPC) introduced by Barclay and 
Warner (1993). It measures the permanent price impact component of price change in 
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each intraday time period, as opposed to how smoothly prices move together in daily 
time periods.  
 
WPC calculations involve calculating the fraction of the price change over the period 
t relative to close-to-close price change on each day, for each stock & for a given 
period t. Then, each day's contribution of period t is weighted based on that day's 
contribution to the cumulative absolute price change over the entire sample period. 
 
The WPC has been used to calculate price discovery and trading after hours16, across 
trading venues 17 , across dealers in different geographic locations 18 , during the 
preopening period19, and during the opening and closing auctions20.  
 
I divide the daily close to close return into four time periods: the opening call 
auction (previous close to opening call), the opening trade (the opening call auction 
just after 0925am to the first continuous trade after 0930am), first 60minutes of the 
trading day, and the remainder of the trading day21.   
 
For each stock, the WPC of time period t is defined as: 
𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑡 = ∑ (
|𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑|
∑ |𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑|
𝐷
𝑑=1
) × (
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡,𝑑
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑
)𝐷𝑑=1   (1) 
 
                                                             
16 Barclay Hendershott 2003 
17 Huang 2002 
18 Anand et al 2011 
19 Cao et al 2000 
20 Ellul et al 2005 
21 This is because information asymmetry is at its highest level for the day just before open.  The 
trades are more likely to be informed than at any other time of the day.  I expect that the trades 
executed at the start of the day, either during the call auction or the first hour after market opening will 
contribute significantly to the day’s price discovery. 
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Where retd is the close-to-close on day d, and rett,d is the logarithmic return for period 
t on day d.22  
I calculate the WPC for each stock, and then obtain crossectional averages across the 
time periods. 23 
The WPC normalises the price discovery per period such that the WPCs sum to one. 
(Barclay Hendershott 2008) The weights in the WPC reduce the heteroskedasticity in 
the observations and avoid the difficulties associated with zero price changes.  
 
Even if the total price discovery appears to be low, individual trades may reveal more 
information.  To measure the price discovery by trade, I divide the WPC for each time 
period by the weighted fraction of trades occurring in that period, and obtain the 
weighted price contribution by trade (WPCT). The WPCT for each stock at time period 
t is defined as: 
𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖 =  
∑ (
|𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑|
∑ |𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑|
𝐷
𝑑=1
)×([
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡,𝑑
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑
])𝐷𝑑=1
∑ (
|𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑|
∑ |𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑|
𝐷
𝑑=1
)𝐷𝑑=1 ×(
𝑡𝑟𝑡,𝑑
𝑡𝑟𝑑
)
  (2) 
where trt,d is the number of executed trades during time period t on day d, and trd is 
the total number of trades on day d. 
                                                             
22 Some previous studies use price changes rather than returns (see Cao et al 2000).  However, I 
follow Barclay and Hendershott (2008) in using returns to make the results comparable across stocks 
and to facilitate the calculation of standard errors.  
23 The WPC is typically calculated on a stock-by-stock basis, and then averaged across the stocks. (see 
Cao et al 2000, Huang 2002, Barclay and Hendershott 2008)  It is said that stock correlations, due to 
common components in stock returns, complicate statistical inferences about the mean WPC. (Barclay 
and Hendershott 2003) Thus I also computed WPC for each day, and then averaged across days.  The 
results [not reported] are qualitatively similar. 
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3.4.2  Noise 
One popular 24  method for capturing the noisiness of stock prices is the R-square 
methodology first employed by Pagano and Schwartz (2003) in their study of the Paris 
Bourse. This approach, based on earlier work by Cohen et al (1983), uses a market 
model to contrast the short and long run relationship between individual stocks and the 
broader market index over different time intervals. The technique is based on the idea 
that frictions in the trading process would delay the adjustment of prices to new 
information. The result is that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators of beta would 
become biased or inefficient. Thus, an increase in the adjusted-R squares following the 
reform will indicate greater synchronicity in prices, a tighter fit between the individual 
asset returns and market returns, and improved price efficiency. 
The use and interpretation of results derived from the R-square approach do have 
limitations.  This technique uses daily data (opening and closing prices) rather than 
allowing for analysis of market efficiency on an intraday basis.  Furthermore, 
Bramante et al (2013) found, on the use of R-square as a measure of price efficiency, 
that for China, R-square did not increase with market capitalisation. Smaller market 
cap stocks have higher R-squares than large cap, which would imply that large cap 
stocks are less informationally efficient that smaller cap stocks.  
 
Therefore for this study, I use the alternative ‘unbiasedness regressions’ developed by 
Biais Hillion and Spatt (1999) to measure the informational efficiency of prices as 
price discovery takes place.  For each stock and each one minute time period, I regress 
                                                             
24 Pagano and Schwartz (2003), Pagano and Schwartz (2005), Chelley-Steeley (2009), Battig and 
Chelley-Steeley (2010), Comerton-Forde, Lau and McInish (2007),  
53 
 
the daily close-to-close return (retcc) on the return from the previous close to the end of 
that time period t (retct):  
retcc= α + β x retct + εt    (3) 
In a ‘perfect’ efficient market that learns from past price information, β should be 
approximately one.  However, Barclay and Hendershott (2003) points out that the 
coefficient estimate in the unbiasedness regression suffers from bias due to 
measurement error. Assuming an efficient market, they theorize that β is equal to one 
as long as stock prices are serially uncorrelated and precisely gauged.  These two 
assumptions rarely occur in reality. Both bid-ask spreads and pricing errors may cause 
market prices to be serially correlated.  Thus, the observed price will always be 
contaminated by noise and the coefficient estimate from ordinary least squares will be 
biased downwards. 
Instead, Barclay and Hendershott (2003, 2008) suggest that β be interpreted as a signal 
to noise ratio25 since:  
?̂?  
𝑝
→  𝛽 (
𝜎𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑡
2
𝜎𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑡
2 +𝜎𝑢
2)       (4) 
 
where RETcc and RETct are the unobservable ‘true’ returns.  retcc = RETcc+v and retct 
= RETct+u .   σ2𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑡  is the variance of the ‘true’ returns from the previous close to 
time t. (ie. the signal)   u and v have zero mean and variances equal to 𝜎𝑢
2  and 
𝜎𝑣
2respectively. (ie. the noise)  
                                                             
25 or more precisely, a signal-to-signal-plus-noise ratio 
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Therefore, the extent to which the estimated OLS slope coefficient, ?̂?, is less than one 
allows us to infer the extent of noise in period t.  
Finally, I control for trading activity and other factors affecting stock price volatility 
by performing the following regression: 
Volatilityi,t,d = β0+ β1 * ln(market_capi) + β2*ln(turnoveri,t,d) + β3*effspreadi,t,d 
+β4*change+  ∑ 𝛽𝑛
15
𝑛=5  * time interval dummies + εit    (5) 
Where Volatility i,t,d is the Parkinson (1980)
26 ‘High Low Range Volatility’ for stock i, 
at 5-minute interval t, on day d. market_capi is the equity market capitalization for 
stock i based on closing prices on 30 June 2006. turnoveri,t,d is the total turnover for 
stock i, during time interval t, on day d. effspreadi,t,d is the mean effective spread
27 for 
stock i, during time interval t, on day d. Change is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of one after the reform to the opening call system, and a value of zero if otherwise.  
Also included are 11 five-minute time interval dummies from 0930 to 1030, in order 
to capture the time varying characteristics of these volatility measures. 
3.5   Data 
Just as it was the case in Chapter 2, a period of five weeks before and after the event 
date is selected to capture the immediate and permanent impact of the change in 
opening call auction transparency on the SSE.  The pre-event period runs from 29 may 
2006 to 30 June 2006.  The post-event period covers 01 July 2006 to 04 August 2006.  
The sample of 780 A-share securities is also the same.  These stocks are divided into 
                                                             
26 As shown by Parkinson (1980), this volatility measurement properly scaled, not only is an unbiased 
estimator of volatility but is five times more efficient than the classic estimator of volatility. 
27 Effective spread=2x|transaction price −
 bidask midpoint immediately prior to the transaction| 
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quintiles based on their average trade volume during the study period.  Quintile 1 
represents the most active securities, whereas quintile 5 is the least active.   
 
All of my daily transaction and order book data is obtained from the Reuters database 
maintained by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). 
 
3.6.   Results 
3.6.1  Price discovery 
3.6.1.1 Weighted Price Contribution 
Table 3.1 presents the average WPC as well as the mean change in WPC following the 
reform on 01 July 2006.  The findings support hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2.   
The introduction of a more transparent opening call auction saw price discovery move 
away from the call auction to the continuous market.   The return contribution of the 
opening call auction price halved (from 20% to 11%), as did the level of price 
discovery in the first continuous trade of the trading day (from 2.4% to 1.5%). This 
was observed across all quintile groups. 
Price discovery becomes more concentrated in the 60 minutes after the market opens.  
In the post-event period, the first hour of the trading day now accounts for 31% of the 
day's permanent price change.  Whilst the first hour of trading absorbed the majority 
of the price discovery that would have taken place in the opening call auction pre-
reform, not all of the price information that would have been disseminated under the 
previous call auction system migrated to the immediate 60 minute trading period.  As 
such, the level of price discovery in the subsequent period also increased.  This is 
expected, because without the aid of a black-box call auction to place trades whilst 
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concealing private information, some traders opted to reveal their information in a 
more gradual manner, over the course of the entire trading day. 
Amongst the quintile groups, there is an overall greater level of price discovery for 
actively traded stocks during the first hour of the trading day than for inactively traded 
stocks.  This confirms existing literature that price discovery of illiquid stocks with 
high information asymmetry is more gradual, revealed over the course of the trading 
day.  But the effect of the call transparency regime change is a bigger boost in price 
discovery during the first hour for inactive stocks than active ones. This confirms my 
finding in Chapter 2 that a transparent call auction is discouraging to traders of illiquid 
stocks, causing the dissemination of public and private information through trade to 
migrate from the call auction to the continuous trading market. 
[insert Table 3.1 here] 
Finally, to illustrate how permanent price changes are disseminated over the course of 
an entire trading day, I divide the trading day into 15 minute time intervals and 
calculated the mean WPC for each interval.  The results are presented in Table 3.2 and 
Figure 3.1.  The time intervals with price discovery having the biggest permanent 
impact on prices are at the start of the continuous trading day, towards the end of 
morning trading session, and at the closure of market.   
[insert Table 3.2 here] 
[insert Figure 3.1 here] 
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3.6.1.2 Weighted Price Contribution per Trade 
As I found in Chapter 2, there was decreased trading activity in the first hour of the 
continuous market following the reform.  In this section, I attempt to evaluate price 
discovery, whilst controlling for the level of trading activity.  
[insert Table 3.3 here] 
The WPCT results in Table 3.3 reveal that opening call auction trades on Shanghai 
Stock Exchange contribute little to price discovery, and became even less informative 
in the post-event period.  The low level of information contained in opening prices in 
Shanghai is somewhat surprising given the accumulation of public and private 
information overnight that awaits dissemination through public trading.  This result is 
at variance with Barclay and Hendershott (2003) and Ibukunle (2015)’s findings on 
Nasdaq and London Stock Exchange, respectively, that WPCT is highest during the 
pre-opening period.  On the SSE, there is an evident reluctance by traders to post 
competitive orders that move prices or signal material information during the pre-
opening period, and it was not mitigated by making the call auction more transparent.   
Instead, the call auction reform increased the price contribution of trades during the 
first hour of trading.  WPCT rose from 5.33 to 6.7, indicating that individual trades 
during the first hour contained more information, as opposed to noise, and worked 
more at making prices more efficient, than it did pre-reform. 
Individual trades of active stocks have more permanent price impact than inactive 
stocks. The contribution to price discovery of trades increased in the first hour across 
all quintiles. As it was the case for the WPC, the reform had a bigger impact on less 
liquid stocks than active ones.  
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3.6.2  Noise 
3.6.2.1 Unbiasedness Regression 
The WPC results reveal that about 50% of the day’s price discovery takes place on the 
SSE before the first hour of continuous trading is complete.  But how informationally 
efficient is that price discovery process, given the noise, large spreads, and price 
reversals that impede market efficiency?  And did a more transparent call auction 
enhance the efficiency of price discovery in the critical first hour of continuous trading, 
as it sets the mood for trading for the rest of the day?   
[insert Figure 3.2 here] 
Figure 3.2 plots the mean coefficient estimates, as well as their 5% confidence 
intervals calculated using the standard errors of the coefficient estimates.   
Consistent with existing empirical literature28, the opening β estimates are less than 
one.  That beta is less than one at the start of the day is also due to transitory order 
imbalances at the open that add noise to prices.  In Chapter 2, I showed that depth is 
lowest at the start of the day and steadily increased as the trading day progressed.  
However, the average opening ?̂? is much lower in the post-event period, dropping 
from 0.93 to 0.68.  This was across all quintile groups. But the pattern for the signal-
to-noise ratio in the pre-event period is remarkable in that it opened high but then 
declined for a few minutes afterwards, indicating more noise in the market prices. A 
plausible explanation is that as part of the reform, traders were now able to cancel or 
amend their orders in the call auction, resulting in less unexecuted orders automatically 
                                                             
28 Biais et al (1999) – Paris Bourse, an order-driven market with no market-makers, no trading during 
the pre-open, report median β value of 0.68 at opening 
Barclay and Hendershott (2003) – NASDAQ, a quote-drive market with market makers, shares are 
traded in the pre-open – report β between 0.8-0.9 at market open. 
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transferred to the continuous market from the pre-opening period. The slight dip in 
information efficiency just after the call auction could be directly caused by those 
inefficient limit orders. 
In the post-event period, signal-to-noise ratio opened lower but rose steadily towards 
one, gaining price efficiency as available information was absorbed into the trading 
process.  When the stocks were split into quintile groups, we observed a momentary 
rise in noise just after opening for all of the actively traded quintile groups, and 
sometimes in the post-event period as well.   
After the signal-to-noise ratio recovered from the dip at the open, it hoovered around 
1 for the remainder of that first hour.  By contrast, after the change to call auction 
transparency, the signal-to-noise ratios tended to push past 1, hugging around 1.1.  At 
first glance, when one sees β estimates around 1, one might automatically conclude 
that the market was more efficient before the regime change. But Biais, Hilion and 
Spatt (1999) warned that interpretations of unbiasedness regression β findings of 1 
should be done cautiously.  It could reflect the countervailing effects of noise in prices 
(which drive the slope below one) and staleness (which drives prices above one).  I 
showed in Chapter 2 that trading volume is relatively low in morning trade, apart from 
trading at market open; therefore there is also considerable noise. 
The fact that average β in the post-event period is statistically >1 suggests that prices 
are either stale, or the market slightly underreacts to information, because cov (retcc, 
retci)>0.   
[insert Figure 3.3 here] 
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The general reduced level of noise in the price discovery process after the reform is 
further supported by Figure 3.3, which reveal lower root mean standard errors (RMSE) 
for all quintiles.   
The RMSE chart illustrates learning in the market.  Fluctuations in the RMSE charts 
reflect the fact that the rate at which incremental information is impounded is not 
stationary.  Figure 3.3 shows that in general, the biggest acceleration in the speed of 
learning takes place in the first half an hour after opening.  In the first 30 minutes, we 
observe the biggest fall in RMSE.  After that, they decline more gradually.  It is also 
worth noting that as stocks become less actively traded, the RMSE time series has 
more volatility.  For Quintile 1, the RMSE exhibit is almost a smooth line.  
3.6.2.2 Volatility regression 
A basic feature of efficient markets is low noise or price volatility29.  But the fact that 
the SSE is less noisy in the post-event period could simply be due to a diminished level 
of trading activity, as opposed to improvements in the efficiency of price discovery.   
The volatility regression results are reported in Table 3.4.     
[insert Table 3.4 here] 
The change variable is statistically significant and negative30.  Therefore, even after 
controlling for a reduced level of trading activity in the first hour, call auction 
transparency made the continuous market less noisy.  This result mirrors the reduction 
in RMSE of the unbiasedness regression and is consistent with hypothesis 3. 
                                                             
29 Black (1981) 
30 I note that the coefficient is close to zero, so this change is not an economically significant one. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
Establishing an opening reference price after an overnight period of inactivity can be 
a challenging process, but the opening price is important to trading strategy and sets 
the investor sentiment for the remainder of the trading day.   
 
The move from a fully opaque to a semi-transparent auction system caused a 
significant shift in price discovery from the call auction to the continuous market.  I 
observed a higher level of price discovery in the first hour of continuous trading, as 
well as the individual trades during that first hour becoming more informative.  This 
effect was more strongly felt amongst inactive stocks than actively traded ones. 
 
The opening prices in the post-event period have a lower signal-to-noise ratio, 
confirming that the opening price contained less information, as most of the price 
discovery has not taken place yet.  But the signal-to-noise ratio quickly rises and 
remains steadily higher than the pre-reform period for the remainder of the first hour 
time period.  Even controlling for a slightly diminished level of trading activity in the 
first hour, the market was calmer.  Foucault (1999) shows that in a market with less 
volatility, passive traders face less risk of being picked off at stale prices, and thus 
submit more aggressive limit orders.   
 
As previously mentioned, much of this could be due to the cancellation or amendment 
of otherwise unexecuted call auction orders.  That is only possible if traders are able 
to ‘look in’ at the price discovery taking effect during the opening call auction, even if 
it prompts many informed investors to wait until the continuous market before 
disseminating their private information by trade.   
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I agree with Comerton-Forde, Rydge and Burridge (2007) that call market design and 
trading rules can have a significant effect on its outcomes.  Overall, I conclude that 
call auction transparency improved the efficiency of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
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Chapter 4. The impact of a closing call auction on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
4.1 Introduction 
Since 1996, when it was introduced for illiquid stocks on the Paris Bourse, call auctions 
have increasingly been used to determine the closing price on international stock markets.  
Call auctions are argued to aggregate information by pooling orders, lower execution and 
market impact costs, eliminate the risk of front running and information disclosure, and 
lower price manipulations (Agarwalla, Jacob and Pandey, 2015).  Around closing times, 
market prices are subject to transitory inefficiencies, marked by high volatility and trade 
volume, as traders speed up their order entry to close out their position before the end of 
the trading day.  The call auction is often advocated as the best solution to handle such 
order imbalances and mitigate the transitory inefficiencies at the end of the trading day 
(Pagano, Peng and Schwartz, 2013). 
 
But while academic studies into the introduction of call auctions have generally shown 
that they improve price efficiency 31  and reduce market manipulations, not all 
introductions of the call auction to close markets have been positive.   When Hong Kong 
adopted the closing call auction in 2008, it was hampered by chaotic price swings and the 
call auction was abandoned after just 10 months.  It cannot, therefore, be assumed that all 
call auctions are superior to other price formation mechanisms. The performance of call 
auctions is largely influenced by its design and trading rules (Comerton-Forde, Rydge 
and Burridge, 2007).  Each example of closing call auction and its associated auction 
design is worthy of investigation.   
                                                             
31 A market that is price efficient is one in which prices ‘fully reflect’ all available information. (Fama, 
1970) 
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On 01 July 2006, the Shenzhen stock exchange (SZSE) commenced using a three minute 
call auction to close each day’s continuous market trading.  The Shenzhen experience is 
of particular study interest for two reasons.  First, Shenzhen’s closing call auction has a 
number of unusual characteristics.  It is unusually short32, fully opaque, and exists on a 
pure limit order book market that does not have an alternative trading platform during the 
non-trading hours.  It is a market dominated by uninformed rumour-based individual 
traders rather than institutional traders that rely heavily on the closing price to set the 
benchmark price for indexes and funds. During the time period covered by this study, 
there were no futures contracts, so the results of this chapter are not contaminated by 
abnormal trading behaviour on option expiry days. 
 
A quick, ‘black box’ call auction may have been designed to reduce the risk of price 
manipulation like that experienced by Hong Kong, but it comes at the expense of price 
discovery, an oft-cited merit of call auctions.  Pagano and Schwartz (2005) argue that 
transparency is critical for a closing call to be effective. “The driving force behind good 
price discovery at the close is for participants to see any buy or sell imbalances, and to 
benefit from an imbalance by entering an order that offsets it.” During SZSE’s three-
minute closing call, the system disseminates no information about imbalances or 
indicative closing prices. Therefore in the context of Shenzhen, an otherwise continuous 
trading market, I aim to find out whether a black box closing call auction worsens price 
discovery and deters traders that favour execution certainty. 
 
                                                             
32 The typical pre-closing period on other equity markets are 5-10 minutes.   
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The second motivation is that the SZSE exists as a competitor to the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange on the mainland Chinese stock market. Companies can only be listed on one, 
but not both exchanges.  Therefore, SZSE competes with Shanghai for a share in China’s 
stock market capitalisation.   
 
Right now, Hong Hong and Shanghai are the only two top 10 equity markets in the world 
that do not employ a call auction to determine the day’s closing price. The high price 
volatility near the end of the day makes it difficult for investors to match the closing price, 
which is needed to facilitate the execution of portfolio valuation and index rebalancing. 
(Aitken, Lepone and Chan, 2011).   In 2006, the SZSE was about 1/3 the market 
capitalisation of the SHSE.  It held 532 listed companies, whereas Shanghai had 834.33 
By July 2015, Shenzhen had grown to a market capitalisation of 3.3 trillion RMB and had 
1729 listed companies.  SHSE had also grown during this time to 4.8 trillion RMB, with 
1071 listed companies.  With SZSE quickly gaining on SHSE in scale and their otherwise 
very similar trading mechanism, it is a pertinent regulatory question whether the closing 
call auction is effective in the Chinese trading environment and whether Shanghai should 
follow the rest of the world in adopting it as well. 
 
I use this natural experiment to examine the effects of the new closing mechanism on the 
quality of the continuous market and on the trading behaviour of the market participants.  
I contribute to the literature by using high-frequency data to study the effects of the 
closing call auction on  spreads, volatility, turnover, trade size, and price discovery in 
one-minute intervals.  Focusing on such brief time intervals allows me to isolate the 
effects of market structure from broader market movement effects.  It is particularly 
                                                             
33 Source: http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics 
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relevant in the minutes that precede the close as the market is most volatile and active. 
(Kandel et al, 2012)   
 
I find that the closing call auction did not generate a substantial migration of trading 
activity from the continuous market, only 1.4% of daily turnover was transacted. The call 
auction, however, made trading in the continuous market just prior to 03:57, even more 
active, but not more volatile, amongst traders seeking to avoid the informationally non-
transparent closing call auction. Bid-ask spreads narrowed just before the close of 
continuous trading.  The quoted and effective spreads generated at the end of the call 
auction is substantially lower than when the closing price was generated by continuous 
trading.  In terms of closing price discovery, the efficiency of actively traded stocks 
improved but the efficiency of the closing price of the inactive stocks declined.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides the theoretical 
and empirical framework and develops the hypotheses.  Section 4.3 provides an overview 
of the institutional features of the SZSE and describes the call auction implementation. 
Section 4.4 provides the theoretical framework and develops the hypotheses. Sections 4.5 
and 4.6 describe the data and method used, respectively. Section 4.7 reports the results 
and Section 4.8 concludes. 
 
4.2  Literature review and hypothesis development 
A stream of literature has examined the impact of the introduction of the closing call 
auction on market quality.  
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The general academic opinion is that closing call auctions improve price discovery34. It 
does so in two ways.  First, closing call auctions pool information.  "With continuous 
trading, the technological ability to measure time and fire in orders with sub-millisecond 
precision fractures the order flow, thereby thinning out liquidity and disrupting the 
efficiency of price discovery. In contrast, call auctions by their very design match multiple 
orders so as to find the prices that best clear the market."35  
Secondly, calls prevent the manipulation of the closing price (Hoffman and Bommell, 
2010).  Hillion and Souminen (2004) showed that the introduction of closing call auction 
in Paris reduced price manipulation at the end of the continuous phase.  Similarly, in 
Singapore, Comerton-Forde, Lau and McInish (2007) found significantly reduced 
skewness and kurtosis for day-end returns, also suggesting reduced price manipulation. 
However, as the previous two chapters showed, the call market design, trading rules and 
institutional settings can have a significant impact on the call auction’s outcomes.  A 
‘plain vanilla’ call auction mechanism in Hong Kong was discovered to be susceptible to 
price manipulation, particularly in the form of sniping.  Suen and Wan (2012) explained: 
‘The HKEx experience is exceptional in that it is the only major stock exchange in the 
world that adopted a closing auction procedure without any precaution against price 
manipulation.’  This eventually led to its abandonment. 
Although it is the opinion of Pagano and Schwartz (2003) that call auctions deliver a more 
efficient closing price than continuous trading, Ho, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1985) 
showed that the prices in a call market, in general, are not equal to Walrasian equilibrium 
                                                             
34 See  Chelley-Steeley (2008, 2009), Battig and Chelley-Steeley (2010) – London 
Pagano and Schwartz (2005) – NASDAQ 
Pagano and Schwartz (2003) – Paris 
Comerton-Forde, Lau and McInish (2007), Chang, Rhee, Stone and Tang (2008) – Singapore 
35 Schwartz (2010) 
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unless (a) there is ‘symmetry in the distribution of individual buy/sell orders’, and (b) 
traders’ expectation about market clearing prices are accurate.  Because the traders in 
Shenzhen have no idea about the market clearing price during its 3 minute call auction, I 
expect the call closing price to be less than optimal, but nevertheless still an improvement 
upon the previous system because it ameliorates order imbalances and deters price 
manipulation.  Furthermore, the volume of liquidity-motivated traders migrating to the 
call auction and the fully opaque nature of the call auction order book, might lure 
informed traders and thus further enhance price discovery in the call.  The following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: The introduction of a closing call auction in Shenzhen improved the 
efficiency of the market closing price 
 
Since the closing call auction offers an alternative trading venue that is competitive with 
the continuous market, it has been argued that a significant proportion of volume shifts 
from the end of the continuous phase to the call auction (Kandel et al, 2012).  Institutional, 
for example, mutual fund investors have strong incentives to trade at the closing price, in 
order to minimise their tracking errors.  Kandel et al (2012) confirmed that this order 
migration is more pronounced when the closing price is set as the reference price. 
 
A shift in trade volume has direct implication for the liquidity of the continuous market.  
According to the limit order book model of Foucault et al (2005), the introduction of the 
closing call auction gives liquidity demanders another opportunity to trade and many 
traders become less impatient to trade before the close. As a result, they submit fewer 
market orders and may even supply liquidity, which reduces spreads and volatility.   
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In addition, Pagano et al (2013) assert that the closing call auction can ameliorate 
transitory inefficiencies, evidenced by widening spreads and accentuated volatilities, at 
the close.  By providing a venue that facilitates a more efficient order matching, the 
closing call auction mitigates the extent to which price discovery is perturbed by order 
imbalances caused by traders seeking to close out their positions by the end of the day.  
Pagano et al (2013) found supporting evidence that NASDAQ’s closing call auction 
significantly reduced both spread and volatility for all market capitalisation groups.   
 
Based on the above, I expect that the introduction of a closing call auction on Shenzhen 
will similarly result in more aggressive quote setting and hence lower price volatility in 
the continuous market that precedes the close.   
Hypothesis 2: The introduction of a closing call auction in Shenzhen narrowed the bid-
ask spreads of closing prices. 
Hypothesis 3: The introduction of a closing call auction in Shenzhen deceased volatility 
at the end of the continuous trading phase. 
 
However, given the proportionally smaller presence of institutional investors and a fully 
opaque call auction, the re-organisation of the end of day order flow may not be as 
substantial as what Kandel et al (2012) evidenced on Borsa Italiana and Paris Bourse after 
the closing call comes into effect.   
Hypothesis 4: The introduction of a closing call auction in Shenzhen moved only a small 
amount of trading volume from the last minutes of the continuous phase to the call auction. 
 
In addition to the papers already mentioned, there are other empirical studies that 
examined the market quality impact of closing call auctions.  Chelley-Steeley (2009) 
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studied the impact of call introduction on the London Stock Exchange.  She found an 
overall improvement in market quality, and the improvement was greatest at the open and 
for stocks with the lowest pre-call liquidity.  The London call auction, however, was 
introduced as a parallel alternative trading venue to a dealer market, and the London 
experience thus cannot be used to study the effect on the limit order book.  Comerton-
Forde, Lau and McInish (2007) and Chang, Rhee, Stone and Tang (2008) used two 
different but complementary methodologies to arrive at the same conclusion that pricing 
efficiency in Singapore improved.  Unfortunately for the Singaporean studies, opening 
and closing call auctions were introduced on the same month and the authors were unable 
to disentangle the impact of the closing auction from the opening auction. 
So far, only Huang and Tsai (2008) have studied the impact of the closing call auction on 
market quality in a fully opaque context, but the stock market on which that study was 
based used the call method for both its normal and closing trading.  Thus, Huang and Tsai 
(2008) is not directly comparable to China, nor the majority of the markets internationally 
that are based on continuous auctions.  Nonetheless, Huang and Tsai (2008) found that 
when a fully opaque order book was used for the closing call auction on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange, trading activity shifted away from the closing auction to the immediately 
preceding call auction intervals.  Trading volume, order submission and market depths at 
the close declined.  Huang and Tsai (2008) were able to sort their order book data by 
trader type and found the decline in order submission during the opaque call auction was 
mainly due to the actions of individual investors, closing their positions earlier rather than 
face an additional execution uncertainty risk during the closing call.  Nevertheless, the 
noise in stock prices declined and the authors concluded that the efficiency of price 
discovery process improved.  In contrast to the methodology used in this chapter, Huang 
and Tsai (2008) used five-minute time intervals to measure changes in various liquidity 
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measures, did not break their sample down to different liquidity groups, and declined to 
use the popular R-square price synchronicity measure despite calculating the relative 
return dispersion (RRD), which is based on the same market model.   
 
Based on the above discussion, it can be seen that the outcomes of a closing call auction 
are crucially dependent on the institutional setting and market conditions.   
 
4.3  Institutional detail 
Just like the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the SZSE is based on the electronic Consolidated 
Open Limit Order Book (COLOB). A 10 minute opening call auction is held between 
09:15 and 09:25, followed by the cooling periods from 9:25 am to 9:30 am, and two 
continuous auction sessions: the morning session from 9:30 am to 11:30 am and the 
afternoon session from 13:00 to 15:00. The market is closed on Saturdays and Sundays 
and other public holidays announced by the exchange. 
There are no designated dealers (specialists) to intervene in trading in the market. 
Investors place their orders with the brokers in the form of either a market order or limit 
order, and only good-to-day limit orders are accepted by the trading system. At the end 
of the trading day, all orders are purged from the COLOB.  The minimum tick size for all 
stocks is 0.01RMB. The quantity of stock purchased must be in round lots of 100, while 
there is no requirement on the quantity of sales.  Shares can’t be sold on the same day 
once they are bought. Floor trading among member brokers, and short selling are strictly 
prohibited. To curb sharp price movements, the limit of price change for each trading day 
is ±10% of the previous closing price, beyond which, trading will be halted for the rest of 
the day.  
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Prior to 1/7/2006, the closing price of stocks was determined by taking a volume-
weighted average price of the trade prices during the one minute before the last trade 
(including the last trade) on that day. In the absence of any trade on a trading day, the 
previous closing price was taken as the closing price of that day. During the continuous 
trading session, the information of the best five offers and bids and their associated 
volume as well as the price and volume for the latest transaction on the stock exchanges 
was displayed on computer terminals viewable by investors on and off both exchanges.  
From 1/7/2006, a closing call auction is held between 14:57-15:00.  During the closing 
call pricing period 14:57-15:00, investors can place but not amend or cancel their orders.  
The buy or sell orders not executed during the continuous trading automatically enter the 
closing call auction.  The closing price is generated from the call auction. In case no 
closing price is generated from the closing call auction, the trading volume-weighted 
average price of all the trades of the security one minute before the last trade (including 
the last trade) on that day is taken as the closing price.  In the absence of trades on a 
trading day, the previous closing price is taken as the closing price of that day. 
 
4.4  Data & sample 
The data used in this study is obtained from the Thomson Reuters database. The data 
comprises intra-day trades and the best bid and ask prices for all stocks listed on the 
Shenzhen stock exchange. Details of all trades and changes in best bid and ask prices are 
time stamped to the nearest second. 
Initially, the sample comprised of all A-shares listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange.  
To remove the effects of new IPO's, I excluded stocks that were listed after 01 July 2005.  
I also excluded stocks that suspended listing during the study period. A further 133 stocks 
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are excluded from the sample due to their inactive trading during the study period, 
resulting in a final sample size of 281 stocks.  
The sample is partitioned into five roughly even quintile groups, based on average daily 
turnover, to examine how the impact of the introduction of the closing call differs across 
stocks with different levels of liquidity.  Quintile 1 represents the most actively traded 
stocks, while quintile 5 is the least active SZSE shares during the study period.   
 
The problem of pricing efficiency and information asymmetry for non-actively traded 
shares is particularly acute in China.  About two-third of the outstanding Chinese stocks 
are state-owned and legal-person shares, which is neither transferrable nor tradeable on 
the open market.  Although they can’t directly deal with their shares, owners of illiquid 
shares exert a great deal of influence on corporate governance. They tend to dominate the 
board of directors and control inside information. By contrast, common traders receive 
very little information and these illiquid stocks are generally not followed by analysts.  In 
London, Chelley-Steeley (2009) showed that low liquidity securities experienced greater 
improvements in price efficiency than stocks with high pre-call liquidity. But Chang et al 
(2008) found that gains were less for less liquid stocks in Singapore. 
Like the previous two chapters, a period of five weeks before and after the disclosure of 
partial order information in the opening call auction of the SZSE is used in the study for 
analysis.  This gives us a sufficient window to capture the immediate as well as the 
permanent effect of the change in opening call auction transparency. 
To measure changes in market efficiency, I extend the sample period to 6 months before 
and 6 months after the event, a total of 240 trading days.  This sample length, using 
Pagano and Schwartz’s (2003) methodology, is consistent with the literature.   
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4.5 Methodology 
This chapter examines the impact of the introduction of the closing call auction on market 
quality, focusing particularly on its effect on spread, volatility, trading activity and price 
efficiency.   
4.5.1  Univariate comparisons 
I begin by examining the changes in the intraday patterns of liquidity and volatility in the 
last thirty minutes of normal trading on the SZSE.   I limit the investigation of the 
continuous market to the last half an hour because Kandel et al (2012) showed that the 
introduction of call auction had very little effect on the markets in Paris and Italy 
throughout most of the day, until during the very last minutes, where the effect was found 
to be very dramatic.  The intraday patterns are assessed in 30 one-minute intervals 
between 14:30 and 15:00.  Longer intervals (eg. 30 minutes), which other papers36 have 
done, make it difficult to discern whether the changes are attributable to matters 
pertaining to the closing call per se, or some other attribute of the continuous market.  
This approach is compatible with that of Kandel et al (2012), Pagano et al (2013), Ibikunle 
(2015).   
I analyse the changes in liquidity from both the price aspect (ie. quoted proportional 
spread, effective proportional spread) and quantity aspect (ie. dollar depth).   The liquidity 
measures are calculated as follows: 
PROPORTIONAL BID-ASK SPREAD (%) = 
𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒−𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑏𝑖𝑑−𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡
×100 
PROPORTIONAL EFFECTIVE SPREAD (%) =  
2×
|𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑏𝑖𝑑−𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛|
𝑏𝑖𝑑−𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡
×100  
                                                             
36 Pagano and Schwartz (2003), Aitken et al (2011) 
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DOLLAR DEPTH = (𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ×𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒) +
(𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ×𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒) 
 
Volatility is calculated by Parkinson’s (1980)’s volatility measure: 
VOLATILITY idt (%)= (𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑑𝑡) ×100 
Where 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑡  is the highest transaction price of stock i, for day d, interval t; and 𝐿𝑖𝑑𝑡 is the 
lowest transaction price of stock i, for day d, interval t. 
Intraday patterns in trading activity are assessed as follows:  
PROPORTIONAL 37  NUMBER OF TRADES = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦
 
 PROPORTIONAL AVERAGE TRADE SIZE = 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦
 
 
PROPORTIONAL TURNOVER = 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦
 
If the introduction of the closing call auction causes trade volume to shift to the call 
auction as hypothesised, the proportional values of turnover at the end of the trading day 
will decline significantly as this volume is shifted to the closing call auction.   
                                                             
37 In order to control for variations in trading activity across trading days and stocks 
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4.5.2 Multivariate analysis 
To control for other changes in overall market conditions during the sample period, 
multivariate regressions are performed on spread and volatility.  The bid-ask spread is 
affected by price volatility38, market capitalisation39, and trading activity40.  Similarly, 
price volatility can be broken into spread, market capitalisation, volatility of the 
underlying price discovery process and the level of trading activity (Pagano et al 2013).   
I conduct panel regression analysis on spread and volatility for one-minute intervals 
during the last thirty minutes of the trading day for the full sample group.  For the 
endogeneity reasons as outlined in chapter 2, I solve the equations simultaneously: 
𝑝𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑑 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑑 +
 𝛽2 ln(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖)  +  𝛽3 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑑 + 𝛽4 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑑  +
 ∑ 𝛽𝑛
7
𝑛=5 ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑛
10
𝑛=8 ∗ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 ∗
𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡     (1) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑑 = 𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑝𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑑 +
 𝛾2 ln(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖) + 𝛾3𝑠𝑡𝑑_𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖   +
𝛾4𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑑 + 𝛾5 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑑 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑛
8
𝑛=6 ∗
𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑛
11
𝑛=9 ∗ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 ∗
𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡      (2) 
Where 𝑝𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑑  is the average proportional bid-ask spread (%) for stock i, at time interval 
t, on day d. 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑑  is the Parkinson (1980) volatility (%) measure for stock i, time 
interval t, day d.  𝑠𝑡𝑑_𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖  is the standard deviation of close-to-close returns 
                                                             
38 McInish and Wood (1992) 
39 Huberman and Halka (2001) 
40 Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) 
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measured over the study period, and represents volatility of the underlying price 
discovery process.  𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is the equity market capitalisation as at the 
close of trading on June 30 2006. 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑑 is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the 
observation is after 1 July 2006, and 0 otherwise. Also included are 3 five-minute time 
interval dummies to capture the sharp rise in spread and volatility in the last fifteen 
minutes of trading.  The interaction variables  𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 ∗
𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡  captures any additional changes in the intraday 
patterns as a result of the closing call introduction.  The results are reported in Table 4.3. 
4.5.3  Measuring price efficiency 
4.5.3.1 Return Synchronicity 
To measure market efficiency, I apply the methodology first employed by Pagano and 
Schwartz (2003) to study changes in market efficiency on the Paris Bourse. It is based on 
Cohen et al (1983), which uses a market model to compare short and long run relationship 
between individual stocks and the broader market index over different time intervals.  The 
idea is that that frictions in the trading process would delay the adjustment of prices to 
new information and the resulting Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators of beta would 
become biased or inefficient.  An increase in the adjusted-R squares following the reform 
will indicate greater synchronicity in prices, a tighter fit between the individual asset 
returns and market returns, and hence improved price efficiency. 
I use the Shenzhen A-share index as the market index for running the market model 
regressions.  I calculate daily close-to-close returns for each stock and the A-share 
index using 12 different intervals: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, and 20 days.  Each stock's 
12 adjusted R-squares in the 120 trading days pre-event period and 120 trading days post-
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event period are calculated by performing a 'first pass regression' on the following market 
model: 
RidLE = αiLE + βiLE RmdLE + eidL,E       i=1,...n    L=1,...10, 15, 20  E=1,2         (3) 
where RidLE  is the close-to-close return for stock  i on day d for time interval L, using 
either the pre or post-event returns (E).  Correspondingly, RmdLE is the market return on 
day d for time interval L, using either the pre or post-event returns (E).   The adjusted R-
square estimates are expected to be higher in the post-event period if the introduction of 
the closing call auction improved price discovery. 
To assess whether the post-event R-squares are higher than pre-event R-squares, the 
adjusted R-square estimates from the first-pass regression are used as regressors to 
estimate the following second-pass regression: 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑅𝑖𝐿𝐸
2  =  𝛽𝑖0 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐿
−1) + 𝛽𝑖2(𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝐸 ∙ 𝑙𝑛(1 +
𝐿−1)) +  𝛽𝑖3(𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝐸) + 𝑢𝑖𝐿𝐸           (4) 
where 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑅𝑖𝐿𝐸
2   is the adjusted R-square for stock i, calculated using a L-day return 
interval during  either the pre or post-event period (E).  𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝐸  is set to 1 if the 
observation is in the post-event period, and 0 for the pre-event period.  L is the return 
interval used in the first-pass regression.   
The second-pass regression is written as such because Pagano and Schwartz (2003) 
determined that the transformed time interval, ln(1+L-1), would provide the best linear fit 
between the R-square estimates from the first-pass regression and L.  As L approaches 
infinity, the constant term becomes the asymptotic value of R-square.  So if price 
synchronicity is improved in the post-event period, adjusted R-square will shift to a higher 
asymptotic or 'true' level, as reflected in positive and significant 𝛽𝑖3  estimates.  The 
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coefficient 𝛽𝑖1 is expected to be negative as R-square of the market is expected to increase 
with return interval. 
4.5.3.2 Relative Return Dispersion (RRD) 
For robustness, I extend my study by examining another measure of market efficiency: 
the Relative return dispersion coefficient (RRD) presented in Amihud et al (1997).  They 
argue that as market frictions weaken, the market quality improves and the residuals of 
the market model decline. Using one-day returns, the RRD coefficient is calculated as: 
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑑 = (
1
𝑛
) ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝐸𝑑
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑑  is the average relative return dispersion coefficient on day d, obtained 
using all i stock samples. n is the number of stocks in the sample on day d.  𝑒𝑖𝐸𝑑
2  is the 
squared market model (equation 3) residuals of security i on day d.  
The RRD measure provides a complimentary approach to Cohen et al (1983).  The R-
square statistic captures the size of the market model residuals over time, for a particular 
stock.  The RRD measure depicts the size of the market model residuals across stocks, 
for a particular trading day.  Therefore, it captures the co-variation in the residuals across 
the sample stocks.  Since the dispersion of returns for the individual stocks due to firm-
specific information should be independent of the trading mechanism, systematic 
differences in RRD measure in the pre and post-call period indicate differences in 
efficiency (Chelley-Steeley, 2009).  The RRD should fall after the introduction of a 
closing call auction, as the closing trading system is better able to cope with order 
imbalances, resulting in less correlated and smaller residuals across the sample on day d. 
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4.6  Results 
4.6.1  Effect on liquidity 
4.6.1.1 Intraday univariate analysis 
[insert Table 4.1 here] 
[insert Table 4.2 here] 
Panels A–C in tables 4.1 and 4.2 document the change in intraday spread patterns during 
the last half an hour of the trading day, over the 5 week pre and post-event periods.   
The results show a decrease in average quoted and effective spreads across every minute 
interval.  The magnitude of the decrease is greater and more statistically significant in the 
earlier intervals than about 9 minutes before the commencement of the call auction.  
During the interval 1430 - 1431, quoted proportional spread fell 2.9%, but it merely 
dropped an average of 0.2% for the time interval 1454-1455, which is not a statistically 
significant change.   
Interestingly, the quoted proportional spread in the post-event period peaks about two 
minutes before the commencement of the closing call auction. A minute before the 
closing auction, the quoted proportional spread drops and is again statistically 
significantly lower than in the same time period before the call auction.  It is a sign of 
traders submitting competitive last-minute limit orders so that their trade can either be 
completed before the market moves into the call auction phase or their limit order gets 
rolled into the call auction and is executed as part of the closing price.  Only limit orders 
are submitted during the closing call auction.   
Also notable is that after the closing call auction was introduced, the closing spread is 
drastically reduced.  Average quoted proportional spread fell 73.6% to a significantly 
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lower 0.0775%, average closing effective spread dropped 16.3% to 0.011 RMB and 
average proportional effective spread fell by 16% to 0.257%.   
As a sign of their illiquidity, higher quintile stocks have higher average quoted and 
effective spreads.  Quoted proportional spread and proportional effective spread generally 
fell across all quintiles during the assessed time intervals. However, the difference is 
generally statistically significant for the actively traded quintile groups than for the 
illiquid ones.  For all five quintiles, closing quoted proportional spread and closing 
proportional effective spread is significantly lower in the post-event period, and quoted 
proportional spread peaks two minutes before the onset of the closing call auction.   
Panel D in table 4.1 and 4.2 documents the intraday patterns of order book depth in the 
last 30 minutes, before and after the introduction of the closing call auction. As it can be 
seen, average dollar depth declined in the post-event period.  Whilst this may be argued 
to be a direct result of the introduction of the closing call auction, it is more plausibly 
caused by the introduction of market orders on the SZSE from 01 July 2006.  Market 
orders are used by liquidity-motivated traders who are no longer required to supply 
liquidity to the market by posting competitive limit orders.  Limit orders supply market 
liquidity whereas market orders consume the liquidity supplied, hence there is less depth 
at the best bid and ask quotes.   
The overall minute by minute fall is more statistically significant for some quintile groups 
than for others. The decline in dollar depth is mostly statistically significant for quintile 
5, and somewhat significant for quintile 1.  The changes are generally not statistically 
significant for quintiles 2, 3 and 4. 
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4.6.1.2 Multivariate analysis 
Table 4.2 reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics of the multivariate analysis of 
spread, controlling for other changes in overall market conditions during the sample 
period.  
The parameter estimate for the change variable shows that overall, the call had a 
significant impact on reducing proportional bid-ask spread in the last 30 minutes of the 
trading day, at the 10% level of significance.  Compared with before the introduction of 
the closing call auction, proportional bid-ask spread within the last 30 minutes of trading 
are, on average, 0.001% lower.  Spread is inversely related to market capitalization and 
positively related to price volatility and trade turnover.  The dummy interaction variables 
reveal that spread reduction is especially large in the last five minutes of the market.  The 
marginal decline is 0.0063% and 0.0034% for the last 5 minutes and last 10 minutes, 
respectively.  
The univariate and multivariate results combined reveal that closing call auction tangibly 
narrowed the closing bid-ask spreads, and reduced the overall immediacy cost of trading 
on the Shenzhen stock market.  The hypothesis that closing call auction will result in more 
aggressive quote setting and narrower bid-ask spreads as the market approaches closure 
is supported. 
4.6.2  Effect on volatility 
4.6.2.1 Intraday univariate analysis 
Panel E in table 4.1 and 4.2 presents the univariate minute by minute volatility patterns 
for the last half an hour of the trading day, over the 5 week pre and post-event periods.      
The data shows that stock prices become increasingly volatile as the market approaches 
the end of its continuous trading.  But with the availability of a closing call auction, the 
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peak of price volatility (0.04%), which occurs just before the close of continuous trading, 
is nearly half of the peak volatility during the pre-event period (0.07%).  During the other 
one-minute time intervals, volatility in the post-event period is generally lower, and 
generally by a statistically significant amount.  This observed pattern is consistent across 
all five quintile stock groups. 
The only two intervals where the post-event volatility is noticeably higher than the pre-
event period volatility is during the two minutes just before the post-event continuous 
market closes (14:55-14:56, 14:56-14:57).  But that is due to imminent continuous market 
closure.  The equivalent two minutes (14:58-14:59, 14:59-15:00) in the pre-event period 
generated significantly higher price volatility, averaging 0.05% and 0.07% respectively.   
4.6.2.2 Multivariate analysis 
[insert Table 4.3 here] 
Table 4.3 reports the results of the multivariate analysis based on one-minute volatility 
estimates during the final 30 minutes of the trading day.   
The parameter estimate for the change variable in equation (2) shows that, compared to 
prior to the introduction of the closing call auction, average one-minute interval 
volatilities fell by 0.005% in the 30 minutes lead up to the close.  The final five minutes 
has an additional 0.021% less volatility, compared to the same time period, prior to 01 
July 2006.  
The multivariate regression also confirms that the closing 5 minutes have significantly 
higher volatility, compared to the rest of the trading day, and is consistent with the 
intraday pattern observed in table 4.1 and 4.2, Panel D.  In Shenzhen, volatility increases 
with the spread, market cap size, the daily return volatility and average turnover. 
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In summary, these results support my initial hypothesis that closing call auctions will 
dampen the volatility accentuations that typically characterize order-book market 
closings.  The effect is strongest during the minutes just prior to the close.  
4.6.3 Effect on trading activity 
Panels F-H in Table 4.1 and 4.2 present the univariate intraday patterns for proportional 
number of trades, proportional average trade size, and proportional turnover. 
Panel F Table 4.1 shows that as the market approaches the end of its trading day, the 
proportional number of trade that gets transacted in each time interval increases.  During 
the last 30 minutes of the trading day, this proportional value nearly doubles, from 0.48% 
during 14:30-1:431 interval to 0.83% in 14:59-15:00 in the pre-event study period.  The 
less actively a stock is traded, the bigger proportion of its daily trades is transacted near 
the end of the trading day.  This is to be expected, as traders in illiquid stocks will want 
to concentrate their trading during the parts of the day when liquidity is highest.  
Similar to the proportional number of trades, the proportional size of the trades and the 
proportional turnover in each time interval also increase as the market approaches 15:00.  
At the end of continuous trading in the pre and post-event period, the average trade size 
is about 132% and 124%, respectively, of its daily average trade size.  Proportional 
turnover in the last minute before the end of continuous trading is about double the 
turnover 30 minutes before at 15:30-15:31.   
The effect of the introduction of the closing call auction is that about 1.4% of daily 
turnover migrated to the closing call.  The daily percentage turnover slightly increases as 
stock liquidity decreases. This turnover is low but similar to other Asia-Pacific markets, 
which tend to have lower trading volumes in the closing call auctions than in other 
markets. (Pinfold and He, 2012)   
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In addition, there is a significant rise in the average proportional number of trades, 
average proportional trade size and average proportional turnover in the last 30 minutes, 
in the post-event study period.  This evinces an increased aggressiveness in trading 
activity in the market just before the end of continuous trading by traders that want to 
avoid the call auction.   
Therefore, the introduction of the closing call auction did not cause a substantial 
migration of trading activity away from the continuous market, and in fact made trading 
the continuous market just before the close even more intense.  The lack of information 
transparency made the call auction too risky for the majority of traders, preferring to close 
their daily trading in the continuous auction market instead.   
4.6.4 Price Efficiency 
4.6.4.1 First pass results 
[insert Table 4.4 here] 
Table 4.4 reports the synchronicity of the price discovery, as judged by the adjusted R-
square estimates of equation 3.  The table reports the average adjusted R-squares for the 
full sample and then five quintile groups using the 12 time intervals, 240 trading days 
before and after the event.  As commensurate with the literature41, the magnitude of the 
average R-squares are higher in the actively traded stock groups and as the return horizon 
increases. 
Overall, the results show that following the introduction of a closing call auction, the 
average adjusted R-squares increased for the actively traded stocks (Quintiles 1-3) but 
declined for the inactive stock groups (quintiles 4 and 5).  The diminished levels of 
                                                             
41 For example, Battig and Chelley-Steeley (2009).  Also, Pinfold and He (2012) points out that illiquid 
stocks have stale prices, and this reduces the value of its R-squares.  Nevertheless, improvements in R-
squares represent improvements in pricing efficiencies for all stocks. 
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synchronicity for the inactively traded stocks suggest lower market quality and is 
consistent with the theory presented in chapter 2 that in a market with high adverse 
selection risk and information asymmetry, a fully opaque call auction can discourage 
participation and therefore meaningful price discovery.   
4.6.4.2 Second-pass regression 
The result of the second-pass regression is presented in Table 4.5.  The asymptotic levels 
of R-square (  𝛽𝑖0 and (𝛽𝑖0 + 𝛽𝑖3) for the pre and post-event period, respectively) are 
reported as R2CONSTANT. R2SLOPE is the second-pass slope parameter estimated as 
𝛽𝑖1 and (𝛽𝑖1+𝛽𝑖2) for the pre and post-event period, respectively.   
[insert Table 4.5 here] 
The second-pass regression results confirm the findings from the first-pass regression that 
the price quality of illiquid stocks declined, but the price quality of active liquid stocks 
improved in the post-event period.  The magnitude of the post-call R2CONSTANT 
parameter rose at a statistically significant level for quintiles 1-3 and fell for quintiles 4 
and 5.  
The R2SLOPE parameter is negative and significant for all quintiles.  In the post-call 
period, this parameter became even more negative.  This suggests a strengthening of the 
relationship between R-square and lag length in the post-call period.  (Chelley-Steeley, 
2009) 
In table 4.6, I also present the results of the second-pass regression in a frequency table.  
For each quintile, the stocks are divided into three categories of pricing efficiency change 
as measured by the dummy coefficient 𝛽𝑖3 : statistically significant and negative, not 
statistically significant, and statistically significant and positive.  The level of significance 
used is 5%.   
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[insert Table 4.6 here] 
Table 4.6 shows that more than half of the stocks in quintiles 1 and 2 shifted to a higher 
asymptotic R-square level after the closing call auction was introduced.  For the two least 
liquid quintiles, there were more declines in asymptotic R-square values than increases.  
Overall, the majority change in the R2CONSTANT parameter was a positive increase in 
the post-event period. 
4.6.4.3  RRD results 
Table 4.7 shows the mean values of the RRD statistic for the full sample, and then five 
quintile groups.  The average RRD across the full sample is 0.00277 (median=0.001124) 
in the pre-event period and 0.000724 (median=0.000659) in the post-event period.  This 
decrease in mean RRD is significant at 5% level of significance.  
In addition, the RRD measure fell across all quintiles after the introduction of the closing 
call auction.  The magnitude of the change appears to be roughly related to stock liquidity.  
The mean drop is greatest for the most actively traded group, and then becomes generally 
smaller as stock illiquidity increases.  This pattern of change suggests that the actively 
traded stocks experience a greater improvement in market quality than illiquid securities.  
[insert Table 4.7 here] 
4.7  Conclusion 
The introduction of the closing call auction did not cause a substantial migration of order 
flow away from the continuous market.  Rather than observing very little trading before 
the close, the introduction of the call auction made trading in the continuous market the 
immediately preceded the closing call even more attractive and active.  The risk of 
execution uncertainty, made worse by the lack of information disclosure during the call, 
and a ‘black box’ trading system that advantages informed traders, made traders that do 
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not need to trade at the closing price even keener to complete their orders before the 
closing call.   
Nevertheless, the call auction’s competitiveness and role in reducing order imbalances, 
lowered spreads and stabilised prices in the period both in the period leading up to the 
close and at the close.  The decrease in the spread is most significant in the minutes just 
before the onset of the closing call auction.   
The closing call auction did not improve the efficiency of all stocks.  The results in 
Shenzhen showed that the closing call generally improved the efficiency of actively 
traded stocks’ closing prices, but was detrimental to the price quality of less actively 
traded ones.  This finding is in contrast with Chelley-Steeley (2009), which drew the 
opposite conclusion that closing call auctions was beneficial to the quality of illiquid 
stocks but did not enhance the market quality of high-liquid ones, and Pinfold and He 
(2012), which found that even highly illiquid stocks in New Zealand benefited from a 
closing call auction.  London and New Zealand, unlike Shenzhen, had its full order book 
disclosed during the call and allowed orders placed in the closing auction to be withdrawn 
before the auction closed.  This type of call auction structure reduced adverse selection 
risk to the participants in the auction and encouraged price discovery.  The quality of 
Shenzhen’s closing call auction system may be improved by adopting similar rules. 
In view of the fact that it narrowed spreads, reduced market volatility and improved price 
efficiency (for some stocks), the closing call auction was a positive addition to the 
Chinese trading environment.  It is arguable that the results would be even more enhanced 
if the closing call auction disclosed some information, such as the indicative auction 
prices and indicative auction volumes during the call.  Given that Shanghai has now the 
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fifth largest stock market in the world by market capitalisation42, the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange43 should consider adopting a closing call auction as well. 
 
                                                             
42 Source: http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics 
43 I repeated the methodology used in this chapter on A-shares traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
over the same time period. My results are available upon request. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This dissertation contains three essays that investigate the impact of a stock market call 
auction reform on market quality.  Call auctions play an integral role in price-setting and 
have become the most popular means to open and close daily trading in equity markets 
around the world.  The performance of a call auction is entirely dependent on its market 
design and exchange trading rules.  Nevertheless, the information transparency of the call 
auction is a still-not-settled and under-developed research area. Furthermore, the 
academic literature has tended to focus on developed Western markets.  Very few studies 
have been published about emerging markets such as China, which has unique market 
characteristics that give new insight into the behaviour of uninformed individuals in 
financial markets.  The conclusions and intraday data presented in this dissertation allow 
regulators and Chinese market participants to make decisions on how to best make use of 
this alternative trading platform.  
 
The first essay in this dissertation uses the natural experiment offered by the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange to examine the relationship between the transparency of the opening call 
auction and the liquidity of the continuous market.  The dynamics of the opening process 
and its impact on trading activity for the rest of the day is of interest to traders because 
traders can either cluster their trades during the non-trading period or withhold their 
orders until the market opens.   
 
The results indicate that the dissemination of indicative trade information during the 
opening call session led to an overall improvement in liquidity costs.  Bid-ask spreads 
narrowed because adverse selection risk fell significantly and there is less price volatility 
in the continuous market.  This effect is greater for actively traded securities than illiquid 
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securities.  The results also reveal a temporary decrease in trading volume in the first hour.  
The essay concludes that in an emerging market, where the market is dominated by 
individual investors, although improved transparency may discourage trading from 
informed investors, small non-institutional investors do benefit from better market 
transparency.   
 
The second essay builds upon the first essay by examining the impact the introduction of 
opening call auction transparency in Shanghai, and the resulting decline in trading activity, 
had on the price discovery process of the continuous market, particularly within the first 
hour after market opening.  Market efficiency is assessed on both dimensions of price 
discovery and noise.  
 
The results reveal some migration in price discovery from the call auction to the 
continuous trading period. As a result, overall price discovery in the first hour of 
continuous trading rose.  The proportional increase in this price discovery was observed 
to be greater for inactively traded stocks, than for actively traded stocks.  Additionally, 
the continuous market became less noisy, even after controlling for trading activity.  The 
essay suggests that this is due to the cancellation or amendment of otherwise unexecuted 
call auction orders.  It is only possible if traders are able to ‘look in’ at the price discovery 
taking effect during the opening call auction, even if it prompts many informed investors 
to wait until the continuous market before disseminating their private information by trade.  
The essay concludes that a more transparency opening call auction is good for the 
efficiency of the Chinese stock market. 
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The third essay examines the effect of the introduction of a new closing call auction in 
Shenzhen on the quality of the market and on the trading behaviour of the Chinese market 
participants.  The study employs high-frequency data to examine the effects of the closing 
call auction on  spreads, volatility, turnover, trade size, and price discovery in one-minute 
intervals.    
 
The results indicate that the closing call auction did not cause a substantial migration of 
trading activity from the continuous market to the call.  Instead, the closing call auction 
generated a new peak in trading activity just prior to the closure of the continuous market, 
as traders sought to avoid the informationally opaque closing call auction.  Bid-ask 
spreads also narrowed just before the end of continuous trading.  Likewise, the quoted 
and effective spreads generated at the end of the call auction were substantially lower 
than pre-reform, when the closing price was generated by continuous trading prices.   
 
In terms of closing price discovery, the results show that the closing call generally 
improved the efficiency of actively traded stocks’ closing prices, but was detrimental to 
the price quality of less actively traded ones.  This finding is in contrast with Chelley-
Steeley (2009) and Pinfold and He (2012).  In those two studies, the stock markets had 
its full order book disclosed during the call and allowed orders that were placed in the 
closing auction to be withdrawn before the auction closed.  This type of call auction 
structure reduced adverse selection risk to the market participants and encouraged price 
discovery.  It is suggested that the quality of Shenzhen’s closing call auction system may 
be improved by adopting similar rules.  Furthermore, the regulators of Shanghai Stock 
Exchange may use this study to support proposals to introduce closing call auctions as 
well.    
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Tables 
Table 2.1 Univariate test for five weeks before and after July 1, 2006 
Panel A Entire sample 
  Pre Post Difference 
Number of trades in the first hour   
 Mean 245.25 210.1 -35.15 
 Mean difference t-test -26.75* 
Quoted Proportional Spread (%) 
 Mean 0.3221 0.3162 -0.006 
 Mean difference t-test -3.941* 
Effective Spread 
 Mean 0.0259 0.0216 -0.0044 
 Mean difference t-test -18.91* 
Proportional Effective Spread (%) 
 Mean 0.403 0.3325 -0.071 
 Mean difference t-test -37.94* 
Depth  
 Mean 66900 53805 -13095 
 Mean difference t-test -10.06* 
Dollar Depth  (RMB) 
 Mean 295017 230726 -64291 
 Mean difference t-test -9.57* 
Time between trades (seconds) 
 Mean 17.95 22.17 4.22 
 Mean difference t-test 13.34* 
Total trading volume 
 Mean 1983815 1410092 -573724 
 Mean difference t-test 16.02* 
Ratio of transacted volume from call auction to trade volume during  first hour 
 Mean 0.0226 0.0213 -0.0013 
 Mean difference t-test -0.5362 
    Volatility (standard deviation) 
 Mean 0.0544 0.0479 -0.0065 
 Mean difference t-test -7.599 * 
This table contains the descriptive statistics for the first hour of daily trade: the number of trades, proportional 
quoted spread (%), effective spread, proportional effective spread (%), depth (sum of best bid and ask 
volume), time between trades (seconds), volatility (standard deviation), trading volume and the ratio of 
transacted call volume to trade volume.  For each variable, the mean and mean changes for the five weeks 
before and after the structural change on July 1, 2006 are reported.  A t-test reports whether the change in 
mean values between the pre and post-event period is statistically significant.  The sample consist of 780 
stocks included in Shanghai’s A-share index.   
* denotes significance at the 1% level  
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Table 2.1 Univariate test for five weeks before and after July 2006 
Panel B to Panel F Sorted into quintiles 
 
Panel B - Quintile 1 Trade Volume 1   Trade Volume 2   Trade Volume 3   Total 
 Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change 
Number of stocks 125 125   26 26   5 5   156 156  
Number of trades in the first hour                            
Mean 399.50 361.42 -38.07  323.39 262.91 -60.48  239.45 216.71 -22.74  385.79 344.08 -41.71 
Mean difference t-test  -6.42    -4.99    -4.18    -7.82 
Quoted Proportional Spread (%)                           
Mean 0.2294 0.2218 -0.0076  0.1958 0.1911 -0.0048  0.2560 0.2565 0.0005  0.2240 0.2169 0.0070 
Mean difference t-test  -17.1507    -3.2080    0.0373    -15.7281 
Effective spread                             
Mean 0.0183 0.0160 -0.0023  0.0441 0.0393 -0.0048  0.0779 0.0696 -0.0084  0.0230 0.0202 -0.0027 
Mean difference t-test  -17.48    -7.47    -1.81    -16.97 
Proportional Effective Spread (%)                         
Mean 0.2795 0.2524 -0.2318  0.2457 0.2231 -0.4839  0.2865 0.3104 -0.8378  0.2741 0.2477 -0.0260 
Mean difference t-test  -19.51    -9.92    -1.45    -21.68 
Depth                               
Mean 161541 146932 -14609  15408 13304 -2104  8530 7275 -1255  136196 123773 -12423 
Mean difference t-test  -14.40    -15.24    1.44    -14.78 
Dollar Depth (RMB)                             
Mean 631729 576808 -54921  246762 218326 -28437  164366 231162 66796  564572 514845 -49727 
Mean difference t-test  -17.44    -11.81    2.83    -18.82 
Time between trades (seconds)                           
Mean 9.34 10.43 1.08  11.49 14.29 2.81  14.96 16.52 1.55  9.74 11.11 1.37 
Mean difference t-test  5.98    5.21    4.19    7.57 
Ratio of transacted volume from call auction to trade volume during the first hour                 
Mean 0.0125 0.0159 0.0034  0.0105 0.0124 0.0019  0.0079 0.0276 0.0197  0.0121 0.0153 0.0032 
Mean difference t-test  4.07    1.05    1.98    4.28 
Volatility                               
Mean 0.0560 0.0486 -0.0074  0.1601 0.1287 -0.0314  0.2455 0.2126 -0.0329  0.0746 0.0630 -0.0115 
Mean difference t-test   -3.70       -2.48       -2.01       -4.20 
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Panel C - Quintile 2                
 Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change 
Number of stocks 81 81   53 53   22 22   156 156  
Number of trades in the first hour               
Mean 317.90 266.03 -51.86  258.43 244.49 -13.93  198.69 153.81 -44.87  280.88 242.89 -37.99 
Mean difference t-test  -6.49    -1.76    -4.16    -7.12 
Quoted Proportional Spread (%)              
Mean 0.2780 0.2757 -0.0023  0.2271 0.2215 -0.0056  0.3111 0.3209 0.0098  0.2654 0.2636 -0.0020 
Mean difference t-test  -3.62    -4.62    2.59    -21.31 
Effective spread                
Mean 0.0160 0.0133 -0.0027  0.0326 0.0210 -0.0116  0.0921 0.0704 -0.0217  0.0324 0.0240 -0.0084 
Mean difference t-test  -13.99    -7.20    -5.11    -10.24 
Proportional Effective Spread (%)              
Mean 0.3527 0.3014 -0.0513  0.4364 0.2554 -0.1811  0.4093 0.3278 -0.0815  0.3891 0.2895 -0.1000 
Mean difference t-test  -12.34    -7.84    -5.83    -11.87 
Depth                
Mean 70765 70545 -220  22053 21542 -511  11201 9920 -1281  45815 45346 -468 
Mean difference t-test  -0.46    -3.57    -5.98    -1.85 
Dollar Depth (RMB)               
Mean 281633 271099 -10534  165370 163940 -1430  185690 179136 -6554  228117 222209 -5907 
Mean difference t-test  -6.31    1.28    -1.42    -5.14 
Time between trades (seconds)               
Mean 11.59 13.95 2.36  14.51 15.10 0.59  19.40 25.77 6.37  13.68 16.01 2.32 
Mean difference t-test  6.46    0.96    4.35    6.19 
Ratio of transacted volume from call auction to trade volume during the first hour          
Mean 0.0193 0.0201 0.0008  0.0150 0.0120 -0.0029  0.0161 0.0203 0.0043  0.0170 0.0172 0.0002 
Mean difference t-test  0.30    -1.23    0.60    0.09 
Volatility                
Mean 0.0363 0.0310 -0.0053  0.0603 0.0608 0.0005  0.1812 0.1498 -0.0314  0.0649 0.0579 -0.0070 
Mean difference t-test  -4.90    0.14    -2.81    13.27 
 
Panel D - Quintile 3                
 Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change 
Number of stocks 47 47   82 82   22 27   156 156  
Number of trades in the first hour               
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Mean 283.21 226.83 -56.38  229.14 203.94 -25.21  192.17 147.25 -44.91  239.03 201.02 -38.01 
Mean difference t-test  -4.89    -3.71    -4.33    -7.06 
Quoted Proportional Spread (%)              
Mean 0.3548 0.3605 0.0057  0.2831 0.2727 -0.0105  0.2812 0.3203 0.0391  0.3044 0.3074 -0.0030 
Mean difference t-test          4.67    -8.47    11.18    3.06 
Effective spread                
Mean 0.0178 0.0124 -0.0055  0.0186 0.0157 -0.0028  0.0426 0.0407 -0.0019  0.0222 0.0194 -0.0028 
Mean difference t-test  -13.67    -16.71    3.54    -15.80 
Proportional Effective Spread (%)              
Mean 0.5124 0.3804 -0.1321  0.3490 0.2985 -0.0504  0.3214 0.3164 -0.0051  0.3934 0.3262 -0.0670 
Mean difference t-test  -13.49    -18.04    -1.68    -19.93 
Depth                
Mean 79750 86012 6262  32062 34005 1942  12042 10990 -1052  45690 42964 -2725 
Mean difference t-test  5.97    8.01    -6.41    7.95 
Dollar Depth (RMB)               
Mean 253595 261090 7494  157843 169811 11968  136219 120866 -15354  182948 188840 5891 
Mean difference t-test  2.45    9.84    -8.79    5.05 
Time between trades (seconds)               
Mean 13.19 16.45 3.25  16.25 18.20 1.95  19.70 28.30 8.60  15.93 19.42 3.49 
Mean difference t-test  4.62    3.47    3.65    6.08 
Ratio of transacted volume from call auction to trade volume during the first hour          
Mean 0.0279 0.0303 0.0024  0.0221 0.0180 -0.0041  0.0163 0.0151 -0.0012  0.0165 0.0163 -0.0002 
Mean difference t-test  0.22    -0.80    -0.34    -0.16 
Volatility                
Mean 0.0363 0.0310 -0.0053  0.0608 0.0603 -0.0005  0.1812 0.1498 -0.0314  0.0473 0.0407 -0.0066 
Mean difference t-test  -3.97    -1.67    -3.67    -4.87 
 
Panel E - Quintile 4                
 Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change 
Number of stocks 7 7   71 71   78 78   156 156  
Number of trades in the first hour               
Mean 226.60 209.25 -17.35  207.98 178.39 -29.59  164.42 139.24 -25.18  186.16 158.96 -27.20 
Mean difference t-test  -5.29    -4.18    -4.66    -6.16 
Quoted Proportional Spread (%)              
Mean 0.4849 0.3755 -0.1094  0.3448 0.3440 -0.0008  0.3353 0.4217 0.0864  0.3838 0.3418 -0.0420 
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Mean difference t-test  -12.25    -0.81    6.22    -5.94 
Effective spread                
Mean 0.0410 0.0111 -0.0298  0.0160 0.0140 -0.0020  0.0401 0.0307 -0.0094  0.0285 0.0224 -0.0061 
Mean difference t-test  -12.57    -12.10    -6.42    -8.14 
Proportional Effective Spread (%)              
Mean 0.4067 0.3043 -0.1024  0.4215 0.3717 -0.0497  0.4758 0.3453 -0.1306  0.4610 0.3599 -0.1010 
Mean difference t-test  -11.68    -12.83    -7.92    -11.66 
Depth                
Mean 67042 111639 44597  40742 39040 -1702  113708 15960 -97748  78030 28282 -49747 
Mean difference t-test  7.92    -6.79    -7.74    ? 
Dollar Depth (RMB)               
Mean 225610 232248 6638  146796 141843 -4954  620071 114253 -505818  387478 129030 -258448 
Mean difference t-test  0.58    -5.57    -7.70    -7.75 
Time between trades (seconds)               
Mean 16.83 17.14 0.31  17.86 21.02 3.16  23.39 29.03 5.64  20.65 25.03 4.38 
Mean difference t-test  7.75    4.33    4.71    6.18 
Ratio of transacted volume from call auction to trade volume during the first hour          
Mean 0.0219 0.0542 0.0324  0.0399 0.0314 -0.0085  0.0373 0.0342 -0.0032  0.0216 0.0208 -0.0007 
Mean difference t-test  0.95    0.72    -1.36    -0.34 
Volatility                
Mean 0.0231 0.0205 -0.0025  0.0301 0.0283 -0.0018  0.0611 0.0569 -0.0042  0.0457 0.0427 -0.0030 
Mean difference t-test  -0.81    -1.67    -1.64    -1.91 
 
Panel F - Quintile 5 
 Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change  Pre Post Change 
Number of stocks 3 3   23 23   130 130   156 156  
Number of trades in the first hour               
Mean 178.48 142.63 -35.84  167.99 118.16 -49.83  127.92 100.60 -27.33  134.41 103.57 -30.84 
Mean difference t-test  -10.39    -6.45    -7.42    -9.16 
Quoted Proportional Spread (%)              
Mean 0.6534 0.5874 -0.0660  0.4650 0.4725 0.0075  0.4255 0.4467 0.0213  0.4443 0.4530 0.0087 
Mean difference t-test  -9.30    3.19    10.26    5.26 
Effective spread                
Mean 0.0195 0.0105 -0.0090  0.0175 0.0130 -0.0045  0.0250 0.0237 -0.0013  0.0238 0.0220 -0.0018 
Mean difference t-test  -8.25    -12.08    -6.19    -9.91 
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Proportional Effective Spread (%)              
Mean 0.4687 0.4308 -0.0381  0.6258 0.4780 -0.1475  0.6749 0.5450 -0.1299  0.4972 0.4387 -0.0590 
Mean difference t-test  -11.30    -14.60    -24.83    -17.70 
Depth                
Mean 159590 89239 -70351  72206 57971 -14235  23061 19581 -3480  35751 30329 -5422 
Mean difference t-test  -11.84    -10.80    -15.44    -19.33 
Dollar Depth (RMB)               
Mean 262175 172422 -89752  182548 152289 -30260  97895 88328 -9567  111971 98707 -13264 
Mean difference t-test  -8.40    -8.97    -12.71    -16.04 
Time between trades (seconds)               
Mean 20.00 24.97 4.96  22.33 31.23 8.90  31.21 40.90 9.69  29.78 39.31 9.54 
Mean difference t-test  7.21    6.37    7.41    8.54 
Ratio of transacted volume from call auction to trade volume during the first hour          
Mean 0.0219 0.0542 0.0324  0.0399 0.0314 -0.0085  0.0373 0.0342 -0.0032  0.0349 0.0355 0.0005 
Mean difference t-test  1.62    -1.29    -0.25    0.10 
Volatility                
Mean 0.0218 0.0133 -0.0085  0.0229 0.0200 -0.0029  0.0430 0.0383 -0.0047  0.0397 0.0354 -0.0043 
Mean difference t-test  -6.37    -2.50    -3.24    -3.52 
 
This table contains the descriptive statistics for the first hour of daily trade: the number of trades, proportional quoted spread (%), effective spread, 
proportional effective spread (%), depth (sum of best bid and ask volume), time between trades (seconds), volatility (standard deviation), and the ratio of 
transacted call volume to trade volume.  For each variable, the mean and mean changes for the five weeks before and after the structural change on July 1, 
2006 are reported.  A t-test reports whether the change in mean values between the pre and post-event period is statistically significant.  Actively traded 
A-shares are sorted into quintiles according to their average daily turnover during the study period.  Within each quintile, they are further sorted according 
to their average trade volume.  Quintile 1 represents the most liquid stocks, and quintile 5 contains the most illiquid.  Similarly, trade volume 1 contains 
the largest trade volume stocks, and trade volume 3 the least. 
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Table 2.2 Simultaneous two-equation regression analysis  
Panel A Summary statistics of regression variables 
 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
peffspread (%) 0.39 0.29 1.39 0.00 118.89 
depth 52553.02 19947.67 283912.95 110.00 15079976.22 
volume 5443.49 3748.15 7728.42 1.00 584915.97 
market capitalisation  
(Million RMB) 787.15 303.18 3680.92 50.50 86701.99 
volatility (%) 4.42 2.63 6.22 0.00 216.12 
 
 
Panel B Autocorrelation coefficients of variables 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
peffspread 0.532 0.476 0.426 0.377 0.128 
depth 0.288 0.221 0.190 0.170 0.156 
Volume 0.318 0.280 0.261 0.149 0.135 
market capitalisation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Volatility 0.231 0.216 0.170 0.104 0.038 
 
1-first-order autocorrelation; 
2-second-order autocorrelation; 
3-third-order autocorrelation; 
4-fourth-order autocorrelation; 
5-fivth-order autocorrelation 
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Panel C Regression results for spread and depth in a simultaneous two-equation system 
Dependent variable: peffspread 
Explanatory Variable Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept -0.0251  -5.71* 
ln(Depth) -0.0008  -2.96* 
ln(Volume) 0.0007 2.95* 
Market Capitalisation -0.0010  -4.42* 
volatility  0.0008 8.88* 
Change  -0.0010  -3.99* 
09:30 to 09:35 -0.0017 -14.48* 
09:35 to 09:40 -0.0023 -15.29* 
09:40 to 09:45 -0.0027 16.31* 
09:45 to 09:50 -0.0029 -13.35* 
09:50 to 09:55 -0.0031 13.05* 
10:00 to 10:05 -0.0032  -13.45* 
10:05 to 10:10 -0.0033  -13.49* 
10:10 to 10:15 -0.0035  -11.27* 
10:15 to 10:20 -0.0035  -12.34*  
10:20 to 10:25 -0.0035  -12.29* 
10:25 to 10:30 -0.0035 -11.56* 
Adjusted R2  0.0138  
Dependent variable: ln(depthit ) 
Explanatory Variable Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept -4.4987 -7.30* 
Proportional Effective Spread -2.8129 -5.05* 
Market Capitalisation 0.4424 14.01* 
volatility  -0.9877  -8.86* 
Change  -0.0098  -10.50* 
09:30 to 09:35 -2374  -17.89* 
09:35 to 09:40 -0.3527  -12.18* 
09:40 to 09:45 -0.4389  -14.64* 
09:45 to 09:50 -0.4934  -16.03* 
09:50 to 09:55 -0.5430  -16.93* 
10:00 to 10:05 0.5858 18.03* 
10:05 to 10:10 0.6176 18.39* 
10:10 to 10:15 0.6441 18.78* 
10:15 to 10:20 0.6600 17.61* 
10:20 to 10:25 0.6733 18.01* 
10:25 to 10:30 0.6700 1069* 
Adjusted R2  0.8283  
* denotes significance at the 1% level  
This table presents the results of regression for spread and depth in a simultaneous two-equation system 
for 806 A-share stocks.  The system consist of the following two equations: 
peffspreadit = β0 + β1* ln(depthit )+  β2* ln(volumeit) + β3* market capitalizationi+ β4* volatilityit+ β5* 
changeit + ∑ 𝛽𝑛
11
𝑛=1  * time interval dummies + εit 
ln(depthit )= γ0 + γ1*peffspreadit  +  γ2* market capitalizationi  + γ3 *volatilityit *+ γ4* changeit + ∑ 𝛾𝑛
11
𝑛=1  
time interval dummies + εit 
The sample period is from May 29, 2006 to Aug 7, 2006.  Depth is the sum of order book volume at the 
best bid and ask prices.  peffspread is the effective spread divided by transaction price.  Market 
capitalization is equity market capitalization based on closing prices on June 30, 2006.  Volatility is a 
Parkinson’s volatility measure.  Change is a dummy variable that is assigned a value of one if the 
observation is after July 1, 2006.  The remaining variables are dummy five-minute time interval 
variables to control for the time-varying behaviour of proportional effective spread and depth.   
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Table 2.3 Components of the effective spread 
  
Estimated Adverse selection 
component of spread 
Estimated Order 
Processing Component of 
spread 
 Before After Change Before After Change 
Full Sample (806 stocks)   
 Mean 0.7294 0.4180 -0.3114 0.1101 0.4819 0.3718 
 Median 0.8037      0.4331 -0.3745      0.0781 0.4862 0.3888 
 Mean difference t-test          -33.10*          88.16* 
Quintile 1 (162 stocks)   
 Mean 0.7663 0.3812 -0.3850 0.09406 0.5350 0.4409      
 Median 0.8377 0.4160 -0.4432 0.06664 0.5296 0.4569      
 Mean difference t-test  -18.35*  57.28 *  
Quintile 2 (161 stocks)  
 Mean 0.7496 0.4170 -0.3326 0.10899      0.49596      0.38697      
 Median 0.8327 0.4308 -0.3947      0.08861      0.50004      0.40517      
 Mean difference t-test  -15.43 *  49.15* 
Quintile 3 (161 stocks)  
 Mean 0.7506      0.4132      -0.3373 0.1101 0.4871 0.3770 
 Median 0.8284      0.4207      -0.4042 0.0771      0.4944      0.3963      
 Mean difference t-test  -16.86*   41.65* 
Quintile 4 (160 stocks)  
 Mean 0.7191      0.4325      -0.2866      0.1073      0.4586      0.3512 
 Median 0.8020      0.4348      -0.3557      0.0667      0.4611      0.3659      
 Mean difference t-test  -13.65*      36.96*     
Quintile 5 (162 stocks)  
 Mean 0.6619 0.4459 -0.2160      0.1297      0.4330      0.3032      
 Median 0.7054      0.4447      -0.2489      0.0904      0.4321      0.3238      
 Mean difference t-test  -11.13*      32.03*   
We use the regression models from Lin Sanger Booth (1994) to estimate the components of effective 
bid-ask spread in the first hour of daily trading for each of the 806 sample stocks:  
ΔQt+1 = λzt + et+1 
ΔP+1= - γzt + μt+1 
where ΔQt+1 = Qt+1 – Qt; Qt is the logarithm of the quoted bid-ask midpoint at time t; zt =Pt-Qt; Pt is 
the logarithm of trade price at time t; λ is the adverse selection component of effective spread and γ is 
the order processing cost component.  The before period extends from May 29 to June 30, 2006, and 
the after period covers July 1 to August 7, 2006.   
* denotes significance at the 1% level 
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Table 2.4 Five-minute interval intraday data five days before and five days after the 
regime change 
 
Time 
Proportional 
Spread (%) Depth 
Parkinson's 
Volatility (%) Volume 
Proportional  
Volume (%) 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Panel A: Morning Session 
9:30 0.3823 0.3692 22427 24363 0.0068 0.0066 9422 9633 0.1298 0.1254 
9:35 0.2964 0.3017 32677 29232 0.0031 0.0041 7771 7720 0.1086 0.1029 
9:40 0.2691 0.2700 37796 32614 0.0026 0.0027 7142 7484 0.1080 0.1028 
9:45 0.2564 0.2535 42781 37788 0.0024 0.0020 7612 7572 0.1154 0.1044 
9:50 0.2502 0.2455 48499 41892 0.0020 0.0019 7764 7716 0.1191 0.1056 
9:55 0.2447 0.2377 50567 45066 0.0017 0.0018 7483 7630 0.1144 0.1062 
10:00 0.2444 0.2370 51468 44495 0.0017 0.0017 7374 7261 0.1199 0.1042 
10:05 0.2417 0.2352 52224 45945 0.0015 0.0015 7115 7072 0.1165 0.1011 
10:10 0.2383 0.2332 53035 49836 0.0016 0.0014 7446 7242 0.1197 0.1034 
10:15 0.2413 0.2307 50907 54472 0.0018 0.0012 8403 6892 0.1305 0.1016 
10:20 0.2378 0.2291 51774 61140 0.0016 0.0011 7136 7650 0.1168 0.1126 
10:25 0.2367 0.2297 55970 63328 0.0012 0.0012 6947 6950 0.1149 0.1036 
10:30 0.2375 0.2271 57292 62689 0.0013 0.0013 7001 7851 0.1130 0.1118 
10:35 0.2372 0.2281 60510 64378 0.0011 0.0012 6601 7556 0.1087 0.1085 
10:40 0.2368 0.2279 61801 68770 0.0010 0.0010 6676 7137 0.1119 0.1044 
10:45 0.2370 0.2262 62934 75392 0.0011 0.0011 6480 7104 0.1094 0.1056 
10:50 0.2380 0.2257 61209 73657 0.0011 0.0011 6341 7276 0.1084 0.1064 
10:55 0.2364 0.2292 61943 68729 0.0012 0.0011 6485 6967 0.1080 0.1066 
11:00 0.2366 0.2265 65854 72777 0.0010 0.0011 6556 7142 0.1027 0.1080 
11:05 0.2338 0.2271 67057 74482 0.0009 0.0011 6515 7156 0.1062 0.1071 
11:10 0.2357 0.2277 68872 75037 0.0010 0.0010 6573 7430 0.1102 0.1074 
11:15 0.2363 0.2267 71754 73197 0.0011 0.0011 7161 7745 0.1156 0.1081 
11:20 0.2379 0.2293 68659 71919 0.0009 0.0009 6725 7412 0.1098 0.1038 
11:25 0.2357 0.2301 69504 69312 0.0008 0.0009 6415 6942 0.1046 0.1024 
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Table 2.4, continued 
 
Time 
Proportional 
Spread (%) Depth 
Parkinson's 
Volatility (%) Volume 
Proportional  
Volume (%) 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Panel B: Afternoon Session 
13:00 0.2379 0.2331 65866 65716 0.0011 0.0012 10588 10115 0.1589 0.1505 
13:05 0.2317 0.2253 64321 66083 0.0008 0.0009 6891 6709 0.1062 0.0992 
13:10 0.2310 0.2251 66850 68934 0.0009 0.0009 6918 6777 0.1114 0.1005 
13:15 0.2313 0.2237 67244 68761 0.0009 0.0008 7176 6858 0.1106 0.1012 
13:20 0.2299 0.2219 68120 69080 0.0009 0.0009 7129 7171 0.1088 0.1038 
13:25 0.2298 0.2232 72531 69155 0.0009 0.0008 6770 7586 0.1112 0.1103 
13:30 0.2303 0.2228 72935 71291 0.0008 0.0009 6608 6703 0.1063 0.1021 
13:35 0.2307 0.2212 70773 76692 0.0009 0.0009 6312 6671 0.1066 0.1042 
13:40 0.2290 0.2219 71077 73695 0.0010 0.0013 6592 8097 0.1116 0.1180 
13:45 0.2291 0.2243 74400 70062 0.0008 0.0012 6459 7949 0.1068 0.1186 
13:50 0.2292 0.2228 74576 66540 0.0009 0.0013 6802 7683 0.1095 0.1178 
13:55 0.2278 0.2252 77623 69590 0.0008 0.0011 7054 7071 0.1104 0.1092 
14:00 0.2274 0.2234 80299 70901 0.0008 0.0009 6848 6995 0.1103 0.1079 
14:05 0.2284 0.2223 74161 69867 0.0010 0.0009 7186 7255 0.1149 0.1102 
14:10 0.2284 0.2229 69752 71343 0.0009 0.0010 6833 7238 0.1152 0.1140 
14:15 0.2299 0.2209 74568 72566 0.0009 0.0010 6633 7474 0.1164 0.1197 
14:20 0.2289 0.2217 79402 74558 0.0009 0.0009 6703 7534 0.1147 0.1129 
14:25 0.2288 0.2211 82969 73486 0.0010 0.0010 6777 7369 0.1152 0.1132 
14:30 0.2277 0.2205 82244 71802 0.0009 0.0009 7122 7226 0.1181 0.1108 
14:35 0.2275 0.2178 81938 75351 0.0009 0.0011 7068 7507 0.1203 0.1169 
14:40 0.2271 0.2195 82901 79824 0.0009 0.0010 7264 7775 0.1251 0.1193 
14:45 0.2260 0.2171 80862 77186 0.0010 0.0009 7610 8112 0.1301 0.1274 
14:50 0.2256 0.2176 75072 74265 0.0010 0.0011 8404 8107 0.1413 0.1312 
14:55 0.2270 0.2210 64958 69775 0.0015 0.0014 9367 8933 0.1607 0.1439 
This table reports the mean values for proportional spread, depth, volatility, volume and proportional 
volume in each five-minute time interval, five trading days before and then five trading days after the 
regime change.  The sample size is 188 shares.  It excludes A-shares that experienced share splits during 
2006, stocks that didn’t trade during the ten day period, and stocks that resumed trading at 10.30am.     
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Table 2.5 Univariate test for shorter or longer time period before and after July 1, 2006 
Panel A Ten weeks before and after July 1, 2006 
  Pre Post Difference 
Number of trades in the first hour   
 Mean 260.25 185.26 -74.99 
 Mean difference t-test -31.88 * 
Quoted Proportional Spread (%) 
 Mean 0.325 0.311 -0.014 
 Mean difference t-test -8.271* 
Effective Spread 
 Mean 0.0272 0.0211 -0.0061 
 Mean difference t-test -28.64 * 
Proportional Effective Spread (%) 
 Mean 0.414 0.328 -0.086 
 Mean difference t-test -38.34* 
Depth  
 Mean 71238 61783 -9155 
 Mean difference t-test -6.77* 
Dollar Depth  (RMB) 
 Mean 325689 268955 -56734 
 Mean difference t-test -5.48* 
Time between trades (seconds) 
 Mean 18.82 21.38 2.56 
 Mean difference t-test 7.64* 
Total trading volume 
 Mean 1913872 1586585 -327287 
 Mean difference t-test 9.36* 
Ratio of transacted volume from call auction to trade volume during  first hour 
 Mean 0.0229 0.0210 -0.0019 
  Mean difference t-test -1.359 
Volatility (standard deviation) 
 Mean 0.0589 0.0482 -0.107 
 Mean difference t-test -8.729 * 
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Panel B Two weeks before and after 1 July 2006 
  Pre Post Difference 
Number of trades in the first hour   
 Mean 243.7 209.2 -34.5 
 Mean difference t-test 24.19* 
Quoted Proportional Spread (%) 
 Mean 0.321 0.315 -0.006 
 Mean difference t-test 7.46* 
Effective Spread 
 Mean 0.023 0.021 -0.002 
 Mean difference t-test -6.89 * 
Proportional Effective Spread (%) 
 Mean 0.396 0.313 -0.083 
 Mean difference t-test -14.07 * 
Depth  
 Mean 70992 61936 -9056 
 Mean difference t-test -5.89* 
Dollar Depth  (RMB) 
 Mean 306784 270416 -36368 
 Mean difference t-test -5.68* 
Time between trades (seconds) 
 Mean 16.38 21.56 5.18 
 Mean difference t-test 15.29* 
Total trading volume 
 Mean 1962352 1506935 -455417 
 Mean difference t-test 14.86* 
Ratio of transacted volume from call auction to trade volume during  first hour 
 Mean 0.0205 0.0182 -0.0023 
 Mean difference t-test -1.085 
Volatility (standard deviation) 
 Mean 0.052 0.046 -0.006 
 Mean difference t-test -4.06* 
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Table 2.6 Market transparency reform and liquidity in A-shares that had (and had not) 
reformed the split share structure 
 
Panel A Sample of A-shares that had reformed the split share structure 
  Pre Post Difference 
Number of trades in the first hour   
 Mean 280.32 225.52 -54.8 
 Mean difference t-test -34.26* 
Quoted Proportional Spread (%) 
 Mean 0.3175 0.3102 -0.0073 
 Mean difference t-test -10.25* 
Effective Spread 
 Mean 0.0251 0.0204 -0.0047 
 Mean difference t-test -22.35* 
Proportional Effective Spread (%) 
 Mean 0.404 0.323 -0.081 
 Mean difference t-test -41.32* 
Depth  
 Mean 66348 51632 -14716 
 Mean difference t-test -11.86* 
Dollar Depth  (RMB) 
 Mean 286538 213684 -127146 
 Mean difference t-test -9.48* 
Time between trades (seconds) 
 Mean 16.38 21.02 4.64 
 Mean difference t-test 15.19* 
Total trading volume 
 Mean 2234568 1823698 -410870 
 Mean difference t-test 10.96* 
Ratio of transacted volume from call auction to trade volume during  first hour 
 Mean 0.0232 0.0217 -0.0015 
  Mean difference t-test -0.875 
Volatility (standard deviation) 
 Mean 0.0532 0.0461 -0.0071 
 Mean difference t-test -6.387 * 
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Panel B Sample of A-shares that had not reformed the share split structure  
  Pre Post Difference 
Number of trades in the first hour   
 Mean 238.18 206.35 -31.83 
 Mean difference t-test -19.68* 
Quoted Proportional Spread (%) 
 Mean 0.3254 0.3209 -0.0045 
 Mean difference t-test -4.923* 
Effective Spread 
 Mean 0.0263 0.0224 -0.0039 
 Mean difference t-test -15.96* 
Proportional Effective Spread (%) 
 Mean 0.401 0.337 -0.064 
 Mean difference t-test -31.67* 
Depth  
 Mean 67236 57889 -9347 
 Mean difference t-test -7.65* 
Dollar Depth  (RMB) 
 Mean 299871 244268 -55603 
 Mean difference t-test -5.39* 
Time between trades (seconds) 
 Mean 18.68 22.81 4.13 
 Mean difference t-test 11.48* 
Total trading volume 
 Mean 1923658 1330976 -592682 
 Mean difference t-test 15.38* 
Ratio of transacted volume from call auction to trade volume during  first hour 
 Mean 0.0223 0.0212 -0.0011 
 Mean difference t-test -0.3689 
    Volatility (standard deviation) 
 Mean 0.0574 0.0513 -0.0061 
 Mean difference t-test -7.599 * 
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Table 3.1 Weighted Price Contribution by time period and trading volume quintile  
Quintile 1500 – 0925 9.25-9.30 09.30-10.30  1030-1500  
 Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change 
Highest 0.1944 0.1066 -0.0878 0.0272 0.0174 -0.0098 0.2944 0.3350 0.0405 0.4838 0.5409 0.0570 
Mean difference t-test   -0.0878   -1.8742***   2.2739**  
 
2 0.2111 0.1024 -0.1087 0.0229 0.0216 -0.0013 0.2744 0.3163 0.0418 0.4915 0.5595 0.0680 
Mean difference t-test   -5.4688*   -0.2598***   2.7557*  
 
3 0.2252 0.1268 -0.0985 0.0300 0.0124 -0.0176 0.2527 0.2970 0.0442 0.4919 0.5638 0.0718 
Mean difference t-test   -3.2711*   -2.4552**   2.2203**  
 
4 0.1790 0.1325 -0.0465 0.0255 0.0080 -0.0175 0.2309 0.2983 0.0673 0.5644 0.5610 -0.0034 
Mean difference t-test   -2.2161**   -2.8045*   4.2136*  
 
Lowest 0.2031 0.0864 -0.1167 0.0186 0.0161 -0.0026 0.2169 0.3055 0.0885 0.5612 0.5919 0.0307 
Mean difference t-test   -5.4558*   -0.3714   5.6123*  
 
Overall 0.2026 0.1109 -0.0916 0.0249 0.0151 -0.0098 0.2539 0.3104 0.0565 0.5186 0.5634 0.0448 
Mean difference t-test   -8.842*   -3.5369*   7.4099*  8.6589* 
*, ** and *** denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
This table reports the mean weighted price contribution (WPC) for 780 stocks that comprise Shanghai’s A-share index between 29 May 2006 and 04 Aug 2006, 
sorted into quintiles based on their average trade volume during the study period. Quintile 1 represents the most liquid stocks, and quintile 5 contains the most 
illiquid.  The daily close to close return is divided into four time periods: the opening call auction (previous close to opening call), the opening trade (the opening 
call auction just after 0925am to the first continuous trade after 0930am), first 60minutes of the trading day, and the remainder of the trading day.   
For each time period t, the weighted price contribution is calculated for each stock and then averaged across stocks: 
𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑡 = ∑ (
|𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑|
∑ |𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑|
𝐷
𝑑=1
) × (
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡,𝑑
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑
)
𝐷
𝑑=1
 
where retd is the close-to-close on day d, and rett,d is the logarithmic return for period t on day d.    
Mean changes in the WPC following the reform on 01 July 2006 are also reported. A t-test reports whether the change in mean values between the pre and post-
event periods are statistically significant.   
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Table 3.2 Mean WPC across the trading day 
Time Pre Post 
0925-0930 0.0249 0.0152 
0930-0945 0.1208 0.1316 
0945-1000 0.0586 0.0912 
1000-1015 0.0484 0.0405 
1015-1030 0.0447 0.0540 
1030-1045 0.0162 0.0542 
1045-1100 0.0629 0.0301 
1100-1115 0.0435 0.0587 
1115-1135 0.0629 0.0844 
1300-1315 0.0376 0.0242 
1315-1330 0.0110 0.0287 
1330-1345 0.0254 0.0211 
1345-1400 0.0249 0.0152 
1400-1415 0.1208 0.1316 
1415-1430 0.0586 0.0912 
1430-1445 0.0484 0.0405 
1445-1500 0.0447 0.0540 
 
This table reports the mean Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) for 780 stocks on the SSE in 15-
minute time intervals.  The sample period is five weeks before and five weeks after the regime change 
on 01 July 2006.   
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Table 3.3 Weighted Price Contribution per trade by time period and trading volume 
quintile 
Quintile 1500-0925 0930-1030 
 Pre Post Change Pre Post Change 
Highest 0.6127 0.4778 -0.1350 6.5672 7.4862 0.9189 
Mean difference t-test -1.1721   2.3452** 
2 0.5241 0.5203 -0.0038 5.8430 6.9668 1.1237 
Mean difference t-test -0.035   3.6014* 
3 0.5578 0.3340 -0.2238 4.9608 6.6459 1.6851 
Mean difference t-test -1.8632 ***  5.0071* 
4 0.5223 0.1925 -0.3298 4.7911 6.2659 1.4747 
Mean difference t-test -2.7452 *  4.2473* 
Lowest 0.4418 0.3108 -0.131 4.4943 6.1551 1.6607 
Mean difference t-test -0.9538   5.2942* 
Overall 0.5318 0.3671 -0.1647 5.3313 6.7040 1.3726 
Mean difference t-test -3.0543 *  8.9882* 
* denotes significance at 0.01 level    
** denotes significance at 0.05 level    
*** denotes significance at 0.10 level    
 
The weighted price contribution per trade (WPCT) is computed by dividing the WPC for each time 
period by the weighted fraction of trades occurring in that interval.  The WPCT for each stock at time 
period t is defined as: 
𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖 =  
∑ (
|𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑|
∑ |𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑|
𝐷
𝑑=1
)×([
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡,𝑑
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑
])𝐷𝑑=1
∑ (
|𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑|
∑ |𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑|
𝐷
𝑑=1
)𝐷𝑑=1 ×(
𝑡𝑟𝑡,𝑑
𝑡𝑟𝑑
)
  (2) 
where trt,d is the number of executed trades during time period t on day d, and trd is the total 
number of trades on day d. 
The five week pre-event sample period runs from 29 May 2006 to 30 June 2006, and the post-event 
sample period is from 01 July 2006 to 04 August 2006.  780 stocks that comprise Shanghai’s A-share 
index are sorted into quintiles based on their average trade volume during the study period. Quintile 1 
represents the most liquid stocks, and quintile 5 contains the most illiquid.   
Mean changes in the WPCT are also reported. A t-test reports whether the change in mean values 
between the pre and post-event periods are statistically significant.   
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Table 3.4 Volatility Regression 
Explanatory Variable Estimate t-statistic 
intercept 0.0081 49.12 
ln(market_capi) -0.0012 -132.41 
ln(turnoveri,t,d) 0.0017 288.75 
effspreadi,t,d 0.0162 29.29 
change -0.0006 -41.3 
09:30 to 09:35 0.0064 169.58 
09:35 to 09:40 0.0031 82.35 
09:40 to 09:45 0.0014 38.43 
09:45 to 09:50 0.0007 20.04 
09:50 to 09:55 0.0003 8.46 
10:00 to 10:05 -0.0002 -4.36 
10:05 to 10:10 -0.0003 -8.49 
10:10 to 10:15 -0.0005 -12.92 
10:15 to 10:20 -0.0006 -17.29 
10:20 to 10:25 -0.0007 -19.58 
10:25 to 10:30 -0.0037 -95.45 
Adjusted R2  0.2797  
All variables are significant at 1% level 
 
Table 3.4 presents the result from the following volatility regression: 
Volatilityi,t,d = β0+ β1 * ln(market_capi) + β2*ln(turnoveri,t,d) + β3*effspreadi,t,d +β4*change+  ∑ 𝛽𝑛
15
𝑛=5  
* time interval dummies + εit     
Based on a sample of 780 A-share stocks from 29 May 2006 to 7 Aug 2006.  Volatility i,t,d is the 
Parkinson (1980)44 ‘High Low Range Volatility’ for stock i, at 5-minute interval t, on day d. 
market_capi is the equity market capitalization for stock i based on closing prices on 30 June 2006. 
turnoveri,t,d is the total turnover for stock i, during time interval t, on day d. effspreadi,t,d is the mean 
effective spread45 for stock i, during time interval t, on day d., Change is a dummy variable that takes 
a value of one after the reform to the opening call system, and a value of zero if otherwise.  Also 
included are 11 five-minute time interval dummies for the first hour of trading, to capture the time 
varying characteristics of these volatility measures.  
 
 
 
                                                             
44 As shown by Parkinson (1980), this volatility measurement properly scaled, not only is an unbiased estimator 
of volatility but is five times more efficient than the classic estimator of volatility. 
45 Effective spread=2x|transaction price −  bidask midpoint immediately prior to the transaction| 
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Table 4.1 Intraday univariateest for 5 weeks before and 5 weeks after 01 July 2006 – Full sample 
Time Pre Post Change  Time Pre Post Change  Time Pre Post Change 
number of stocks 281 281            
Panel A: Proportional bid-ask spread (%)           
14:30-14:31 0.2909 0.2829 -0.0085**  14:40-14:41 0.2841 0.2804 -0.0043  14:50-14:51 0.2806 0.2803 -0.0005 
14:31-14:32 0.2936 0.2848 -0.0084**  14:41-14:42 0.2860 0.2788 -0.0074**  14:51-14:52 0.2789 0.2803 0.0009 
14:32-14:33 0.2963 0.2827 -0.0133***  14:42-14:43 0.2838 0.2789 -0.0061*  14:52-14:53 0.2803 0.2777 -0.0025 
14:33-14:34 0.2944 0.2830 -0.0112**  14:43-14:44 0.2867 0.2794 -0.0075**  14:53-14:54 0.2800 0.2781 -0.0023 
14:34-14:35 0.2884 0.2807 -0.0081**  14:44-14:45 0.2820 0.2806 -0.0026  14:54-14:55 0.2797 0.2797 -0.0006 
14:35-14:36 0.2882 0.2804 -0.0088**  14:45-14:46 0.2831 0.2791 -0.0038  14:55-14:56 0.2821 0.2812 -0.0011 
14:36-14:37 0.2891 0.2799 -0.0095**  14:46-14:47 0.2814 0.2766 -0.0048  14:56-14:57 0.2811 0.2496 -0.0317*** 
14:37-14:38 0.2848 0.2799 -0.0052  14:47-14:48 0.2810 0.2785 -0.0024  14:57-14:58 0.2824 . . 
14:38-14:39 0.2874 0.2810 -0.0064*  14:48-14:49 0.2788 0.2801 0.0009  14:58-14:59 0.2891 . . 
14:39-14:40 0.2838 0.2793 -0.0049  14:49-14:50 0.2813 0.2805 -0.0011  14:59-close 0.2923 0.0775 -0.2151*** 
Panel B: Effective spread            
14:30-14:31 0.0137 0.0133 -0.0004  14:40-14:41 0.0132 0.0125 -0.00043*  14:50-14:51 0.0130 0.0128 -3.8E-05 
14:31-14:32 0.0134 0.0130 -0.0002  14:41-14:42 0.0133 0.0126 -0.00035  14:51-14:52 0.0128 0.0128 0.0002 
14:32-14:33 0.0133 0.0128 -0.0002  14:42-14:43 0.0131 0.0126 -0.00034  14:52-14:53 0.0128 0.0126 6.43E-05 
14:33-14:34 0.0134 0.0127 -0.0004**  14:43-14:44 0.0133 0.0127 -0.00047  14:53-14:54 0.0129 0.0127 -6.9E-05 
14:34-14:35 0.0132 0.0126 -0.0004**  14:44-14:45 0.0130 0.0127 -0.00022  14:54-14:55 0.0131 0.0128 -1.5E-05 
14:35-14:36 0.0131 0.0126 -0.0004  14:45-14:46 0.0129 0.0127 -1.9E-05  14:55-14:56 0.0132 0.0130 5.15E-05 
14:36-14:37 0.0132 0.0125 -0.0005**  14:46-14:47 0.0129 0.0126 -6.2E-05  14:56-14:57 0.0134 0.0130 -6E-05 
14:37-14:38 0.0131 0.0126 -0.0003  14:47-14:48 0.0130 0.0126 -5.2E-05  14:57-14:58 0.0133 . . 
14:38-14:39 0.0131 0.0128 -6.8E-05  14:48-14:49 0.0128 0.0126 -5.3E-05  14:58-14:59 0.0138 . . 
14:39-14:40 0.0130 0.0126 -0.0003  14:49-14:50 0.0128 0.0127 -2.6E-05  14:59-close 0.0142 0.0115 -0.0023 
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Time Pre Post Change  Time Pre Post Change  Time Pre Post Change 
Panel C: Proportional effective spread (%)           
14:30-14:31 0.2956 0.2836 -0.0117**  14:40-14:41 0.2878 0.2764 -0.0115***  14:50-14:51 0.2852 0.2819 -0.0032 
14:31-14:32 0.2909 0.2823 -0.0087**  14:41-14:42 0.2875 0.2773 -0.0102***  14:51-14:52 0.2828 0.2827 0.0004 
14:32-14:33 0.2901 0.2809 -0.0075**  14:42-14:43 0.2865 0.2778 -0.0098***  14:52-14:53 0.2835 0.2805 -0.0028 
14:33-14:34 0.2926 0.2804 -0.0119***  14:43-14:44 0.2899 0.2808 -0.0094*  14:53-14:54 0.2847 0.2803 -0.0041 
14:34-14:35 0.2897 0.2790 -0.0109***  14:44-14:45 0.2870 0.2800 -0.0075**  14:54-14:55 0.2864 0.2841 -0.0022 
14:35-14:36 0.2880 0.2789 -0.0101**  14:45-14:46 0.2842 0.2791 -0.0047  14:55-14:56 0.2882 0.2865 -0.0007 
14:36-14:37 0.2877 0.2769 -0.0108***  14:46-14:47 0.2841 0.2765 -0.0077**  14:56-14:57 0.2903 0.2891 -1.3E-06 
14:37-14:38 0.2877 0.2789 -0.0078**  14:47-14:48 0.2846 0.2779 -0.0059  14:57-14:58 0.2899 . . 
14:38-14:39 0.2870 0.2814 -0.0059  14:48-14:49 0.2815 0.2795 -0.0028  14:58-14:59 0.2999 . . 
14:39-14:40 0.2844 0.2775 -0.0079**  14:49-14:50 0.2832 0.2795 -0.0043  14:59-close 0.3078 0.2575 -0.0492*** 
Panel D: Dollar depth             
14:30-14:31 572006 538128 -123376**  14:40-14:41 596443 599548 -73746  14:50-14:51 607918 582186 -91402** 
14:31-14:32 610937 551820 -131371**  14:41-14:42 600484 596044 -95492*  14:51-14:52 636472 623976 -95080 
14:32-14:33 599384 540581 -118130**  14:42-14:43 588212 555963 -105911*  14:52-14:53 631741 586704 -118809** 
14:33-14:34 594900 582535 -109066*  14:43-14:44 602401 575089 -90683  14:53-14:54 645772 564902 -156029** 
14:34-14:35 608227 561918 -144318**  14:44-14:45 587062 585475 -93567**  14:54-14:55 613516 576389 -134890*** 
14:35-14:36 616309 576583 -101186*  14:45-14:46 614377 598191 -84139*  14:55-14:56 632654 585100 -147716*** 
14:36-14:37 641868 567277 -138709**  14:46-14:47 616983 562625 -87075*  14:56-14:57 639554 530990 -185773*** 
14:37-14:38 619966 567202 -134969**  14:47-14:48 618699 561103 -121638**  14:57-14:58 622319 . . 
14:38-14:39 612991 548754 -129338**  14:48-14:49 611858 581349 -102078**  14:58-14:59 642914 . . 
14:39-14:40 577332 568083 -91836**  14:49-14:50 637453 595701 -142162**  14:59-close 654914 522588 -108843** 
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Time Pre Post Change  Time Pre Post Change  Time Pre Post Change 
Panel E: Parkinson's volatility (%)            
14:30-14:31 0.0266 0.0200 -0.0069***  14:40-14:41 0.0279 0.0205 -0.0070***  14:50-14:51 0.0272 0.0249 -0.0018 
14:31-14:32 0.0247 0.0209 -0.0039***  14:41-14:42 0.0263 0.0193 -0.0063***  14:51-14:52 0.0287 0.0267 -0.0010 
14:32-14:33 0.0240 0.0196 -0.0037***  14:42-14:43 0.0267 0.0203 -0.0066***  14:52-14:53 0.0303 0.0250 -0.0052** 
14:33-14:34 0.0257 0.0205 -0.0055***  14:43-14:44 0.0264 0.0209 -0.0051***  14:53-14:54 0.0298 0.0284 -0.0015 
14:34-14:35 0.0264 0.0206 -0.0059*  14:44-14:45 0.0265 0.0201 -0.0062***  14:54-14:55 0.0316 0.0289 -0.0029 
14:35-14:36 0.0269 0.0202 -0.0070***  14:45-14:46 0.0271 0.0223 -0.0037**  14:55-14:56 0.0328 0.0333 0.0004 
14:36-14:37 0.0262 0.0189 -0.0076***  14:46-14:47 0.0269 0.0207 -0.0045***  14:56-14:57 0.0348 0.0466 0.0122*** 
14:37-14:38 0.0272 0.0212 -0.0060***  14:47-14:48 0.0288 0.0247 -0.0041  14:57-14:58 0.0384 . . 
14:38-14:39 0.0253 0.0211 -0.0045**  14:48-14:49 0.0273 0.0261 -0.0013  14:58-14:59 0.0532 . . 
14:39-14:40 0.0236 0.0209 -0.0032**  14:49-14:50 0.0267 0.0242 -0.0028*  14:59-close 0.0776 0.0000 -0.0770*** 
Panel F: Proportional number of trades (%)           
14:30-14:31 0.4820 0.5137 0.0309***  14:40-14:41 0.4957 0.5319 0.0347***  14:50-14:51 0.5540 0.6062 0.0541*** 
14:31-14:32 0.4738 0.5099 0.0356***  14:41-14:42 0.4909 0.5278 0.0367***  14:51-14:52 0.5577 0.6190 0.0615*** 
14:32-14:33 0.4861 0.5122 0.0263***  14:42-14:43 0.5027 0.5294 0.0259***  14:52-14:53 0.5767 0.6174 0.0432*** 
14:33-14:34 0.4908 0.5194 0.0287***  14:43-14:44 0.5047 0.5556 0.0518***  14:53-14:54 0.5822 0.6513 0.0697*** 
14:34-14:35 0.4902 0.5218 0.0312***  14:44-14:45 0.5227 0.5431 0.0217***  14:54-14:55 0.6132 0.6496 0.0389*** 
14:35-14:36 0.4796 0.5292 0.0518***  14:45-14:46 0.5092 0.5589 0.0511***  14:55-14:56 0.6171 0.6856 0.0687*** 
14:36-14:37 0.4929 0.5236 0.0307***  14:46-14:47 0.5345 0.5578 0.0251***  14:56-14:57 0.6420 0.8889 0.2481*** 
14:37-14:38 0.4900 0.5302 0.0406***  14:47-14:48 0.5188 0.5837 0.0666***  14:57-14:58 0.6479 . . 
14:38-14:39 0.4972 0.5220 0.0241***  14:48-14:49 0.5356 0.5851 0.0498***  14:58-14:59 0.6991 . . 
14:39-14:40 0.4829 0.5300 0.0480***  14:49-14:50 0.5388 0.5904 000.0557***  14:59-close 0.8338 0.2088 -0.6259*** 
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Time Pre Post Change  Time Pre Post Change  Time Pre Post Change 
Panel G: Proportional average trade size           
14:30-14:31 0.9972 1.0172 0.0129  14:40-14:41 1.0165 1.0356 0.0206  14:50-14:51 1.0942 1.1137 0.0224 
14:31-14:32 0.9584 0.9758 0.0185  14:41-14:42 0.9880 1.0327 0.0454  14:51-14:52 1.1094 1.1265 0.0290 
14:32-14:33 0.9982 0.9743 -0.0220  14:42-14:43 0.9750 1.0057 0.0252  14:52-14:53 1.1348 1.1317 0.0110 
14:33-14:34 0.9699 0.9672 0.0002  14:43-14:44 1.0228 1.0068 -0.0201  14:53-14:54 1.1184 1.1259 0.0067 
14:34-14:35 1.0001 1.0088 0.0148  14:44-14:45 1.0146 1.0323 0.0231  14:54-14:55 1.1695 1.2163 0.0628** 
14:35-14:36 0.9756 0.9882 0.0119  14:45-14:46 1.0340 1.0670 0.0450*  14:55-14:56 1.1759 1.2474 0.0658** 
14:36-14:37 1.0104 0.9814 -0.0318  14:46-14:47 1.0459 1.0575 0.0180  14:56-14:57 1.2229 1.2486 0.0291 
14:37-14:38 0.9984 0.9997 0.0001  14:47-14:48 1.0909 1.0824 -0.0066  14:57-14:58 1.2824 . . 
14:38-14:39 0.9636 1.0009 0.0385  14:48-14:49 1.0470 1.0765 0.0430*  14:58-14:59 1.3346 . . 
14:39-14:40 0.9406 1.0254 0.0817***  14:49-14:50 1.0625 1.0911 0.0283  14:59-close 1.3254 9.2497 7.9292*** 
Panel H: Proportional turnover (%)           
14:30-14:31 0.5055 0.5377 0.0287  14:40-14:41 0.5119 0.5490 0.0343*  14:50-14:51 0.6230 0.6896 0.0693*** 
14:31-14:32 0.4709 0.5124 0.0421*  14:41-14:42 0.4936 0.5559 0.0646***  14:51-14:52 0.6339 0.7110 0.0821*** 
14:32-14:33 0.4980 0.5140 0.0176  14:42-14:43 0.5154 0.5401 0.0216  14:52-14:53 0.6542 0.7051 0.0623*** 
14:33-14:34 0.4827 0.5221 0.0403***  14:43-14:44 0.5228 0.5726 0.0484***  14:53-14:54 0.6672 0.7429 0.0773*** 
14:34-14:35 0.5011 0.5352 0.0320  14:44-14:45 0.5446 0.5852 0.0436***  14:54-14:55 0.7265 0.7894 0.0774*** 
14:35-14:36 0.4934 0.5372 0.0453**  14:45-14:46 0.5352 0.6084 0.0789***  14:55-14:56 0.7430 0.8632 0.1182*** 
14:36-14:37 0.5167 0.5316 0.0136  14:46-14:47 0.5579 0.5931 0.0397***  14:56-14:57 0.7899 1.1156 0.3295*** 
14:37-14:38 0.4927 0.5460 0.0551***  14:47-14:48 0.5785 0.6485 0.0732***  14:57-14:58 0.8393 . . 
14:38-14:39 0.4966 0.5385 0.0433***  14:48-14:49 0.5764 0.6597 0.0905***  14:58-14:59 0.9457 . . 
14:39-14:40 0.4771 0.5501 0.0719***  14:49-14:50 0.5897 0.6613 0.0732***  14:59-close 1.1239 1.4207 0.2998*** 
***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
This table presents the univariate mean comparisons of the intraday patterns between 14:30 and 15:00 of: proportional bid-ask spread (%), effective spread, 
proportional effective spread (%), dollar depth, Parkinson’s volatility (%), proportional number of trades (%), proportional average trade size, and 
proportional turnover (%).  The pre-period is from 29 May to 30 June 2006.  The post-period runs from 01 July to 04 August 2006. 
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Table 4.2 Intraday univariate test for 5 weeks before and 5 weeks after 01 July 2006 – Quintiles 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Time Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. 
number  
of stocks 
56 56  56 56  56 56  56 56  57 57  
Panel A: Proportional bid-ask spread (%) 
14:30-14:31 0.2035 0.1951 -0.0084* 0.2627 0.2619 -0.0008 0.2949 0.2778 -0.0171*** 0.3095 0.3079 -0.0017 0.3878 0.3732 -0.0145 
14:31-14:32 0.2014 0.1969 -0.0044 0.2607 0.2653 0.0046 0.3000 0.2797 -0.0203*** 0.3125 0.3081 -0.0043 0.3937 0.3765 -0.0172 
14:32-14:33 0.2021 0.1962 -0.0058 0.2601 0.2645 0.0044 0.3007 0.2788 -0.0219*** 0.3183 0.3043 -0.0140 0.4022 0.3734 -0.0288* 
14:33-14:34 0.2026 0.1939 -0.0086** 0.2580 0.2624 0.0043 0.2972 0.2795 -0.0177*** 0.3135 0.3036 -0.0099 0.4022 0.3785 -0.0238 
14:34-14:35 0.1986 0.1914 -0.0071* 0.2578 0.2599 0.0022 0.2957 0.2768 -0.0189*** 0.3147 0.3087 -0.0060 0.3799 0.3691 -0.0108 
14:35-14:36 0.2008 0.1901 -0.0107** 0.2603 0.2562 -0.0041 0.2948 0.2771 -0.0177*** 0.3076 0.3082 0.0006 0.3831 0.3711 -0.0120 
14:36-14:37 0.1990 0.1900 -0.0090** 0.2535 0.2540 0.0004 0.2962 0.2756 -0.0206*** 0.3065 0.3075 0.0010 0.3921 0.3730 -0.0191 
14:37-14:38 0.1994 0.1902 -0.0092** 0.2549 0.2566 0.0017 0.2949 0.2744 -0.0205*** 0.3084 0.3102 0.0019 0.3691 0.3693 0.0002 
14:38-14:39 0.1987 0.1931 -0.0056 0.2568 0.2566 -0.0002 0.2913 0.2758 -0.0155*** 0.3076 0.3063 -0.0013 0.3848 0.3753 -0.0095 
14:39-14:40 0.1997 0.1929 -0.0069* 0.2573 0.2532 -0.0041 0.2880 0.2750 -0.0130** 0.3072 0.3072 -0.0001 0.3707 0.3702 -0.0005 
14:40-14:41 0.1997 0.1944 -0.0052 0.2575 0.2512 -0.0063 0.2871 0.2744 -0.0127** 0.3068 0.3022 -0.0046 0.3739 0.3810 0.0072 
14:41-14:42 0.1988 0.1945 -0.0043 0.2569 0.2524 -0.0045 0.2877 0.2738 -0.0139** 0.3070 0.3064 -0.0005 0.3801 0.3666 -0.0135 
14:42-14:43 0.2006 0.1934 -0.0072* 0.2562 0.2512 -0.0050 0.2845 0.2702 -0.0143*** 0.3092 0.3043 -0.0049 0.3747 0.3757 0.0010 
14:43-14:44 0.2002 0.1916 -0.0086** 0.2572 0.2528 -0.0045 0.2902 0.2721 -0.0180*** 0.3047 0.3004 -0.0043 0.3820 0.3800 -0.0021 
14:44-14:45 0.1971 0.1932 -0.0040 0.2547 0.2533 -0.0014 0.2861 0.2762 -0.0099* 0.3065 0.3055 -0.0010 0.3713 0.3742 0.0030 
14:45-14:46 0.2008 0.1928 -0.0079 0.2516 0.2537 0.0021 0.2847 0.2714 -0.0133*** 0.3084 0.2969 -0.0115 0.3699 0.3813 0.0113 
14:46-14:47 0.1980 0.1915 -0.0065 0.2513 0.2524 0.0011 0.2841 0.2725 -0.0116** 0.3060 0.2967 -0.0093 0.3693 0.3715 0.0022 
14:47-14:48 0.1980 0.1916 -0.0064 0.2523 0.2518 -0.0005 0.2833 0.2754 -0.0079 0.3019 0.2966 -0.0053 0.3694 0.3771 0.0077 
14:48-14:49 0.1989 0.1880 -0.0109** 0.2566 0.2559 -0.0007 0.2813 0.2776 -0.0037 0.2998 0.3034 0.0037 0.3619 0.3775 0.0156 
14:49-14:50 0.1980 0.1910 -0.0070* 0.2526 0.2558 0.0032 0.2827 0.2812 -0.0015 0.3059 0.3012 -0.0047 0.3718 0.3761 0.0043 
14:50-14:51 0.1980 0.1899 -0.0081** 0.2488 0.2551 0.0063 0.2842 0.2781 -0.0061 0.3075 0.2976 -0.0099 0.3690 0.3841 0.0150 
14:51-14:52 0.1974 0.1903 -0.0071* 0.2513 0.2625 0.0111 0.2852 0.2817 -0.0034 0.3012 0.2988 -0.0024 0.3647 0.3709 0.0061 
14:52-14:53 0.1953 0.1912 -0.0041 0.2524 0.2633 0.0109 0.2820 0.2736 -0.0083 0.3048 0.2958 -0.0090 0.3689 0.3668 -0.0021 
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14:53-14:54 0.1979 0.1897 -0.0082** 0.2514 0.2604 0.0091 0.2816 0.2774 -0.0042 0.3042 0.2987 -0.0054 0.3698 0.3671 -0.0027 
14:54-14:55 0.1962 0.1902 -0.0059 0.2523 0.2615 0.0092 0.2846 0.2777 -0.0069 0.3050 0.2965 -0.0085 0.3665 0.3754 0.0089 
14:55-14:56 0.1978 0.1920 -0.0058 0.2540 0.2599 0.0059 0.2850 0.2798 -0.0052 0.3080 0.2972 -0.0108 0.3699 0.3801 0.0102 
14:56-14:57 0.1990 0.1672 -0.0317*** 0.2555 0.2264 -0.0291*** 0.2849 0.2484 -0.0365*** 0.3032 0.2655 -0.0376*** 0.3670 0.3434 -0.0236** 
14:57-14:58 0.1995 . . 0.2594 . . 0.2852 . . 0.3049 . . 0.3668 . . 
14:58-14:59 0.1996 . . 0.2603 . . 0.2906 . . 0.3097 . . 0.3872 . . 
14:59-close 0.2052 0.0351 -0.1701*** 0.2622 0.0525 -0.2097*** 0.2907 0.0689 -0.2218*** 0.3176 0.0882 -0.2293*** 0.3876 0.1434 -0.2442*** 
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 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Time Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. 
Panel B: Effective spread 
14:30-14:31 0.0140 0.0129 -0.0010* 0.0131 0.0137 0.0006 0.0135 0.0125 -0.0010 0.0129 0.0133 0.0004 0.0137 0.0124 -0.0012* 
14:31-14:32 0.0137 0.0133 -0.0004 0.0129 0.0133 0.0005 0.0139 0.0124 -0.0015 0.0129 0.0129 0.0000 0.0127 0.0130 0.0003 
14:32-14:33 0.0136 0.0130 -0.0005 0.0128 0.0130 0.0002 0.0132 0.0122 -0.0011** 0.0130 0.0129 -0.0001 0.0124 0.0128 0.0004* 
14:33-14:34 0.0134 0.0129 -0.0005** 0.0126 0.0128 0.0002 0.0135 0.0125 -0.0010* 0.0128 0.0129 0.0001 0.0135 0.0126 -0.0009 
14:34-14:35 0.0133 0.0125 -0.0008* 0.0128 0.0126 -0.0002 0.0132 0.0122 -0.0010** 0.0131 0.0133 0.0003 0.0130 0.0126 -0.0005 
14:35-14:36 0.0133 0.0126 -0.0007* 0.0128 0.0125 -0.0003 0.0133 0.0120 -0.0012** 0.0126 0.0132 0.0006 0.0128 0.0127 -0.0002 
14:36-14:37 0.0131 0.0127 -0.0004 0.0123 0.0120 -0.0003 0.0136 0.0119 -0.0017** 0.0130 0.0130 0.0001 0.0127 0.0127 -0.0001 
14:37-14:38 0.0133 0.0126 -0.0007 0.0124 0.0123 -0.0001 0.0133 0.0121 -0.0013* 0.0127 0.0134 0.0007 0.0126 0.0126 0.0000 
14:38-14:39 0.0132 0.0129 -0.0003 0.0127 0.0125 -0.0002 0.0131 0.0122 -0.0009*** 0.0128 0.0130 0.0003 0.0126 0.0134 0.0008 
14:39-14:40 0.0133 0.0128 -0.0005 0.0127 0.0123 -0.0004 0.0130 0.0121 -0.0009* 0.0130 0.0130 0.0001 0.0123 0.0125 0.0002 
14:40-14:41 0.0135 0.0129 -0.0006 0.0127 0.0122 -0.0005* 0.0131 0.0120 -0.0011** 0.0128 0.0130 0.0002 0.0127 0.0126 -0.0001 
14:41-14:42 0.0133 0.0130 -0.0003 0.0126 0.0124 -0.0002 0.0132 0.0122 -0.0010*** 0.0132 0.0132 0.0000 0.0127 0.0124 -0.0003 
14:42-14:43 0.0136 0.0129 -0.0007 0.0128 0.0124 -0.0004 0.0129 0.0119 -0.0010** 0.0130 0.0130 0.0000 0.0125 0.0130 0.0004 
14:43-14:44 0.0137 0.0125 -0.0011* 0.0129 0.0124 -0.0005 0.0133 0.0119 -0.0014** 0.0130 0.0131 0.0001 0.0129 0.0134 0.0005 
14:44-14:45 0.0133 0.0127 -0.0006 0.0125 0.0127 0.0002 0.0131 0.0121 -0.0010* 0.0127 0.0129 0.0002 0.0128 0.0129 0.0000 
14:45-14:46 0.0134 0.0128 -0.0006 0.0122 0.0126 0.0005 0.0127 0.0121 -0.0006*** 0.0128 0.0128 0.0000 0.0125 0.0131 0.0006 
14:46-14:47 0.0131 0.0128 -0.0003 0.0124 0.0125 0.0001 0.0126 0.0122 -0.0004 0.0126 0.0126 0.0000 0.0126 0.0129 0.0004 
14:47-14:48 0.0131 0.0127 -0.0004 0.0124 0.0124 0.0000 0.0127 0.0128 0.0001 0.0123 0.0125 0.0002 0.0128 0.0126 -0.0001 
14:48-14:49 0.0131 0.0124 -0.0007 0.0128 0.0127 -0.0001 0.0125 0.0123 -0.0002 0.0125 0.0128 0.0002 0.0125 0.0130 0.0005 
14:49-14:50 0.0131 0.0126 -0.0005 0.0126 0.0125 0.0000 0.0125 0.0127 0.0002 0.0128 0.0129 0.0001 0.0125 0.0126 0.0001 
14:50-14:51 0.0132 0.0126 -0.0006 0.0123 0.0128 0.0005** 0.0128 0.0127 -0.0001 0.0131 0.0127 -0.0004 0.0129 0.0133 0.0004 
14:51-14:52 0.0130 0.0127 -0.0003 0.0123 0.0134 0.0010** 0.0129 0.0126 -0.0003 0.0125 0.0128 0.0002 0.0123 0.0129 0.0006 
14:52-14:53 0.0129 0.0126 -0.0002 0.0122 0.0132 0.0010** 0.0127 0.0119 -0.0009* 0.0126 0.0127 0.0001 0.0126 0.0129 0.0003 
14:53-14:54 0.0132 0.0126 -0.0006 0.0125 0.0130 0.0005 0.0127 0.0124 -0.0004 0.0130 0.0126 -0.0004 0.0124 0.0129 0.0005 
14:54-14:55 0.0131 0.0128 -0.0003 0.0128 0.0129 0.0002 0.0130 0.0123 -0.0006 0.0128 0.0127 -0.0001 0.0128 0.0135 0.0008 
14:55-14:56 0.0131 0.0128 -0.0003 0.0130 0.0129 -0.0001 0.0133 0.0127 -0.0007 0.0128 0.0130 0.0002 0.0126 0.0137 0.0011 
14:56-14:57 0.0135 0.0131 -0.0005 0.0130 0.0128 -0.0002 0.0135 0.0123 -0.0012 0.0127 0.0132 0.0004 0.0128 0.0139 0.0011 
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14:57-14:58 0.0135 . . 0.0128 . . 0.0135 . . 0.0128 . . 0.0123 . . 
14:58-14:59 0.0136 . . 0.0128 . . 0.0140 . . 0.0136 . . 0.0134 . . 
14:59-close 0.0141 0.0123 -0.0018*** 0.0132 0.0112 -0.0020*** 0.0142 0.0110 -0.0032** 0.0139 0.0115 -0.0023*** 0.0142 0.0118 -0.0023*** 
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 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Time Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. 
Panel C: Proportional effective spread (%) 
14:30-14:31 0.2116 0.1983 -0.0133*** 0.2703 0.2691 -0.0012 0.2964 0.2821 -0.0143* 0.3056 0.3117 0.0061 0.3928 0.3576 -0.0351** 
*14:31-14:32 0.2091 0.1997 -0.0094** 0.2669 0.2644 -0.0025 0.2991 0.2810 -0.0181** 0.3104 0.3065 -0.0039 0.3709 0.3613 -0.0095 
14:32-14:33 0.2075 0.1978 -0.0097** 0.2645 0.2640 -0.0005 0.3004 0.2784 -0.0220*** 0.3098 0.3074 -0.0024 0.3631 0.3601 -0.0030 
14:33-14:34 0.2074 0.1966 -0.0108** 0.2600 0.2644 0.0044 0.2992 0.2784 -0.0208*** 0.3091 0.3037 -0.0054 0.3860 0.3595 -0.0264** 
14:34-14:35 0.2028 0.1939 -0.0089** 0.2627 0.2582 -0.0045 0.2977 0.2774 -0.0203*** 0.3127 0.3095 -0.0033 0.3746 0.3573 -0.0173* 
14:35-14:36 0.2056 0.1938 -0.0118*** 0.2620 0.2566 -0.0054 0.2969 0.2743 -0.0226*** 0.3037 0.3076 0.0039 0.3757 0.3613 -0.0144 
14:36-14:37 0.2028 0.1941 -0.0087* 0.2565 0.2526 -0.0039 0.2989 0.2739 -0.0251*** 0.3084 0.3060 -0.0024 0.3714 0.3575 -0.0139 
14:37-14:38 0.2039 0.1933 -0.0106** 0.2600 0.2569 -0.0031 0.2955 0.2765 -0.0191*** 0.3044 0.3097 0.0053 0.3702 0.3601 -0.0116 
14:38-14:39 0.2041 0.1970 -0.0071 0.2634 0.2584 -0.0051 0.2959 0.2747 -0.0212**** 0.3077 0.3060 -0.0017 0.3658 0.3712 0.0054 
14:39-14:40 0.2056 0.1963 -0.0093** 0.2628 0.2541 -0.0087 0.2892 0.2771 -0.0122** 0.3078 0.3050 -0.0027 0.3610 0.3543 -0.0067 
14:40-14:41 0.2067 0.1973 -0.0094** 0.2633 0.2511 -0.0122** 0.2945 0.2752 -0.0194*** 0.3037 0.3010 -0.0027 0.3715 0.3575 -0.0140 
14:41-14:42 0.2062 0.1980 -0.0082* 0.2601 0.2537 -0.0064 0.2925 0.2739 -0.0186*** 0.3091 0.3061 -0.0030 0.3680 0.3531 -0.0149 
14:42-14:43 0.2097 0.1961 -0.0135*** 0.2624 0.2546 -0.0078 0.2886 0.2700 -0.0186*** 0.3094 0.3032 -0.0062 0.3677 0.3646 -0.0031 
14:43-14:44 0.2086 0.1940 -0.0147*** 0.2639 0.2557 -0.0082 0.2932 0.2725 -0.0207*** 0.3099 0.3061 -0.0038 0.3751 0.3755 0.0004 
14:44-14:45 0.2057 0.1951 -0.0106** 0.2606 0.2573 -0.0032 0.2919 0.2765 -0.0154** 0.3064 0.3053 -0.0011 0.3725 0.3651 -0.0074 
14:45-14:46 0.2082 0.1960 -0.0122** 0.2561 0.2564 0.0002 0.2854 0.2718 -0.0136*** 0.3077 0.2985 -0.0092 0.3614 0.3724 0.0110 
14:46-14:47 0.2015 0.1951 -0.0064 0.2578 0.2555 -0.0022 0.2879 0.2748 -0.0131** 0.3043 0.2955 -0.0088 0.3703 0.3624 -0.0079 
14:47-14:48 0.2029 0.1937 -0.0092** 0.2566 0.2538 -0.0029 0.2853 0.2818 -0.0035 0.2999 0.2961 -0.0038 0.3736 0.3637 -0.0099 
14:48-14:49 0.2017 0.1917 -0.0100** 0.2614 0.2579 -0.0034 0.2861 0.2787 -0.0074 0.3016 0.3006 -0.0009 0.3620 0.3693 0.0073 
14:49-14:50 0.2036 0.1946 -0.0090** 0.2607 0.2589 -0.0018 0.2850 0.2827 -0.0023 0.3049 0.3018 -0.0031 0.3640 0.3610 -0.0055 
14:50-14:51 0.2037 0.1933 -0.0104** 0.2552 0.2624 0.0072 0.2872 0.2820 -0.0052 0.3061 0.2989 -0.0072 0.3748 0.3743 -0.0005 
14:51-14:52 0.2033 0.1935 -0.0098** 0.2575 0.2708 0.0132 0.2897 0.2826 -0.0071 0.2995 0.3024 0.0029 0.3629 0.3654 0.0025 
14:52-14:53 0.2017 0.1956 -0.0061 0.2556 0.2671 0.0115 0.2859 0.2734 -0.0125** 0.3036 0.2971 -0.0065 0.3701 0.3696 -0.0005 
14:53-14:54 0.2047 0.1948 -0.0099** 0.2587 0.2665 0.0077 0.2870 0.2798 -0.0072 0.3090 0.2972 -0.0118 0.3646 0.3652 0.0006 
14:54-14:55 0.2068 0.1959 -0.0109** 0.2597 0.2642 0.0045 0.2894 0.2810 -0.0084 0.3050 0.2992 -0.0059 0.3706 0.3803 0.0097 
14:55-14:56 0.2042 0.1987 -0.0055 0.2686 0.2639 -0.0047 0.2907 0.2858 -0.0049 0.3090 0.3032 -0.0058 0.3659 0.3829 0.0170* 
14:56-14:57 0.2070 0.2012 -0.0059 0.2685 0.2646 -0.0039 0.2934 0.2851 -0.0082 0.3063 0.3083 0.0020 0.3718 0.3875 0.0157 
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14:57-14:58 0.2073 . . 0.2699 . . 0.2968 . . 0.3051 . . 0.3655 . . 
14:58-14:59 0.2111 . . 0.2730 . . 0.2995 . . 0.3168 . . 0.3930 . . 
14:59-close 0.2178 0.1874 -0.0304*** 0.2776 0.2354 -0.0422*** 0.3037 0.2568 -0.0469*** 0.3251 0.2750 -0.0501*** 0.4106 0.3346 -0.0760*** 
  
131 
 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Time Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. 
Panel D: Dollar depth 
14:30-14:31 1065644 631120 -434523* 558099 579349 21250 554696 421619 -133077 343471 330367 -13105 264217 205636 -58581 
14:31-14:32 1153186 716123 -437063 594014 566278 -27736 543892 419223 -124669 371486 354674 -16812 258018 206023 -51995** 
14:32-14:33 1101549 719247 -382302* 570792 526078 -44714 528765 393539 -135226 399894 415068 15174 255830 210937 -44893* 
14:33-14:34 1110053 729134 -380919 618474 565732 -52741 545792 430993 -114799 364158 421118 56960 274293 219492 -54802* 
14:34-14:35 1117920 671771 -446149** 721224 541646 -179579 510976 460589 -50386 400599 388827 -11773 255535 219891 -35644 
14:35-14:36 1081509 732174 -349335 648519 594598 -53922 537365 433563 -103802 364648 420180 55532 275795 220569 -55226 
14:36-14:37 1179279 735529 -443750* 647579 576142 -71437 565477 424262 -141215 369386 384673 15287 270221 216277 -53943* 
14:37-14:38 1145415 728791 -416624 650517 609509 -41008 604859 462886 -141973 370095 382413 12318 296830 208438 -88392 
14:38-14:39 1064191 740624 -323567* 672143 598298 -73844 559910 447959 -111951 361027 285210 -75817 267372 204673 -62699** 
14:39-14:40 961709 716375 -245335* 635552 580971 -54581 540170 447858 -92312 398010 396448 -1562 256815 190958 -65857** 
14:40-14:41 1025874 773697 -252177 587117 639036 51919 560274 456145 -104128 390745 396906 6161 254790 184231 -70559** 
14:41-14:42 1072839 714257 -358582* 605560 597419 -8141 586008 484704 -101304 391138 407247 16109 245923 219152 -26771*** 
14:42-14:43 1095241 721320 -373921* 563828 566250 2421 537092 457499 -79594 372318 354840 -17477 264374 202602 -61771 
14:43-14:44 1120651 754330 -366321 575744 572451 -3293 527650 489780 -37870 376529 376484 -45 253367 206698 -46669** 
14:44-14:45 1039058 763602 -275456 598884 552916 -45968 537620 506055 -31566 422694 335518 -87177 235512 206689 -28823* 
14:45-14:46 1049508 740624 -308884* 610383 590220 -20163 530138 507270 -22868 416144 394130 -22014 248707 201284 -47423 
14:46-14:47 1075576 753062 -322514* 618586 550806 -67780 502580 501632 -947 405414 418946 13531 265010 206828 -58182** 
14:47-14:48 1129343 784660 -344683 629339 509336 -120004 557860 490438 -67422 402621 374066 -28555 249732 200904 -48828** 
14:48-14:49 1113025 749355 -363670** 588291 557062 -31229 569048 530587 -38461 432970 413129 -19841 253306 195327 -57979** 
14:49-14:50 1237910 801138 -436771* 624206 552666 -71539 564843 507667 -57176 433323 361400 -71923 261137 186530 -74607*** 
14:50-14:51 1090322 783718 -306604* 621531 562852 -58679 501001 495458 -5543 408933 395607 -13326 272269 199085 -73184*** 
14:51-14:52 1192517 839439 -353078 614139 592266 -21874 582346 482486 -99860 401083 481058 79975 286208 205392 -80816*** 
14:52-14:53 1188314 778822 -409493** 635904 571908 -63996 508413 478754 -29659 423625 384255 -39371 260925 208218 -52707** 
14:53-14:54 1279309 766390 -512919* 625321 567724 -57597 531459 484511 -46948 447193 338246 -108947 266964 211434 -55530** 
14:54-14:55 1178038 770933 -407104** 618030 533586 -84444 533096 498185 -34911 420585 339346 -81239 290036 222090 -67945** 
14:55-14:56 1197236 754762 -442475** 639323 537846 -101476 535772 486497 -49275 422083 348687 -73396 283762 210475 -73286* 
14:56-14:57 1172303 717284 -455019*** 632982 506198 -126784 538714 419692 -119022 441436 311667 -129769 292467 192660 -99808** 
132 
 
14:57-14:58 1190937 . . 659788 . . 555724 . . 405617 . . 266232 . . 
14:58-14:59 1263773 . . 637694 . . 550564 . . 435845 . . 269176 . . 
14:59-close 1290261 1090373 -199889 659536 621458 -38078 534538 440587 -93951 402030 278830 -123200 281679 192234 -89445*** 
  
133 
 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Time Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. 
Panel E: Parkinson's volatility (%) 
14:30-14:31 0.0260 0.0206 -0.0054** 0.0327 0.0257 -0.0071 0.0271 0.0214 -0.0057* 0.0248 0.0186 -0.0062** 0.0230 0.0128 -0.0102** 
14:31-14:32 0.0249 0.0224 -0.0024 0.0285 0.0288 0.0002 0.0281 0.0218 -0.0063* 0.0214 0.0172 -0.0042 0.0208 0.0142 -0.0066* 
14:32-14:33 0.0237 0.0217 -0.0019 0.0291 0.0249 -0.0042 0.0251 0.0195 -0.0056** 0.0207 0.0182 -0.0024 0.0180 0.0138 -0.0042* 
14:33-14:34 0.0253 0.0203 -0.0050** 0.0267 0.0260 -0.0007 0.0290 0.0190 -0.0100*** 0.0250 0.0210 -0.0041 0.0242 0.0158 -0.0084* 
14:34-14:35 0.0240 0.0191 -0.0050*** 0.0271 0.0239 -0.0032 0.0262 0.0209 -0.0053** 0.0234 0.0206 -0.0028 0.0315 0.0182 -0.0133 
14:35-14:36 0.0253 0.0196 -0.0058*** 0.0303 0.0261 -0.0043 0.0277 0.0222 -0.0055** 0.0242 0.0200 -0.0043 0.0281 0.0131 -0.0150*** 
14:36-14:37 0.0247 0.0196 -0.0050** 0.0240 0.0211 -0.0028 0.0302 0.0186 -0.0117*** 0.0249 0.0217 -0.0032 0.0281 0.0129 -0.0152*** 
14:37-14:38 0.0251 0.0209 -0.0042** 0.0278 0.0256 -0.0022 0.0365 0.0203 -0.0161** 0.0221 0.0212 -0.0010 0.0244 0.0180 -0.0067 
14:38-14:39 0.0251 0.0216 -0.0035 0.0255 0.0213 -0.0042* 0.0295 0.0188 -0.0107*** 0.0250 0.0186 -0.0064* 0.0219 0.0235 0.0016 
14:39-14:40 0.0228 0.0211 -0.0017 0.0265 0.0230 -0.0035 0.0222 0.0218 -0.0004 0.0243 0.0206 -0.0037 0.0240 0.0165 -0.0075** 
14:40-14:41 0.0260 0.0206 -0.0054*** 0.0266 0.0210 -0.0056** 0.0275 0.0204 -0.0071*** 0.0231 0.0202 -0.0029 0.0319 0.0172 -0.0147 
14:41-14:42 0.0250 0.0191 -0.0059*** 0.0280 0.0225 -0.0055** 0.0256 0.0184 -0.0072*** 0.0219 0.0203 -0.0016 0.0258 0.0145 -0.0113*** 
14:42-14:43 0.0238 0.0196 -0.0041** 0.0295 0.0219 -0.0076** 0.0262 0.0198 -0.0064*** 0.0280 0.0221 -0.0059 0.0272 0.0181 -0.0090** 
14:43-14:44 0.0232 0.0217 -0.0015 0.0329 0.0241 -0.0087* 0.0253 0.0199 -0.0053* 0.0230 0.0177 -0.0053*** 0.0249 0.0201 -0.0048 
14:44-14:45 0.0298 0.0209 -0.0089* 0.0288 0.0257 -0.0031 0.0286 0.0209 -0.0077*** 0.0244 0.0188 -0.0056** 0.0209 0.0147 -0.0062*** 
14:45-14:46 0.0253 0.0213 -0.0040 0.0298 0.0267 -0.0032 0.0266 0.0206 -0.0061*** 0.0233 0.0219 -0.0014 0.0230 0.0194 -0.0037 
14:46-14:47 0.0243 0.0213 -0.0030 0.0260 0.0242 -0.0018 0.0298 0.0225 -0.0072** 0.0235 0.0204 -0.0031 0.0234 0.0155 -0.0079** 
14:47-14:48 0.0258 0.0206 -0.0053*** 0.0283 0.0246 -0.0038 0.0269 0.0267 -0.0003 0.0237 0.0247 0.0010 0.0389 0.0269 -0.0120 
14:48-14:49 0.0275 0.0206 -0.0069** 0.0277 0.0354 0.0078 0.0355 0.0236 -0.0120** 0.0232 0.0238 0.0007 0.0237 0.0273 0.0037 
14:49-14:50 0.0240 0.0223 -0.0017 0.0300 0.0288 -0.0012 0.0302 0.0234 -0.0068** 0.0247 0.0240 -0.0008 0.0254 0.0213 -0.0044 
14:50-14:51 0.0225 0.0199 -0.0026 0.0306 0.0297 -0.0009 0.0306 0.0277 -0.0029 0.0249 0.0236 -0.0013 0.0250 0.0239 -0.0011 
14:51-14:52 0.0260 0.0223 -0.0036 0.0290 0.0383 0.0093 0.0343 0.0252 -0.0091** 0.0245 0.0248 0.0003 0.0237 0.0219 -0.0018 
14:52-14:53 0.0266 0.0211 -0.0054* 0.0285 0.0332 0.0047 0.0331 0.0252 -0.0078*** 0.0277 0.0249 -0.0028 0.0352 0.0201 -0.0151 
14:53-14:54 0.0264 0.0229 -0.0036 0.0352 0.0380 0.0028 0.0313 0.0286 -0.0027 0.0303 0.0256 -0.0047 0.0267 0.0274 0.0007 
14:54-14:55 0.0295 0.0225 -0.0070** 0.0345 0.0393 0.0048 0.0372 0.0279 -0.0093** 0.0327 0.0277 -0.0050 0.0251 0.0269 0.0018 
14:55-14:56 0.0288 0.0308 0.0020 0.0341 0.0382 0.0041 0.0360 0.0306 -0.0054 0.0356 0.0277 -0.0079 0.0296 0.0384 0.0089 
14:56-14:57 0.0333 0.0376 0.0043 0.0359 0.0520 0.0161** 0.0413 0.0480 0.0066 0.0314 0.0436 0.0122*** 0.0303 0.0517 0.0214*** 
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14:57-14:58 0.0310 . . 0.0424 . . 0.0447 . . 0.0351 . . 0.0369 . . 
14:58-14:59 0.0390 . . 0.0523 . . 0.0481 . . 0.0471 . . 0.0777 . . 
14:59-close 0.0663 0.0000 -0.0663*** 0.0721 0.0000 -0.0721*** 0.0632 0.0000 -0.0632*** 0.0616 0.0000 -0.0616*** 0.1210 0.0000 -0.1210*** 
  
135 
 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Time Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. 
Panel F: Proportional number of trades (%) 
14:30-14:31 0.4308 0.4443 0.0134** 0.4454 0.4612 0.0158 0.4760 0.5024 0.0264** 0.4986 0.5232 0.0246** 0.5655 0.6390 0.0735*** 
14:31-14:32 0.4206 0.4427 0.0221*** 0.4400 0.4596 0.0196* 0.4670 0.4898 0.0228** 0.4894 0.5250 0.0357*** 0.5557 0.6329 0.0772*** 
14:32-14:33 0.4266 0.4407 0.0141** 0.4470 0.4608 0.0138 0.4574 0.4853 0.0279** 0.4907 0.5388 0.0481*** 0.6070 0.6345 0.0276 
14:33-14:34 0.4284 0.4478 0.0194*** 0.4485 0.4606 0.0121 0.4661 0.5097 0.0436*** 0.5067 0.5407 0.0340** 0.6014 0.6389 0.0375 
14:34-14:35 0.4313 0.4456 0.0143*** 0.4472 0.4691 0.0219** 0.4797 0.5098 0.0300*** 0.5101 0.5371 0.0271* 0.5829 0.6448 0.0619** 
14:35-14:36 0.4258 0.4557 0.0299*** 0.4381 0.4742 0.0361*** 0.4680 0.5163 0.0483*** 0.4929 0.5444 0.0515*** 0.5609 0.6535 0.0925*** 
14:36-14:37 0.4326 0.4507 0.0180*** 0.4603 0.4757 0.0154 0.4721 0.5109 0.0388*** 0.5175 0.5344 0.0170 0.5819 0.6455 0.0636*** 
14:37-14:38 0.4271 0.4632 0.0361*** 0.4494 0.4834 0.0340*** 0.4624 0.5110 0.0486*** 0.4843 0.5433 0.0591*** 0.6290 0.6499 0.0291 
14:38-14:39 0.4360 0.4537 0.0177*** 0.4510 0.4760 0.0249** 0.4939 0.5060 0.0121 0.5213 0.5203 -0.0010 0.5727 0.6527 0.0800*** 
14:39-14:40 0.4295 0.4591 0.0295*** 0.4393 0.4819 0.0426*** 0.4678 0.5193 0.0515*** 0.5038 0.5276 0.0238** 0.5668 0.6612 0.0944*** 
14:40-14:41 0.4404 0.4596 0.0192*** 0.4618 0.4839 0.0220* 0.4792 0.5221 0.0429*** 0.5026 0.5365 0.0339*** 0.5876 0.6565 0.0689*** 
14:41-14:42 0.4355 0.4620 0.0264*** 0.4526 0.4768 0.0242** 0.4732 0.5042 0.0311*** 0.5075 0.5456 0.0380*** 0.5876 0.6506 0.0631**** 
14:42-14:43 0.4367 0.4636 0.0269*** 0.4600 0.4839 0.0239** 0.4858 0.5017 0.0159 0.5283 0.5371 0.0088 0.6076 0.6612 0.0535** 
14:43-14:44 0.4417 0.4760 0.0342*** 0.4550 0.5010 0.0459*** 0.4910 0.5322 0.0413*** 0.5230 0.5766 0.0535*** 0.6094 0.6928 0.0834*** 
14:44-14:45 0.4606 0.4664 0.0058 0.4692 0.4831 0.0139 0.4954 0.5345 0.0391*** 0.5425 0.5584 0.0159 0.6406 0.6764 0.0357 
14:45-14:46 0.4436 0.4822 0.0385*** 0.4656 0.5071 0.0415*** 0.5027 0.5376 0.0349*** 0.5272 0.5881 0.0608*** 0.6061 0.6852 0.0790** 
14:46-14:47 0.4643 0.4746 0.0104* 0.4841 0.5049 0.0208* 0.5178 0.5514 0.0336* 0.5452 0.5866 0.0414*** 0.6528 0.6748 0.0220 
14:47-14:48 0.4522 0.4847 0.0324*** 0.4734 0.5282 0.0547*** 0.5085 0.5747 0.0661*** 0.5452 0.6016 0.0564*** 0.6121 0.7343 0.1221*** 
14:48-14:49 0.4720 0.4964 0.0245*** 0.4941 0.5205 0.0264** 0.5266 0.5790 0.0524*** 0.5567 0.6194 0.0627*** 0.6333 0.7157 0.0824*** 
14:49-14:50 0.4642 0.5038 0.0397*** 0.4961 0.5400 0.0439*** 0.5363 0.5796 0.0434*** 0.5592 0.6111 0.0518*** 0.6297 0.7210 0.1029*** 
14:50-14:51 0.4729 0.5097 0.0368*** 0.5121 0.5525 0.0405*** 0.5494 0.6002 0.0508*** 0.5732 0.6445 0.0714*** 0.6547 0.7254 0.0707*** 
14:51-14:52 0.4792 0.5158 0.0366*** 0.5139 0.5661 0.0522*** 0.5520 0.6069 0.0549*** 0.5937 0.6325 0.0389** 0.6523 0.7761 0.1239*** 
14:52-14:53 0.4888 0.5233 0.0346*** 0.5335 0.5586 0.0251** 0.5723 0.6113 0.0390*** 0.5952 0.6595 0.0642*** 0.6843 0.7391 0.0547** 
14:53-14:54 0.4925 0.5347 0.0422*** 0.5284 0.5976 0.0693*** 0.5778 0.6395 0.0617*** 0.6212 0.6803 0.0591*** 0.6890 0.8047 0.1156*** 
14:54-14:55 0.5074 0.5362 0.0288*** 0.5565 0.6025 0.0460*** 0.6072 0.6384 0.0313*** 0.6452 0.6991 0.0539*** 0.7416 0.7761 0.0345 
14:55-14:56 0.5075 0.5585 0.0510*** 0.5649 0.6238 0.0589*** 0.6148 0.6756 0.0608*** 0.6561 0.7212 0.0652*** 0.7426 0.8494 0.1068*** 
14:56-14:57 0.5216 0.7300 0.2084*** 0.5857 0.8158 0.2301*** 0.6486 0.8933 0.2447*** 0.6925 0.9436 0.2511*** 0.7575 1.0627 0.3052*** 
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14:57-14:58 0.5301 . . 0.5860 . . 0.6554 . . 0.6986 . . 0.7618 . . 
14:58-14:59 0.5519 . . 0.6315 . . 0.7099 . . 0.7541 . . 0.8407 . . 
14:59-close 0.6804 0.0998 -0.5806*** 0.7587 0.1368 -0.6219*** 0.8437 0.1790 -0.6647*** 0.9220 0.2354 -0.6865*** 0.9639 0.3872 -0.5767*** 
  
137 
 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Time Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. 
Panel G: Proportional average trade size 
14:30-14:31 0.9386 1.0154 0.0768** 0.9792 1.0695 0.0903 1.0373 0.9608 -0.0765 0.9465 1.0239 0.0774 1.1200 1.0185 -0.1015 
14:31-14:32 0.9519 0.9649 0.0130 0.9357 0.9076 -0.0281 1.0135 0.9415 -0.0720 0.9753 0.9667 -0.0086 0.9299 1.1153 0.1854* 
14:32-14:33 1.0044 0.9663 -0.0381 0.9648 0.9564 -0.0084 1.0251 0.9866 -0.0385 1.0414 1.0036 -0.0377 0.9684 0.9804 0.0120 
14:33-14:34 0.9041 0.9181 0.0140 0.9477 1.0335 0.0858 1.0209 0.9720 -0.0489 1.0197 0.9861 -0.0336 0.9548 0.9442 -0.0106 
14:34-14:35 0.9283 1.0261 0.0979* 0.9949 0.9908 -0.0040 0.9786 0.9830 0.0045 0.9371 1.0775 0.1404 1.1508 0.9893 -0.1615 
14:35-14:36 0.9276 0.9563 0.0286 0.9700 1.0032 0.0332 1.0633 0.9937 -0.0696 0.9040 1.0130 0.1090* 1.0125 0.9716 -0.0409 
14:36-14:37 1.0020 0.9694 -0.0326 1.0173 1.0309 0.0136 1.0672 0.9722 -0.0949* 1.0440 0.9994 -0.0446 0.9518 0.9510 -0.0008 
14:37-14:38 0.9345 1.0589 0.1244** 1.0531 0.9931 -0.0600 1.0383 0.9569 -0.0814 1.0126 0.9506 -0.0619 0.9745 1.0345 0.0566 
14:38-14:39 0.9596 0.9894 0.0298 0.9318 1.0060 0.0742 0.9877 1.0419 0.0542 0.9733 1.0022 0.0290 0.9824 0.9726 -0.0097 
14:39-14:40 0.9616 0.9667 0.0051 0.9402 1.0417 0.1015*** 0.9474 0.9815 0.0341 0.9591 1.0753 0.1162** 0.9178 1.0690 0.1512* 
14:40-14:41 0.9852 0.9631 -0.0221 0.9631 0.9560 -0.0071 0.9524 1.0432 0.0908 1.0525 1.1752 0.1227 1.1288 1.0442 -0.0846 
14:41-14:42 0.9426 1.0654 0.1228* 0.9523 1.0012 0.0488 1.0184 1.0614 0.0429 0.9419 1.0412 0.0993 1.0900 1.0053 -0.0848 
14:42-14:43 0.9448 1.0134 0.0686* 0.9705 0.9771 0.0065 1.0594 0.9560 -0.1034* 0.9722 1.0312 0.0589 0.9543 1.0481 0.0938 
14:43-14:44 0.9784 1.0510 0.0726 1.0015 0.9752 -0.0263 1.0462 1.0063 -0.0398 1.0326 0.9774 -0.0552 1.0833 1.0320 -0.0512 
14:44-14:45 0.9343 1.0172 0.0829** 0.9730 1.0344 0.0614 1.1196 1.0327 -0.0869 1.0281 1.0308 0.0026 1.0080 1.0507 0.0427 
14:45-14:46 0.9873 1.0833 0.0960** 1.0509 1.0532 0.0024 1.0445 1.0327 -0.0118 1.0608 1.1078 0.0470 0.9919 1.0827 0.0907 
14:46-14:47 0.9981 1.0713 0.0732 1.0219 1.0469 0.0250 1.0612 1.0403 -0.0209 1.0459 1.0227 -0.0232 1.1015 1.1188 0.0173 
14:47-14:48 1.0803 1.1407 0.0604 1.0422 1.0205 -0.0217 1.0581 1.0831 0.0250 1.0858 1.0887 0.0029 1.1834 1.0854 -0.0980 
14:48-14:49 1.0616 1.1017 0.0402 1.0767 1.0319 -0.0449 1.0619 1.0423 -0.0196 1.0075 1.1250 0.1175* 0.9906 1.1110 0.1204** 
14:49-14:50 1.0752 1.1127 0.0375 1.0376 1.0574 0.0198 1.0890 1.1860 0.0970 1.1113 1.0058 -0.1055* 1.0296 1.1100 0.0795 
14:50-14:51 1.0881 1.0938 0.0057 1.0375 1.1590 0.1214* 1.1162 1.1550 0.0388 1.1142 1.0889 -0.0252 1.1165 1.0885 -0.0280 
14:51-14:52 1.1003 1.1903 0.0900* 1.0666 1.1834 0.1168** 1.1305 1.0564 -0.0741 1.1197 1.1875 0.0678 1.0941 1.0402 -0.0539 
14:52-14:53 1.1204 1.2402 0.1199*** 1.1244 1.1643 0.0399 1.1575 1.1075 -0.0500 1.0712 1.1228 0.0516 1.1604 1.0404 -0.1200 
14:53-14:54 1.1714 1.1899 0.0185* 1.1397 1.1678 0.0282 1.1586 1.1718 0.0132 1.1278 1.0868 -0.0410 1.0122 1.0267 0.0145 
14:54-14:55 1.2261 1.2963 0.0702** 1.2103 1.1854 -0.0250 1.1717 1.2163 0.0446 1.1192 1.1814 0.0622 1.0664 1.2268 0.1604** 
14:55-14:56 1.2612 1.3110 0.0498** 1.2322 1.2095 -0.0227 1.2296 1.2994 0.0698 1.0903 1.1022 0.0119 1.0913 1.3088 0.2175*** 
14:56-14:57 1.3295 1.3216 -0.0080*** 1.2550 1.2398 -0.0152 1.2187 1.2809 0.0623 1.2174 1.1758 -0.0416 1.0952 1.2412 0.1461** 
138 
 
14:57-14:58 1.3697 . . 1.2842 . . 1.3299 . . 1.2620 . . 1.1768 . . 
14:58-14:59 1.5357 . . 1.3679 . . 1.3953 . . 1.2309 . . 1.1646 . . 
14:59-close 1.4440 13.7381 12.2941 1.3375 11.2702 9.9327*** 1.3157 9.3082 7.9924*** 1.1808 7.3166 6.1359*** 1.3542 4.7266 3.3724*** 
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 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Time Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. 
Panel H: Proportional turnover (%) 
14:30-14:31 0.4273 0.4746 0.0473** 0.4547 0.5052 0.0506* 0.5419 0.5025 -0.0395 0.4916 0.5495 0.0579* 0.6331 0.6604 0.0273 
14:31-14:32 0.4082 0.4411 0.0329 0.4260 0.4424 0.0164 0.4925 0.4825 -0.0100 0.4846 0.5295 0.0449 0.5504 0.6753 0.1249 
14:32-14:33 0.4405 0.4418 0.0013 0.4479 0.4637 0.0158 0.4910 0.4782 -0.0128 0.5179 0.5583 0.0404 0.5937 0.6367 0.0430 
14:33-14:34 0.4036 0.4333 0.0297* 0.4312 0.4958 0.0645** 0.4823 0.5221 0.0399 0.5305 0.5454 0.0149 0.5661 0.6237 0.0576 
14:34-14:35 0.4165 0.4628 0.0462** 0.4673 0.4890 0.0217 0.4803 0.5091 0.0287 0.4985 0.5507 0.0522* 0.6524 0.6638 0.0115 
14:35-14:36 0.4102 0.4504 0.0401* 0.4449 0.4946 0.0497* 0.5167 0.5114 -0.0053 0.4804 0.5664 0.0860** 0.6051 0.6611 0.0560 
14:36-14:37 0.4523 0.4550 0.0028 0.4945 0.5096 0.0150 0.4970 0.5042 0.0072 0.5697 0.5629 -0.0068 0.5829 0.6321 0.0492 
14:37-14:38 0.4095 0.4954 0.0859*** 0.4840 0.5062 0.0221 0.4875 0.4952 0.0077 0.4953 0.5453 0.0499* 0.5991 0.6885 0.1015* 
14:38-14:39 0.4397 0.4555 0.0158 0.4362 0.4893 0.0531** 0.4976 0.5439 0.0464* 0.5273 0.5406 0.0132 0.5839 0.6639 0.0800 
14:39-14:40 0.4319 0.4541 0.0222 0.4313 0.5018 0.0705*** 0.4639 0.5333 0.0694*** 0.5135 0.5637 0.0503 0.5517 0.7015 0.1498*** 
14:40-14:41 0.4516 0.4404 -0.0112 0.4453 0.4886 0.0433 0.4811 0.5495 0.0684** 0.5369 0.6176 0.0806** 0.6514 0.6494 -0.0020 
14:41-14:42 0.4292 0.4960 0.0669** 0.4480 0.4929 0.0449** 0.4982 0.5379 0.0397 0.4938 0.5786 0.0848** 0.5974 0.6837 0.0863 
14:42-14:43 0.4307 0.4784 0.0477*** 0.4718 0.4925 0.0207 0.5285 0.4926 -0.0359 0.5502 0.5612 0.0110 0.6142 0.6780 0.0637 
14:43-14:44 0.4440 0.5113 0.0673*** 0.4666 0.5028 0.0361 0.5102 0.5538 0.0436 0.5531 0.5835 0.0304 0.6499 0.7145 0.0645 
14:44-14:45 0.4427 0.4847 0.0420** 0.4750 0.5328 0.0579** 0.5836 0.5707 -0.0129 0.5880 0.6073 0.0193 0.6340 0.7394 0.1054** 
14:45-14:46 0.4477 0.5249 0.0772*** 0.5072 0.5506 0.0434 0.5265 0.5721 0.0456 0.5735 0.6594 0.0860** 0.6109 0.7522 0.1414*** 
14:46-14:47 0.4775 0.5064 0.0290 0.4965 0.5446 0.0481** 0.5695 0.5856 0.0161 0.5666 0.6011 0.0346 0.6758 0.7402 0.0643 
14:47-14:48 0.4969 0.5602 0.0633*** 0.5057 0.5675 0.0618* 0.5517 0.6372 0.0854*** 0.6079 0.6684 0.0605* 0.7243 0.8190 0.0948 
14:48-14:49 0.5159 0.5637 0.0478* 0.5622 0.5680 0.0058 0.5623 0.6426 0.0804*** 0.5868 0.6926 0.1058** 0.6403 0.8511 0.2108*** 
14:49-14:50 0.5105 0.5842 0.0737*** 0.5267 0.5838 0.0572** 0.6132 0.6854 0.0722* 0.6366 0.6369 0.0002 0.6743 0.8290 0.1565*** 
14:50-14:51 0.5287 0.5770 0.0483*** 0.5459 0.6574 0.1116*** 0.6422 0.6983 0.0561 0.6659 0.7284 0.0625* 0.7319 0.8000 0.0681 
14:51-14:52 0.5381 0.6299 0.0918*** 0.5697 0.6888 0.1191*** 0.6314 0.6578 0.0264 0.6799 0.7781 0.0982** 0.7431 0.8183 0.0752 
14:52-14:53 0.5548 0.6561 0.1013*** 0.6096 0.6672 0.0577* 0.6640 0.6771 0.0131 0.6473 0.7698 0.1225*** 0.7577 0.7695 0.0118 
14:53-14:54 0.5844 0.6437 0.0593** 0.6353 0.7222 0.0869*** 0.6953 0.7632 0.0679* 0.7163 0.7625 0.0462 0.7071 0.8326 0.1255*** 
14:54-14:55 0.6273 0.6994 0.0721*** 0.7070 0.7312 0.0242 0.7228 0.7717 0.0489 0.7567 0.8058 0.0491 0.7661 0.9568 0.1906*** 
14:55-14:56 0.6535 0.7519 0.0984*** 0.7190 0.7680 0.0490 0.7836 0.9022 0.1186** 0.7310 0.8129 0.0818* 0.8369 1.0776 0.2407*** 
14:56-14:57 0.7067 0.9791 0.2725*** 0.7650 1.0275 0.2625*** 0.8201 1.1437 0.3236*** 0.8433 1.1214 0.2781*** 0.8109 1.3182 0.5074*** 
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14:57-14:58 0.7334 . . 0.7671 . . 0.8695 . . 0.8967 . . 0.9244 . . 
14:58-14:59 0.8529 . . 0.8915 . . 1.0149 . . 0.9714 . . 0.9999 . . 
14:59-close 0.9981 1.2735 0.2754*** 1.0641 1.3675 0.3034*** 1.1455 1.4767 0.3312*** 1.1460 1.5175 0.3715*** 1.2559 1.4746 0.2187*** 
***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
This table presents the univariate mean comparisons of the intraday patterns between 14:30 and 15:00 of: proportional bid-ask spread (%), effective spread, 
proportional effective spread (%), dollar depth, Parkinson’s volatility (%), proportional number of trades (%), proportional average trade size, and proportional 
turnover (%).  The pre-period is from 29 May to 30 June 2006.  The post-period runs from 01 July to 04 August 2006. The sample stocks are sorted into quintiles 
according to their average daily turnover during the study period.  Quintile 1 represents the most liquid stocks, and quintile 5 contains the most illiquid.  The 
difference in means between the pre and post-event period are recorded.   
  
141 
 
 
Table 4.3 Multivariate regressions of spread and volatility during the closing minutes 
Dependent variable: 𝒑𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒅 
Explanatory Variable Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept 1.6920 324.16*** 
volatility 0.4208 155.15*** 
ln(Market Capitalisation) -0.0673 -275.31*** 
Proportional turnover 0.3745 13.32*** 
Change -0.0010 -1.72* 
14:55 to close  -0.0083 -9.81*** 
14:50 to 14:55 0.0065 7.78*** 
14:45 to 14:50 0.0049 5.85*** 
Change × 14:55 to close -0.0062 -4.75*** 
Change × 14:50 to 14:55 -0.0033 -2.82*** 
Change × 14:45 to 14:50 -0.0013 -1.1** 
Adjusted R2  0.2426  
Dependent variable: 𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕𝒅 
Explanatory Variable Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept -0.2367 -63.56*** 
Pbas 0.1621 155.27*** 
ln(Market Capitalisation) 0.0097 57.43*** 
Std_daily_ret 0.0099 5.95*** 
Proportional turnover 2.0593 120.66*** 
Change -0.0052 -13.99*** 
14:55 to close  0.0098 18.64*** 
14:50 to 14:55 0.0008 1.7* 
14:45 to 14:50 -0.00005 -0.1 
Change × 14:55 to close -0.0206 -25.19*** 
Change × 14:50 to 14:55 0.00062 0.85 
Change × 14:45 to 14:50 0.0009 1.2 
Adjusted R2  0.1187  
***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
This table presents the results of the simultaneous regressions for spread and volatility for 281 A-share 
stock listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange during 29 May - 04 August 2006.  The system consists of 
the following two equations: 
𝑝𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑑 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑑 +
 𝛽2 ln(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖)  +  𝛽3 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑑 + 𝛽4 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑑 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛
7
𝑛=5 ∗
𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛
10
𝑛=8 ∗ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡     
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑑 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑝𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑑 + 𝛾2 ln(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖) + 𝛾3𝑠𝑡𝑑_𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖   +
𝛾4𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑑 + 𝛾5 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑑 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛
8
𝑛=6 ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡 +
 ∑ 𝛾𝑛
11
𝑛=9 ∗ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡     
Where 𝑝𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑑 is the average proportional bid-ask spread (%) for stock i, at time interval t, on day d. 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑑  is the Parkinson (1980) volatility (%) measure for stock i, time interval t, day d.  
𝑠𝑡𝑑_𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 is the standard deviation of close-to-close returns measured over the study period, and 
represents volatility of the underlying price discovery process.  𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is the equity 
market capitalisation as at the close of trading on June 30 2006. 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑑 is a dummy variable that 
equals to 1 if the observation is after 1 July 2006, and 0 otherwise. Also included are 3 five-minute time 
interval dummies to capture the sharp rise in spread and volatility in the last fifteen minutes of trading.  
The interaction variables  𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡  captures any additional 
changes in the intraday patterns as a result of the closing call introduction.    
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Table 4.4 First Pass Regression 
 Full sample Quintile 1 Quintile 2 
L Pre Post Diff % Diff T-stat Pre Post Diff % Diff T-stat Pre Post Diff % Diff T-stat 
1 0.2428 0.2881 0.0453 18.64 3.729* 0.2136 0.3471 0.1335 62.48 5.29* 0.2337 0.3100 0.0764 32.68 2.9* 
2 0.2618 0.2770 0.0152 5.79 1.18 0.2295 0.3361 0.1067 46.49 3.78* 0.2566 0.2991 0.0425 16.55 1.62 
3 0.2780 0.2706 -0.0074 -2.66 -0.54 0.2453 0.3450 0.0997 40.63 3.28* 0.2722 0.2941 0.0219 8.04 0.81 
4 0.2897 0.2737 -0.0160 -5.52 -1.09 0.2553 0.3525 0.0973 38.11 2.94* 0.2846 0.3044 0.0198 6.95 0.68 
5 0.2946 0.2854 -0.0092 -3.12 -0.6 0.2600 0.3627 0.1028 39.53 3.01* 0.2970 0.3272 0.0302 10.18 0.99 
6 0.3059 0.3064 0.0005 0.17 0.03 0.2706 0.3798 0.1092 40.34 3.06* 0.3182 0.3547 0.0365 11.47 1.14 
7 0.3031 0.3178 0.0147 4.85 0.92 0.2651 0.3887 0.1236 46.61 3.39* 0.3174 0.3726 0.0552 17.40 1.69 
8 0.2935 0.3257 0.0322 10.96 1.99* 0.2659 0.3976 0.1317 49.52 3.55* 0.3160 0.3878 0.0718 22.71 2.14* 
9 0.2860 0.3275 0.0415 14.51 2.56* 0.2671 0.4030 0.1359 50.89 3.71* 0.3154 0.3967 0.0813 25.79 2.36* 
10 0.2759 0.3279 0.0519 18.81 3.23* 0.2717 0.4076 0.1359 50.00 3.78* 0.3024 0.3998 0.0974 32.20 2.85* 
15 0.2645 0.3464 0.0819 30.96 4.69* 0.2725 0.4654 0.1928 70.75 4.97* 0.2933 0.4193 0.1259 42.94 3.31* 
20 0.2801 0.3537 0.0736 26.26 3.93* 0.2659 0.4661 0.2002 75.28 4.83* 0.3134 0.4251 0.1117 35.65 2.58* 
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 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
L Pre Post Diff % Diff T-stat Pre Post Diff % Diff T-stat Pre Post Diff % Diff T-stat 
1 0.2717 0.3013 0.0296 10.89 1.03 0.3052 0.2716 -0.0337 -11.03 -1.23 0.1907 0.2117 0.0210 11.02 0.88 
2 0.2685 0.2814 0.0129 4.79 0.44 0.3264 0.2669 -0.0596 -18.25 -1.94 0.2286 0.2026 -0.0260 -11.36 -1.04 
3 0.2714 0.2699 -0.0014 -0.52 -0.05 0.3466 0.2572 -0.0894 -25.79 -2.78* 0.2549 0.1882 -0.0666 -26.14 -2.47* 
4 0.2788 0.2714 -0.0074 -2.65 -0.22 0.3615 0.2574 -0.1040 -28.78 -3.14* 0.2688 0.1844 -0.0844 -31.39 -2.87* 
5 0.2781 0.2807 0.0026 0.94 0.08 0.3654 0.2661 -0.0993 -27.18 -2.92* 0.2730 0.1921 -0.0810 -29.65 -2.63* 
6 0.2927 0.3015 0.0088 3.00 0.24 0.3807 0.2868 -0.0939 -24.66 -2.74* 0.2681 0.2112 -0.0570 -21.24 -1.77 
7 0.2941 0.3112 0.0172 5.84 0.47 0.3800 0.2955 -0.0845 -22.23 -2.45* 0.2598 0.2228 -0.0370 -14.24 -1.11 
8 0.2798 0.3158 0.0360 12.85 0.98 0.3636 0.2989 -0.0647 -17.80 -1.84 0.2431 0.2300 -0.0131 -5.38 -0.38 
9 0.2742 0.3141 0.0399 14.55 1.08 0.3502 0.2963 -0.0538 -15.38 -1.51 0.2242 0.2291 0.0049 2.18 0.14 
10 0.2565 0.3126 0.0561 21.87 1.53 0.3398 0.2930 -0.0468 -13.76 -1.32 0.2104 0.2280 0.0176 8.37 0.52 
15 0.2435 0.3243 0.0807 33.15 1.95 0.3097 0.3000 -0.0097 -3.12 -0.26 0.2044 0.2251 0.0207 10.12 0.59 
20 0.2718 0.3382 0.0663 24.40 1.53 0.3258 0.3047 -0.0211 -6.47 -0.53 0.2246 0.2364 0.0118 5.24 0.33 
* denotes significance at 5% level. 
This table reports the average adjusted R-square estimates over the period 120 trading days before and 120 trading days after 01 July 2006 using the 
regression from equation 3: 
  RidLE = αiLE + βiLE RmdLE + eidL,E       i=1,...n    L=1,...10, 15, 20  E=1,2                                  
where RidLE  is the close-to-close return for stock  i on day d for time interval L, using either the pre or post-event returns (E).  Correspondingly, RmdLE is the 
market return on day d for time interval L, using either the pre or post-event returns (E).   Diff is the difference in mean adjusted R-squares between the pre and 
post-event periods.  The sample stocks are sorted into quintiles according to their average daily turnover during the study period.  Quintile 1 represents the most 
liquid stocks, and quintile 5 contains the most illiquid.   
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Table 4.5 Second Pass Regression 
  Full sample Quintile 1 Quintile 2 
  Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change 
Constant          
 parameter 
0.2952 0.3300 0.0348 0.2774 0.4225 0.1451 0.3217 0.3984 0.0768 
 t-stat 22.7864 26.5181 2.0909* 9.1721 18.0604 3.8985* 10.4941 16.0529 2.1882* 
Slope          
 parameter 
-0.0662 -0.1034 -0.0372 -0.0980 -0.1665 -0.0685 -0.1355 -0.1954 -0.0599 
 t-stat -3.1680 -6.4622 -1.4871 -2.0499 -4.6305 -1.1502 -2.8121 -5.4512 -1.0299 
 
  Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
  Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change 
Constant          
 parameter 
0.2727 0.3533 0.0806 0.3583 0.2952 -0.0630 0.2467 0.2023 -0.0444 
 t-stat 10.9556 11.2010 3.0653* 11.6622 10.6321 -1.7547 9.3236 9.2759 -2.7126* 
Slope          
 parameter 
0.0034 -0.0549 -0.0582 -0.0576 -0.0591 -0.0015 -0.0439 -0.0423 0.0016 
 t-stat 0.0710 -1.4405 -0.9270 -1.1650 -1.8167 -0.0288 -1.0864 -1.3095 0.0356 
* denotes significance at 5% level. 
This table reports the parameter estimates from the following second-pass regression: 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑅𝑖𝐿𝐸
2  =  𝛽𝑖0 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐿
−1) + 𝛽𝑖2(𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝐸 ∙ 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐿
−1)) +  𝛽𝑖3(𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝐸) + 𝑢𝑖𝐿𝐸          i=1,...n    L=1,...10, 15, 20  E=1,2   
where 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑅𝑖𝐿𝐸
2   is the adjusted R-square for stock i, calculated using a L-day return interval during  either the pre or post-event period (E).  𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝐸 is set to 
1 if the observation is in the post-event period, and 0 for the pre-event period.  L is the return interval used in the first-pass regression.  𝑢𝑖𝐿𝐸  is the stochastic 
error term.  The sample stocks are sorted into quintiles according to their average daily turnover during the study period.  Quintile 1 represents the most liquid 
stocks, and quintile 5 contains the most illiquid.  The slope captures the relationship between the first-pass adjusted R-square and the transformed return intervals.  
The constant can be thought of as an asymptotic R-square.  
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Table 4.6 R-squared regression dummy coefficient 
Quintile negative and significant not statistically sig positive and significant 
 
freq count % of total freq freq count % of total freq freq count % of total freq 
1 14 25 6 10.7143 36 64.2857 
2 19 33.9286 8 14.2857 29 51.7857 
3 20 35.7143 12 21.4286 24 42.8571 
4 30 53.5714 11 19.6429 15 26.7857 
5 20 35.0877 21 36.8421 16 28.0702 
overall 103 36.6548 58 20.6406 120 42.7046 
 
This frequency table presents the results of  𝛽𝑖3in the second-pass regression: 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑅𝑖𝐿𝐸
2  =  𝛽𝑖0 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐿
−1) + 𝛽𝑖2(𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝐸 ∙ 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐿
−1)) +  𝛽𝑖3(𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝐸) + 𝑢𝑖𝐿𝐸          i=1,...n    L=1,...10, 15, 20  E=1,2   
where 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑅𝑖𝐿𝐸
2   is the adjusted R-square for stock i, calculated using a L-day return interval during  either the pre or post-event period (E).  𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝐸 is set to 
1 if the observation is in the post-event period, and 0 for the pre-event period.  L is the return interval used in the first-pass regression.  𝑢𝑖𝐿𝐸  is the stochastic 
error term.   
For the full sample and each quintile, 𝛽𝑖3 is classified as: statistically significant and negative, not statistically significant, and statistically significant and 
positive.  The level of significance is 5%.   
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Table 4.7 RRD 
 Full sample Quintile 1 Quintile 2 
 Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change 
mean 0.0028 0.0007 -0.0021 0.0125 0.0007 -0.0118 0.0029 0.0008 -0.0021 
median 0.0011 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0012 0.0005 -0.0007 0.0012 0.0005 -0.0006 
s.d. 0.0123 0.0004 0.0229 0.0676 0.0004 0.0675 0.0087 0.0008 0.0088 
t-stat 2.42 22.11 -2.11* 1.38 11.31 -1.31 2.48 7.37 -1.75 
 
 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change 
mean 0.0031 0.0006 -0.0025 0.0011 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0012 0.0007 -0.0005 
median 0.0012 0.0005 -0.0008 0.0008 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0006 -0.0002 
s.d. 0.0111 0.0004 0.0112 0.0013 0.0006 0.0016 0.0014 0.0003 0.0015 
t-stat 2.07 11.25 -1.64 6.45 10.51 -1.54 6.45 15.58 -2.46* 
*significant at the 5% level 
This table contains the RRD statistics calculated for the pre and post-event periods for the full sample 
and five liquidity sorted groups according to average daily turnover.  Quintile 1 represents the most 
active. Quintile 5 is the least active.  The RRD is calculated using 120 trading days prior and 120 
trading days subsequent to the introduction of the closing call auction. The Relative Return Dispersion 
(RRD) coefficient is calculated as: 
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑑 = (
1
𝑛
) ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝐸𝑑
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑑  is the average relative return dispersion coefficient on day d, obtained using all i stock 
samples. n is the number of stocks in the sample on day d.  𝑒𝑖𝐸𝑑
2  is the squared market model (equation 
3) residuals of security i on day d.  
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Figures 
Figure 2.1 The intraday proportional bid-Ask spread 
This figure depicts the average proportional bid-ask spreads (%) across each five-minute time 
interval for 723 A-share stocks during five trading days before and five trading days after July 
1, 2006. 
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Figure 2.2 The intraday depth 
This figure depicts the average depth across each five-minute time interval for 723 A-share 
stocks during five trading days before and five trading days after July 1, 2006.  Depth is the 
sum of the volume at the best bid and ask quotes. 
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Figure 2.3 The intraday volatility 
This figure depicts the average volatility across each five-minute time interval for 723 A-share 
stocks during five trading days before and five trading days after July 1, 2006.  Volatility is a 
Parkinson’s volatility measure.   
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Figure 2.4 The intraday volume 
This figure depicts the average volume across each five-minute time interval for 723 A-share 
stocks during five trading days before and five trading days after July 1, 2006.   
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Figure 2.5 The intraday proportional volume 
This figure depicts the average proportional volume across each five-minute time interval for 
723 A-share stocks during five trading days before and five trading days after July 1, 2006.  
Proportional volume is the ratio of individual transacted volume divided by daily volume. 
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Figure 3.1 Mean WPC across the trading day 
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Figure 3.2 β estimates of unbiasedness regressions.   
Graph 1 Overall 
 
 
Graph 2 Quintile 1 (highest) 
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Graph 3 Quintile 2 
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Graph 4 Quintile 3 
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Graph 5 Quintile 4 
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Graph 6 Quintile 5 
 
Unbiasedness regressions are performed for each 1 minute period from 0925 to 1030 for 780 A-share 
stocks listed on the SSE.  For each stock and each one minute time period, I regress the daily close-to-
close return (retcc) on the return from the previous close to the end of that time period i (retci):  
retcc= α + β x retci + εi   
The five week pre-event sample period runs from 29 May 2006 to 30 June 2006, and the post-event 
sample period is from 01 July 2006 to 04 August 2006.  Sample stocks are further sorted into quintiles 
based on their average trade volume during the study period. Quintile 1 represents the most liquid 
stocks, and quintile 5 contains the most illiquid.   
Mean value of the β estimates are plotted for the total sample and then for each quintile.  5% confidence 
intervals are calculated using the time series standard errors of the mean coefficient estimates. 
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Figure 3.3 RMSE of unbiasedness regressions.   
Graph 1 Overall 
 
 
 
Graph 2 Quintile 1 (highest) 
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Graph 3 Quintile 2 
 
 
 
Graph 4 Quintile 3 
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Graph 5 Quintile 4 
 
 
Graph 6 Quintile 5 
 
Unbiasedness regressions are performed for each 1 minute period from 0925 to 1030 for 780 A-share 
stocks listed on the SSE.  For each stock and each one minute time period, I regress the daily close-to-
close return (retcc) on the return from the previous close to the end of that time period i (retci):  
retcc= α + β x retci + εi   
The five week pre-event sample period runs from 29 May 2006 to 30 June 2006, and the post-event 
sample period is from 01 July 2006 to 04 August 2006.  Sample stocks are further sorted into quintiles 
based on their average trade volume during the study period. Quintile 1 represents the most liquid 
stocks, and quintile 5 contains the most illiquid.   
Root mean standard errors (RMSE) are plotted for the total sample and then for each quintile.   
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